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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes evidence that the PT’s electoral base has changed over time, posits that the 
Bolsa Família social welfare program and a 2005 corruption scandal worked together to 
produce the shift, if it happened, and uses municipal-level data to test a model of voter support 
for PT candidates in congressional races. It also considers whether the Bolsa program is subject 
to clientelistic interference. Results suggest that the Bolsa program does increase voter support 
for the PT at the municipal level, and that this effect has grown larger as the average benefit 
payment has increased. The provision of conditional benefits to Brazil’s poorest citizens has 
firmly entrenched a pro-poor discourse likely to remain the norm for the foreseeable future.       
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Preface 
In January of 2009, I had lunch at an acquaintance’s home in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The 
home was in the neighborhood, bairro, of Santa Maria, just a few blocks from the seamless 
boundary between Belo, as the city is often called, and Contagem, the city’s principal suburb. It 
was a nicer house than most, with a spacious ground floor, a spotless bathroom whose shower 
was enclosed in glass—in Brazil this is called a box—and a not-too-small backyard. Like most of 
Belo’s bairros, Santa Maria is defined by a steep hill, and this house sat near the top. From the 
dining room’s spacious window, we could see the mall where a Wal-Mart had recently opened, 
an expressway, and rising beyond, the neighborhood of Cabana do Pai Tomas, the slum where I 
spent my afternoons. 
  My companion (for that is what an LDS missionary calls the person with whom he has 
been assigned to spend all his time) and I had been invited by the older couple who lived in the 
house, but we had, to that point, only met the churchgoing wife. Danilo, whom we met that 
afternoon, was a gregarious, skinny man who coughed almost as soon as he met us. “I’ve already 
stopped smoking, Elders,” he assured us. It took only a few minutes for the subject to turn to 
politics. At the time, I knew nothing about what was going on in the country where I had resided 
for about four months. Our host quickly satisfied my curiosity by exclaiming that Lula, by which 
he meant then-President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, was “a lazy good-for-nothing.”  
“The president? Lazy? Didn’t he have to work hard to get elected?” I asked 
“Do you know why they call him Lula?” 
I did not, nor did I know then that lula is the Portuguese word for “squid.” 
“Because years ago, he didn’t want to work. So he cut off his finger to go on disability. 
When he holds up his hand you’ll see he only has nine fingers. That’s why they call him ‘Lula’.” 
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The conversation that followed was my introduction to contemporary Brazilian politics. I 
quickly placed my host somewhere on the political Right. While I knew very little, there was one 
government initiative with which I was familiar, one advertised on billboards and TV, that 
seemed to provide welfare benefits to poor families. The program was called Bolsa Família, 
something that translated in my then-limited Portuguese as “family bag.” It seemed like a decent, 
necessary response to the concentrated poverty I saw in Cabana each day.  
Now, looking out at that slum, Danilo explained that Lula won because he had purchased 
the votes of the poor. Bolsa Família, he explained, was a bribe. Like the disability payments that 
let Lula be lazy during his ascent to the presidency, the Bolsa paid for poor men to go on 
benders. “There are,” Danilo explained, “sheds where men go when they receive their Bolsa 
checks. They buy bottles of cachaça and drink until they pass out. They can sleep in the shed and 
drink until their money runs out. Then they have to leave until the next Bolsa check comes.” I 
was struck by how much his words resembled anti-welfare rhetoric in the United States.  
My conversation with Danilo sparked a persistent interest in Brazilian politics, and led 
me to wonder about the Bolsa program in particular. Were there really flophouses where 
beneficiaries drank away their money? How could someone who saw Cabana each day through 
his window think so poorly of the people who lived there? Was the program helping Brazil’s 
poor? And, most interesting to me, did the Bolsa get Lula reelected? In the year that followed I 
tried to learn as much about the program and country as my limited access to news would allow.  
This thesis is the culmination of a longstanding curiosity that began with a fascinating 
conversation.  
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Introduction 
Between 2002 and 2010, Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT) won three presidential elections 
and twice took the largest number of seats in the country’s lower congressional house. Luis 
Inácio Lula da Silva, a longtime PT leader, left the presidency at the end of his second term in 
2010 with an approval rating of about 83 percent, perhaps the highest ever attained by the head 
of a free democracy.  
In late 2005, it was unclear whether President Lula would win reelection. His chief of 
staff, a longtime co-partisan, had been forced from office after an investigation revealed he had 
been systematically buying the votes of allies in the congress. As lurid tales of money in 
suitcases hit the press and the investigation widened, critics wondered how long it would be 
before the accusations reached the president.   
Forty officials from the government, the legislature, and the top ranks of the PT were 
revealed to have operated a large money-laundering and legislative vote-buying scheme. 
Although the president was never named as a co-conspirator, many believed that extensive, 
negative press coverage over weeks of congressional hearings would ensure his defeat in the 
general elections. When Lula won the race (with 48 percent of the votes in the first round, two 
percent more than he had managed in the first round of the 2002 election), commentators 
suggested that the Bolsa Família,
1
 a welfare program that reached almost a quarter of Brazil’s 
population, had turned the electorate in Lula’s favor (Leali, Interview Aug 2011). The most 
cynical (and most anti-PT) commentators argued that Lula had purchased the votes of the poor.  
Most members of the educated class felt that ordinary Brazilian voters simply did not 
care about corruption, or were not aware of the allegations. Whether or not the voters in question 
                                               
1 “Family Grant” 
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were believed to be ignorant, the conversation was nearly always predicated on the idea that Lula 
could not have won without the Bolsa. These initial responses stemmed from the map of the 
electoral results. Just as much was made of the “red-blue” divide following the 2004 presidential 
election in the United States, the map of Brazilian electoral results fueled widespread speculation 
that social class, and its relationship with social policy, had been the most important factor. The 
map shows a distinct regional divide between support for Lula and Geraldo Alckmin, his 
opponent from the more conservative Social Democracy Party. Underlying that regional divide 
are longstanding class differences: the arid states of northeastern Brazil have long been the least-
developed, and now hold the majority of Bolsa beneficiaries. Poverty and the government’s 
policies toward poor voters provided the foundation for a parsimonious explanation of the 
regional divide. 
The program credited with turning the tide and creating a regional divide in PT support 
was a program that provided money to poor families if they complied with certain behavior 
conditionalities. The first version of the program, called the Bolsa Escola
2
 was an initiative of 
Lula’s predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Under Lula, social policy had become the 
federal government’s primary policy focus, and the school grant program had expanded from a 
                                               
2 “School Grant” 
Figure 1.1 State-level Presidential Election Results, 2006 
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few tens of thousands of families to millions across Brazil. Because of their divergent sizes and 
different goals, Bolsa Família and the Cardoso-era School Grant cannot be considered the same 
program, even though Cardoso’s PSDB party now claims that the Bolsa Família was its 
invention.  
Bolsa Família began in 2004, and by 2006, it reached just under 11 million people 
(IPEA; Lindert 2007). The program’s large scope provided a convenient, parsimonious 
explanation of Lula’s reelection geography. Indeed, there is strong evidence that being a Bolsa 
beneficiary increases the likelihood that a voter chose president Lula in 2006, and voted for his 
successor, Dilma Rousseff, in 2010. But in the same year that Lula won reelection, his party lost 
seats. The PT received two million fewer votes in 2006 than in 2002. Some voters, it seemed, 
were unhappy with the party for its role in the scandal, and chose not to vote for it.  
Accepting the hypothesis that the Bolsa program accounts for Lula’s success in 2006 
leaves the tricky question of why the program helped him but not his party. This paper attempts 
to discern, in the patterns of PT voting over time, profiles of PT voters, the details of the scandal, 
and the relationship between candidates and parties, a compelling description of and explanation 
for the divergence between the PT and its presidential candidates. It explores two questions: 1) 
whether, and 2) why, the PT has not reaped electoral benefits at the congressional level from the 
Bolsa program even as it helped the party’s presidential candidates. As it questions the electoral 
impact of the program, it also considers whether that electoral impact is, as the causal story 
implies, the result of the Bolsa’s being a tool of clientelistic exchange. The paper also explores 
how the program’s impact has changed over time.  
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Outline 
The first chapter explains how the Bolsa program works and where it came from. It 
touches on Brazil’s long history of clientelistic politics, and argues that the program is free of 
political interference. Finally, it explores how insulated bureaucracies arise in chaotic political 
atmospheres.  
In the second chapter, the paper discuss national election trends in greater detail. The 
chapter includes an overview on the unique role of the PT in Brazil’s constantly-changing party 
system, and considers the literature on the Bolsa program’s possible electoral effects.  
The third chapter gives a detailed account of the 2005 corruption scandal. It tracks the 
relationship of public opinion and corruption allegations, and looks at the consequences for the 
lawmakers involved. It then considers the relative importance of regional voting blocs in the PT.  
The fourth chapter develops a model of the Bolsa’s effects on the PT’s municipal-level 
vote share. The chapter compares a model that emphasizes the Bolsa’s pocketbook consequences 
with a model that attempts to capture the program’s primary and secondary impact. It then 
considers why the Bolsa program may have mattered more in 2010 than it did in 2006, and 
examines possible reasons for regional disparities in the Bolsa’s electoral effects.  
A final conclusion assesses how the Bolsa has changed the way Brazilians talk about 
social welfare, and considers what lessons the results might hold for other countries interested in 
imitating the Bolsa program.  
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The Bolsa program in context 
Introduction 
To understand the political consequences of a major policy initiative, it is necessary to 
understand what that policy does. This chapter explains the poverty-fighting paradigm the Bolsa 
follows, discusses the program’s gradual expansion from a municipal-level program in a handful 
of major cities to the signature policy of the Lula administration, and uses this history to show 
that Bolsa Família is deeply connected to the PT. It then turn to concerns about clientelism 
stemming from Brazil’s history of creating national redistributive policies that became subject to 
clientelistic exchange. The final section shows in detail how the program’s design prevents 
abuse, maximizes its precision, and insulates its administrative bureaucracy from outside 
political pressure. The purpose of the chapter is to show why the Bolsa program exists, how 
effective it is as a welfare program, and the roots of criticisms leveled against it.    
What the Bolsa Is and How it works 
The Bolsa Família program is a conditional cash transfer welfare program. It gives 
money, rather than less-liquid benefits like food stamps, to poor households that meet certain 
eligibility criteria. The first of those criteria is a means test: only households with monthly 
incomes below a certain threshold are allowed to be added to the program rolls. The second set 
of criteria is compliance with certain behavior conditionalities. The main conditionality is a 
requirement that children living in beneficiary households must attend school 80 percent of the 
time. A second conditionality requires that beneficiary children visit health clinics on a regular 
basis to receive health check-ups, dental care, and vaccinations.  
As of this writing, the Bolsa Família program reaches approximately 52 million 
Brazilians in 13.4 million beneficiary households, or about one-fourth of the country’s total 
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population (IPEA). Program benefits vary between 22 and 200 reais
3
 each month, and may be 
available to any family with a monthly per capita income below R$140 (MDS). Because of its 
large scope, the program has been the subject of intense scrutiny by scholars interested in the 
program’s effectiveness as a poverty reduction instrument, the efficiency of the ministry that 
runs it, the effect of the program on economic and personal development, and its role in national 
politics. It is not the first conditional cash transfer (CCT) program to focus on health and 
education outcomes, but it is one of the most-studied.  
Soares (2011) writes that cash transfer programs like the Bolsa have a long history in 
Brazil. That history begins with President Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo of the 1930s, which 
imitated European social insurance schemes to develop a measure of social protection for urban 
industrial workers, most of whom were white and lived in the country’s more-developed 
southern regions. The system worked for the formally employed, but then, as today, thanks to 
Brazil’s strict labor regulations, millions of Brazilians were excluded from the formal labor 
market (Economist 10/3/2011). Rural agricultural workers, mostly black, mostly northeastern, 
and mostly poor, were in practice unable to receive benefits from the Vargas-era programs. In 
1971, the military regime began trying to address this gap by creating non-contributory pensions 
for the rural elderly.  
The 1988 constitution established a broadly targeted benefit meant for all poor elderly 
Brazilians. Called the “Continuous Benefit,”4 the program was a step towards the targeted 
benefit model in place today because it was meant specifically for the poor and paid a fixed 
benefit of one minimum monthly salary.  
                                               
3 The Brazilian Real (plural reais, pronounced “Hay-all” and “Hay-ayes,” respectively), abbreviated R$, has lately 
held steady at between $0.65 US and $0.5 US, or 1.6 reais to the dollar. In the discussion of historic social programs 
that follows, it is worth noting that in the 1990s, the Brazilian currency was worth much less in dollar terms.   
4 Benefício de Prestação Continuada 
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The PT’s relationship with cash transfer programs at the national level began in 1991, 
when Eduardo Suplicy, the first Workers’ Party member to be elected to the Federal Senate, 
began his term by presenting a bill calling for a “citizenship income,”5 in effect, a payment that 
would be given to each Brazilian to ensure that he or she had enough money to function as a 
citizen of the Brazilian republic (Soares, Amaral, Britto Interviews August 2011; Soares 2011). 
Although the benefit was limited in scope and never came to a vote in congress, many credit 
Suplicy’s introduction of the bill as a moment that guided Brazilian social policy in the years to 
come. Following Suplicy, officials of the left and center-left developed programs that provided 
minimum incomes to the poor of the cities they administered.  
Cash transfer programs with explicit conditionalities arose almost simultaneously in three 
Brazilian cities in 1995. Campinas and Ribeirão Preto—both large cities in São Paulo state—and 
the Federal District (the administrative region that includes Brasília) created programs that 
offered benefits to families with children less than 15 years old who attended school on a regular 
basis. The following year, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Social Democracy Party 
(PSDB) administration developed a program designed to combat child labor by paying families 
who sent their children to school instead of having them work.
6
 That benefit was targeted at 
families whose children were believed to be especially at risk of working in dangerous jobs like 
harvesting sugarcane and producing charcoal by burning wood. Throughout the late 1990s, other 
municipalities around Brazil developed programs that gave cash benefits to poor families who 
sent their children to school (Lavinas 1998). All of them were designed to break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty by creating incentives for children to attend school.  
                                               
5 Renda da cidadania 
6 Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil, the “program for the eradication of child labor” 
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As conditional benefits programs spread across the country, the Cardoso administration 
agreed to support them by paying 50 percent of their costs through the Child Citizen Fund
7
 
program. They renamed this program Bolsa Escola Federal, “federal school allowance,” in 2001, 
and expanded it to reach most children between the ages of six and 15 who attended school 85 
percent of the time and came from families with monthly household incomes below 90 reais. It 
provided R$15 per child up to three children, and was run by the Ministry of Education. 
In the same year, the health ministry developed a “food allowance,” Bolsa Alimentação, 
which used the same eligibility criteria and disbursed the same benefits as Bolsa Escola, with the 
added requirement that children younger than six years receive vaccines and expectant mothers 
receive prenatal exams.  
When Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office in 2002, he inaugurated a large scale hunger 
eradication effort under the name “Zero Hunger,” which began with the addition of the Cartão 
Alimentação food card program to the existing stable of cash transfers. This program, modeled 
on US food stamps, simply gave R$50 each month to poor families via a card that could only be 
used to purchase food.  
At this point, three federal programs and approximately 30 state and local programs 
provided cash benefits attached to behavioral conditionalities, and two others (the food card 
program and a cooking-gas allowance) provided cash benefits to all poor families (Soares 2011). 
Three federal ministries divided responsibility for the various programs at the national level, 
making it possible for some families to receive benefits from all of the programs even as equally 
needy families in other areas slipped through the cracks and received nothing. To increase the 
efficiency of its antipoverty campaign, the Lula administration decided to consolidate the 
                                               
7 Bolsa Criança Cidadã 
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programs under the newly created Ministry for Social Development and the Fight Against 
Hunger (MDS) in 2003.
8
  
Creating MDS as a cabinet ministry showed that “Zero Hunger” and the consolidation of 
existing CCT programs into one large CCT was the administration’s top domestic priority. This 
consolidation produced the program now called Bolsa Família. The MDS subdivision 
responsible for the Bolsa Família is called the National Citizenship Income Secretariat 
(SENARC), a name meant to remind its functionaries and the public of the program’s connection 
to Eduardo Suplicy’s original calls for a national basic income (Britto, Interview August 2011).  
Bureaucrats at SENARC combined the beneficiary rolls of existing federal and non-
federal transfer programs into a database called the Single Registry
9
 and handed off 
administration of benefits payment to Caixa, a federally-owned commercial and development 
bank with millions of depositors and a long connection to government social programs (Lindert 
et al 2007).  
Enrollment of beneficiaries is decentralized, carried out by employees of municipal 
governments rather than by the MDS. Once a family is on the rolls, the registered head of 
household for purposes of the program (usually a woman) receives an electronic bank card from 
the Bolsa Família program that can be used to withdraw benefit payments from Caixa-affiliated 
ATMs found in most Brazilian communities. Thus, the processing of payments is done through 
an institution that already has the capacity to process large financial transactions, while 
enrollment happens either through having been on the beneficiary rolls of predecessor programs 
or from contact with a municipal employee. This reliance on existing infrastructure was the 
primary reason Bolsa Família was able to scale up very quickly, reaching its initial target of 11.2 
                                               
8 Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome 
9 Cadastro Único 
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million beneficiary families in 2006—just three years after the program began. The centralizing 
of existing records, and the opportunity it provides to collaborate with other government 
ministries, especially the offices of the Controller General and the national tax courts, has made 
it much easier for the MDS to identify the poor, detect potential fraud, and get benefits to 
beneficiaries.  
Targeting 
One of the most important topics of the development literature on CCTs concerns 
“targeting,” the accuracy with which the system is able to identify people who should be 
beneficiaries and deliver benefits only to those who are eligible. (The presence of people on the 
transfer rolls who are ineligible is called “leakage.”) Effective targeting becomes more difficult 
as programs expand. With an estimated 46 million beneficiaries in over eleven million 
households, the Bolsa program faces enormous targeting challenges. Those challenges are 
further complicated by the fact that many of those who most need the program, the poorest of the 
poor, live far from urban centers. They may lack access to sources that inform them to seek 
benefits, and may not have access to transportation that would facilitate registration for the 
program or withdrawal of the benefit payments.
10
  
One response to this ongoing challenge has been to decentralize registration, so that 
officials designated by municipal governments carry out the task of finding eligible people and 
registering them for the program. MDS pays part of the cost of dedicating municipal personnel to 
this task. A set of performance targets and bonuses provides incentives for cities to find and 
register eligible beneficiaries; the targets are related to how closely the number of registered 
                                               
10 In some isolated communities, beneficiaries cooperate with each other to withdraw benefits at distant Caixa 
branches, taking turns traveling to larger communities with several families’ benefit cards and returning with the 
cash (Britto Interview, Aug 2011).  
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families matches the ministry’s estimate of the number of eligible people within the 
municipality.  
Prospective registrants are interviewed by social workers or other city government 
officials, who assist them in filling out a registration application. These municipal workers then 
enter the household’s information into the MDS Single Registry database. Eligible families are 
entered into the list of beneficiary recipients or added to a second list of people who are eligible 
but not receiving benefits. Because the program’s budget and benefits structure are set by 
Congress, there is a hard limit on the number of people MDS is allowed to add to the rolls. When 
the Bolsa program was first set up, that limit was set to correspond with the National Household 
Survey’s11 estimate of the number of people living in households with per capita monthly income 
below the eligibility threshold. Because this target value is a real cap on the number of people 
who can be enrolled, it is possible for the program rolls to fill up before every eligible family can 
be included. Thus, there is a group of people known to the MDS and registered in the Single 
Registry database who are not receiving payments. They are added as other families become 
ineligible or Congress expands the target number of beneficiaries.  
Application forms are prepared by social workers, and include information about the 
family’s domestic situation, income, and possessions. MDS checks applications against tax 
returns to minimize the number of ineligible people on the rolls. Because Brazil has a large 
informal labor market (partly the result of stringent labor market regulations),
12
 the social worker 
                                               
11 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra Domiciliar – PNAD, a study of family income, housing conditions, and 
employment run by the Brazilian census bureau, the IBGE. 
12 Businesses in Brazil must comply with an unusually comprehensive and puzzling set of labor laws which make 
hiring a burdensome process that exposes  employers to a great deal of liability. Labor courts do not recognize many 
forms of just cause for firing and usually side with former employees. Persons seeking formal employment must 
produce notarized proof of former employment. People with insufficient documentation lack access to the formal 
sector to such a degree that social service programs often include efforts to help people put their documentation in 
order. These complications discourage formal hiring. (Soares, Interview August 2011; Economist 3/10/2011; Folha 
de S. Paulo 12/25/2005).  
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interview is essential to ensuring that families with modest informal-sector incomes (who might 
own homes or cars out of reach of a Bolsa-eligible income) but tiny official incomes are not put 
on the rolls.   
Goals 
At the broadest conceptual level, the Bolsa Família program is intended to help the 
poorest Brazilians meet their basic survival needs while incentivizing behaviors likely to have a 
positive impact on children’s lives over the long term. The institutions through which the 
program is mediated were created to maximize poverty reduction and facilitate the monitoring of 
compliance across Brazil. Combining municipal-level reporting with national oversight 
minimizes labor costs, ensures that people with local knowledge are carrying out the targeting 
process, and reduces opportunities for fraud (Lindert 2006). A set of performance targets tied to 
the speed with which cities register eligible families and carry out biennial reviews of the 
program rolls give local governments incentives to keep their records up to date.  
Does the Bolsa Reduce Poverty? 
The Bolsa Família is the largest program of its type in the world (Lindert et al. 2007). 
Conditional cash transfer programs are popular with development economists today, and the 
apparent success of programs like Progresa in Mexico (now named Oportunidades) has fueled a 
growing body of research into such programs’ effects. Three questions underlie most analyses of 
conditional cash-transfer programs: how well do they work? how can their success or failure be 
measured? and to what degree should the benefits be thought of as universalistic, that is, how 
strict should administrators be about removing from the rolls families that fail to comply with the 
behavioral conditionalities? Critics who believe in enforcing compliance tend to see CCT 
programs as privileges tied to good behavior, while the universalistic school sees the 
conditionalities as a helpful encouragement that should only sometimes be enforced. In this 
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view, noncompliance with health and educational conditionalities is a sign that poverty has 
reduced the targeted individuals’ ability to function as citizens (Medeiros et al. 2007; Soares et 
al. 2010). 
 A fourth question, how do these programs influence the political behavior of recipients? 
is addressed tangentially in the development literature and more directly in papers by political 
economists.  
Kathy Lindert, head of a World Bank working group on Brazilian social policy, has 
written several reviews of the Bolsa program and its evolution, along with papers that touch on 
its political consequences, the program’s reception in the press, and a meta-review of the 
program’s impact (Lindert 2005; 2006; Lindert et al. 2007; Lindert and Vincensini 2010). Her 
detailed analysis has shaped most of the political science literature on the program, which tends 
to agree with her conclusion that the program is well-run, effective, and relatively free of 
political interference.  
Lindert’s analysis begins with the broadest fact of Brazil’s fight against poverty: at a time 
when in most of the developed world, the richest tier began pulling away from lower strata at 
record rates, the level of income inequality in Brazil has declined since the mid-2000s. The 
country’s Gini coefficient of income inequality fell from 0.60, its average level since the mid-
1970s, to 0.54 in 2009 (Lindert 2007; World Bank 2010). While that score is higher than most 
OECD countries, it is lower than the level of inequality recorded in Italy, the most unequal of 
OECD countries, in the mid-2000s. Paes de Barros (2005) uses the results of the 2004 National 
Household Study to show that 20-25 percent of the fall in Brazil’s Gini coefficient could be 
explained by the effects of the Bolsa and other cash-transfer programs in effect. Soares et al 
(2010) attribute 21 percent of the decline in inequality directly to the Bolsa, and note that this is 
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an impressive result for a program that consumes only 0.5 percent of total government income. 
Such large gains are possible from a relatively small program because beneficiaries are 
extremely poor—Bolsa transfers, which average out to around $80 US per family each month, 
provide about 10 percent of the total income of the poorest five percent of Brazilians. The 
flattening of the income distribution was, in other words, largely caused by an increase in the real 
incomes of the poorest stratum. In these early analyses, the Bolsa program seemed to be 
achieving its aims. Overall, the percentage of Brazilians living in poverty fell from 36 percent in 
2003 to 22 percent in 2009. Even in a period of dramatic economic growth, the effects of the 
Bolsa program are observable and appear to have played an important role.  
Soares et al. (2010) look at the Bolsa program in comparison to similar programs in other 
Latin American countries. They find that the Bolsa Família differs from its counterparts in using 
self-reported income to determine eligibility, guaranteeing a minimum benefit to the extremely 
poor regardless of compliance with conditionalities, and operating through a decentralized 
application and monitoring process. They conclude that the Bolsa program has chosen to 
emphasize poverty alleviation over compliance—a marked contrast to the approach used by the 
Mexican Progresa / Oportunidades program, where a child’s failure to attend school results in 
his or her family’s quick, permanent removal from the program rolls. MDS’s policies suggest 
that the agency believes that exclusion error (failure to provide benefits to an eligible family) is a 
more serious problem than inclusion error (provision of benefits to an ineligible family). In 
general, decreased inclusion error comes at the cost of increased exclusion error. Steps taken to 
prevent ineligible families from receiving benefits also increase the chance that eligible families 
will be mistakenly excluded. Despite this emphasis on reaching as many people as possible, 
Coady et al. (2004) find that the Bolsa program is among the ten best-targeted CCTs in the 
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world—an impressive place given that the Bolsa is the largest of the 122 CCT programs they 
study.  
Even though the MDS has generally emphasized inclusion over compliance, it manages 
to monitor educational compliance (child school attendance) for 85 percent of beneficiary 
families (about one-third of the total school-age population) in 2008. Monitoring of health 
compliance has been less successful; only 59 percent of beneficiary families were being 
monitored for compliance with health conditionalities like yearly checkups and vaccinations in 
2008 (Soares 2011).  
The differences in compliance monitoring have produced predictable outcomes in child 
education and healthcare. Soares et al. (2010) find that the Bolsa has a “clear, positive impact on 
school attendance.” Children in Bolsa beneficiary families are 3.6 percent less likely to have 
been absent from school in the previous month, and 1.6 percent less likely to have dropped out of 
school than children in non-beneficiary families. Interestingly, beneficiary children are four 
percent less likely to advance in school. Similarly the program increased knowledge about the 
need to access public health services and receive vaccinations, but produced no noticeable 
increase in the number of child vaccinations. These last two findings suggest that, while the 
Bolsa has been effective in getting children into school and raising awareness of child health 
needs, the educational system does not provide enough support to the poorest children to 
improve educational outcomes, and the public health system may be failing to make vaccinations 
available in the poorest areas.  
The overall picture these evaluations present is of a program that is very effective in 
producing the behaviors it specifically rewards and monitors, but fails to achieve goals whose 
fulfillment depends in part on the performance of parts of the government not directly tied to the 
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program’s administration. Bolsa has succeeded in increasing demand for education and health 
services, but the ministries responsible for providing those services have failed to meet that 
demand.  
The Bolsa in the Press and the Public 
When the Bolsa program was first announced, it was the subject of intense commentary. 
Critiques of the plans generally focused on three areas: whether the program was likely to be 
effective as a poverty fighting tool, whether it was a partisan effort to “buy” the votes of the 
poor, and whether it was an appropriate use of public funds.  
Kerstenetsky (2009) provides an analysis of Brazilian media coverage around the Bolsa 
program. She notes that a great deal of coverage, especially on nightly news programs, focused 
on instances where an ineligible family had managed to get on the rolls. The tone of the coverage 
was similar to 1970s reporting on welfare fraud in the United States, embodied in Ronald 
Reagan’s famous anecdote about a Chicago woman defrauding the federal government of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. As discussed above, MDS administrators had ways of 
estimating how often benefits would be given to the wrong families, and while safeguards were 
in place to prevent fraud, they were well aware that a non-trivial number of ineligible people 
would receive benefits. How that number might be reduced remains one of the primary focuses 
of the program evaluation literature (vide Lindert et al. 2007; Hall 2006). This often-sensational 
reporting played on stereotypes about the poor (that they are lazy) and the government (that it is 
hopelessly incompetent and corrupt) that should be familiar to American readers (Medeiros et al. 
2007).  
A second set of criticisms concerned whether money earmarked for Bolsa benefits might 
more beneficially be diverted to other pressing public needs. 
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 Other critiques came from those who said that the program was assistencialista, intended 
to make people dependent on the government for their source of income, rendering them indolent 
(a critique that resonated with religious leaders who opposed the program) or loyal to whoever 
was in power (Folha de S. Paulo 12/25/2005). One of the most vocal of these critics was, 
ironically, Cristovam Buarque, creator of the Bolsa Escola program in Brasília, who honed in on 
the lack of conditionality enforcement as proof that the program was intended solely as a sop to 
poor voters (Buarque 2005). Buarque’s critiques should be taken as examples of how concerns 
about assistencialismo were partisan rhetoric first and substantive policy critiques second—he 
notes that members of the PT had, in the mid-1990s, denounced the federal Bolsa Escola 
program as a “bolsa esmola,” or “handout allowance,” while he himself had first proposed the 
basic citizenship income that would have provided an automatic minimum salary to all 
Brazilians. At the heart of these critiques is a claim that the Bolsa is a clientelistic tool of the 
Lula government. They rely on appeals to preconceptions about how the poor will use money, 
and often come from lawmakers who had supported identical programs in the past, when it had 
been to their advantage. Buarque, it should be noted, had been the education minister under Lula 
in 2003 and 2004, but had been fired from the post and subsequently left the PT.   
Kerstenetsky (2009) rejects claims that the Bolsa is a partisan tool, following the 
conclusion of the World Bank evaluators: the program was decentralized and means-testing is 
done carefully and consistently, making it extremely difficult for ineligible families to remain on 
the rolls if they manage to enter them. She rejects arguments that the program is assistencialista 
because it has no negative effect on participation in the labor force (vide Soares 2011). Thus, the 
program is difficult to manipulate and makes people no less likely to seek out employment, 
rendering them neither idle nor dependent. The only opportunities for clientelistic behavior she 
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sees are at the local level, but the use of cross-checked databases makes even that kind of 
exchange an untenable one over the long term. Finally, budget restrictions on the program ensure 
that it has a hard ceiling of total beneficiaries and can only be expanded with congressional votes 
to increase funding, something the Congress might withhold from a PT-centric program.  
The process of cross-checking Bolsa rolls against other records is probably the most 
important institutional safeguard to protect against improper registration of ineligible 
beneficiaries, which in turn may help limit the degree to which local authorities feel they can 
manipulate the registration process to their own ends. Kerstenetsky’s suggestion that the cap on 
beneficiaries is a viable method of restricting the program’s scope and uses depends on the 
assumption that only the PT has a stake in continued or expanded funding of the Bolsa program. 
Because the Bolsa’s previous funding schemes passed a congress in which the PT controlled less 
than twenty percent of the seats, it is reasonable to assume that the program garnered support 
from other sections of congress. The fact that funding is congressionally controlled may actually 
provide an effective check against use of the program as a large-scale partisan clientelistic 
program. If the Bolsa program is intended to influence voting behavior, it is probably not 
producing gains solely for the PT. It could, however, be intended as a program to benefit the 
entire PT coalition, or all incumbent legislators.   
Brazilian Political Institutions and Clientelism 
Bolsa Família’s success has surprised many who study the country. A highly-effective, 
bureaucratically independent program that reaches 96 percent of the people it is intended to reach 
would be a success in any country. In Brazil, it seems unthinkable. A lively literature on 
Brazilian political institutions tends to describe its government as dysfunctional, corrupt, and full 
of programs hobbled by administrators seeking to engage in clientelistic exchange. These studies 
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reflect historical tendencies that justify Bolsa critics’ fears (and sometimes insistence) that the 
program is being run for electoral gain.  
Armijo, Faucher, and Dembinska (2006) declare that “numerous scholars judge Brazil’s 
political institutions to be almost paradigmatically poorly designed,” before calling the country’s 
success in reform since democratization “a puzzle” (759). Their criticisms draw on a tradition 
beginning with Linz’s (1994) claim that the combination of proportional representation and 
presidentialism leads to political instability. Kunicova and Ackerman (2005) argue that the same 
combination also leads to greater corruption; their conclusion reflects the same belief (again 
following Linz) that PR presidential systems are seriously flawed in many respects. Although 
Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) challenge that conclusion, noting that the regimes Linz 
discusses were flawed in ways that presidentialism could not account for, the sentiment has 
colored subsequent scholarship on Brazil. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999) 
describe a “feckless” Brazilian political atmosphere characterized by frequent party-switching, 
low party discipline, ideological fragmentation, and proliferating political parties. The Brazilian 
popular press often denounces systematic bribery at all levels of government (Folha de S. Paulo 
6/6/2005).  
Institutional studies of legislators’ incentives suggest that the Brazilian political system 
does not allow for effective governance. Ames argues that federal deputies spend most of their 
time pursuing pork-barrel resources to distribute to their backers and blames the open-list 
proportional representation electoral system for undermining party discipline (1995a; 1995b; 
2001). Deputies with local, concentrated constituencies must cultivate ties with municipal 
leaders and deliver pork, which often leads them to take positions quite different from that of the 
party. Because of the open-list system, candidates at the top of party lists can afford to dissent 
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from the party. Ames concludes that the electoral system makes it both possible and necessary 
for deputies to defect from their party’s positions. This in turn makes party affiliation a poor 
indicator of a legislator’s position on the Bolsa program.  
Shugart and Carey’s seminal study on “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote” (1995) 
finds that Brazil’s open-list PR system, in which voters cast their votes for either a party or an 
individual legislator (whose name or registration number they must enter manually), makes 
personal reputation extremely important in Brazilian elections. The authors predict that greater 
district magnitude under open-list PR will increase pork-barreling and constituency service 
activities on the part of deputies seeking reelection. Thus, the 70 federal deputies from São Paulo 
state are more likely to worry about access to pork-barrel resources, provision of prominent 
public goods, and constituency service than the three deputies from tiny Amapá. Persson and 
Tabellini delve into a similar question with their papers on the role of political institutions in 
shaping economic policy (1999; 2000). They find that presidential systems spend less, and 
predict that majoritarian institutions will decrease provision of public goods. The corollary that 
more proportional systems produce greater spending and increase provision of public goods is 
explored by Edwards and Thames (2007). They attempt to determine whether differences in 
spending and public goods provision are the result of institutional majoritarian-ness or incentives 
for cultivating a personal vote. Brazil, with its majoritarian presidency and PR electoral system, 
does not fit easily into the majoritarian-proportional schema used by these comparative political 
scientists and economists. It does, however, fall towards the personalist end of the personal vote 
spectrum. Edwards and Thames find that “in systems with significant incentives for personal 
votes, increases in district magnitude actually decrease both total and public good spending,” a 
result they say, of deputies’ increasing need to provide targeted pork-barrel resources to the 
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slices of the district electorate that keep them in  office (2). This result is consistent with Ames’ 
(1995b) finding that only deputies with concentrated urban support bases consistently support 
welfare. For such deputies, welfare is the good that keeps them in power. For deputies with 
statewide support, it is more important to provide pork to the powerful lobbies that provide the 
money necessary for a statewide campaign. Anderson (2011) notes that, when compared to 
democracies around the world, the sum of money required to successfully win a seat in the 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is second only to the amount necessary to win a seat in the US 
House of Representatives.  
Together, studies of Brazilian deputies suggest a group dependent on personalistic 
relationships with segments of the state electorate whom they court with pork-barrel spending. 
While that spending may come in the form of a public good, it could just as easily come in the 
form of more specific benefits to small groups of people, through which deputies cultivate an 
image of themselves as the champion of a particular region or, in the case of large cities, a sort of 
breadwinner for a group of neighborhoods. This kind of relationship resembles clientelistic 
exchange. 
Chang and Golden extend the personal vote paradigm specifically to clientelistic 
behavior, which they describe as an “illegal search for the personal vote” (2006). Using Italy’s 
pre-1994 open-list PR system as an example, they find that greater district magnitude encourages 
corruption under open-list PR, such that once the number of seats available in a district exceeds 
fifteen, corruption is even greater than under closed-list PR. While corruption is not the object of 
study here, clientelism may be a useful way to think about the relationship between Bolsa 
beneficiaries and their federal deputies. Deputies from large states may be more invested in 
associating themselves with particularistic federal government programs like Bolsa Família, 
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because deputies from places like São Paulo tend to rely on a few hundred thousand voters living 
in one part of the city, often drawing on people from one income stratum. Their counterparts in 
smaller states tend to draw on state-wide constituencies. If the big-state deputy’s support base is 
poorer, she has greater need to associate herself with particularistic social programs. 
To understand the Bolsa relationship through the lens of clientelism requires emphasizing 
the fact that deputies’ votes determine which demographic groups are eligible to receive Bolsa 
benefits and how much beneficiaries will receive. Although only MDS has the power to include 
or exclude a family from the program rolls, deputies could campaign on their support for 
expanding the Bolsa program by raising the eligibility threshold (which would appeal to people 
in the least-needy tier of the lower class) or increasing the per-family benefit (an appeal to those 
who are already receiving money from the program). In theory, legislators have some power to 
punish recalcitrant Bolsa beneficiaries by contracting the program; in practice, that has never 
been done, and, from a clientelisric standpoint, would not be an effective way to exert control 
over voting behavior.  
Policy Consequences of Brazilian Institutions  
There are reasons to think that personal vote incentives and other institutional factors 
promoting patronage-seeking behaviors can seriously reduce governmental effectiveness. Hicken 
and Simmons’s (2008) study of the policy consequences of personal vote incentives finds that, 
while party and personal vote systems spend similar amounts on education, education spending 
produces little improvement in literacy where the electoral system encourages cultivation of a 
personal vote. If one assumes that Hicken and Simmons’s finding holds for other types of 
spending targeted at the poor, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Bolsa Família’s well-
documented success is the result of the extent to which it bypasses Brazil’s elected officials. This 
33 
 
is the opinion of Fenwick (2009), who writes that the Bolsa’s success is due in large part to the 
federal government’s success in keeping the program from coming under the sway of state 
governors and other patronage-seeking officials. She also believes that the federal government’s 
increasing power to constrain subnational budgets has limited state officials’ ability to deliver 
pork of other kinds. With opportunities for state and municipal spending diminished, more 
personal benefits from government action are coming from federal programs. Though she does 
not address the question of voter support, Fenwick’s findings indicate that officials outside of the 
federal government have been unable to claim credit for delivering Bolsa—even if they are 
affiliated with the state branch of the Workers’ Party. Her finding raises an interesting pair of 
questions: does the Bolsa produce different benefits for politicians at different levels of 
government? And if it does, are electoral institutions or the program’s practices more 
responsible?  
There is deep mistrust of subnational officials in Fenwick’s work, and several authors 
have claimed that, historically, Brazil’s government has been compromised by excessively 
strong federalism. State budgets have traditionally been massive, and state officials have access 
to millions of dollars’ worth of pork that, in other countries, would come from the national 
government.  
One surprising consequence of this is Samuels’s (2003) finding that federal deputies 
often pursue careers at the state level, sometimes taking leaves of absence from their federal 
seats to occupy a position in a state ministry. Samuels argues that this phenomenon is a result of 
the president’s increasing willingness to use line-item veto power on budget proposals. Since 
1996, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso vetoed every pork-barrel amendment to the 
national budget, state ministries have been more effective pork-barrel resources than seats in the 
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National Congress. The Bolsa program is today one of the largest purely federal initiatives and, 
as such, may provide federal deputies with renewed abilities to claim (at least to their poorest 
constituents) that they have brought money to their districts. If it does, PT deputies and their 
allies would be the most likely to profit.   
An extensive literature treated later in this paper describes Brazilian legislators’ frequent 
party-switching and the low level of partisanship in the electorate that has resulted. There are 
some signs that the chaotic environment that characterized Brazilian legislators’ working world, 
and disconnected them from partisan identities, is slowly yielding to a more disciplined, 
organized party competition. Samuels (2003) and Figuereido and Limongi (2002) attribute that 
change to the president’s line-item veto power, along with the president’s ability to simply 
defund legislative initiatives he or she dislikes. In the meantime, state ministries, have ceased to 
be the political boondoggles they once were. After the state of Minas Gerais defaulted on $15 
billion of foreign debt, President Cardoso managed to bring state budgets under federal control. 
Still, Samuels’ finding that prospects for pork-barrel spending are better in state government 
reflects the continuing importance of the patronage-oriented exchange described in the personal 
vote literature. Even as the federal government gains greater control over national finances, 
federal deputies are less able to engage in the pork-barreling they believe voters expect. They are 
left with two choices: either attempt to associate themselves with federal programs that provide 
benefits to voters, or move into a state ministry from where they can continue doing business as 
usual.  
The literature on “broken” institutions treats incentives to secure pork as synonymous 
with the successful cultivation of personal political fiefs, and argues that these incentives allow 
(or force) legislators to break with their party. At the same time, these papers describe pork-
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dependence as a major constraint on legislator behavior. Thus, they paint a picture of a Brazilian 
deputy who is simultaneously dependent on pork (which he cannot get without party help) and 
independent of his or her party. These competing forces ensure that there will always be parties, 
but those parties will be in near-constant flux.  
Cox (2006) helpfully points out that the process of granting deputies distributive benefits 
as an incentive to vote for a bill is quite different from targeting benefits to constituents to 
influence electoral outcomes. Importantly, there is reason to think that as the power to grant 
distributive benefits to legislators becomes more concentrated, parties themselves will stabilize, 
in turn reducing incentives to cultivate a personal vote. Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi (2000; 
2002) find that party leaders have, over time, gained near-complete control of the legislative 
process by controlling when bills can be considered under urgency rules. They have begun using 
that power to enforce tighter party discipline. Cheibub et al.’s analysis of roll-call votes suggests 
that Brazilian parties are now highly-disciplined. More and more, Brazilian parties are beginning 
to resemble the institutionalized, programmatic organizations found in older democracies (Strom 
1990). Like politicians everywhere, they continue to have every incentive to claim credit for 
government initiatives they believe might be popular among their constituents.  
Hagopian (2009) analyzes the rise of disciplined, programmatic parties in Brazil, and 
finds that politicians are now willing to run programmatic campaigns, delegate authority to party 
leaders, and no longer switch parties. Samuels (2006) finds that party identification in the 
electorate has risen from 32.5 percent in 1995 to 42.6 percent in 2002, a level similar to that 
found in many countries with established democratic governments. He cautions, though, that 
much of that increase is due to rising support for the PT. Hagopian completes the picture with 
her finding that Rice Index scores of party discipline in Brazil’s National Congress rose from 62 
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to 80 between 1986 to 1999, with especially dramatic increases in the cohesiveness of the PSDB. 
The PT had long been highly disciplined (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Hagopian describes 
these changes as part of a broader shift away from delivering patronage goods to pursuing 
ideological programs. In her opinion, the shift means that party scholarship must focus less on 
the incentives (usually perverse) created by the electoral system, and work to better understand 
the incentives now pushing politicians towards party loyalty and programmatic appeals. In a 
wistfully-titled article, “They don’t make political machines like they used to,” Borges (2010) 
describes how the PT broke the back of the long-established Liberal Front Party (PFL, now 
“Democrats”) machine in the state of Bahia. The shift, which he believes was closely related to 
Bolsa Família, meant that “traditional” conceptions of Brazilian politics as “clientelistic” and 
“anti-Republican” no longer fit the current reality (186). Since the pioneering work of Ames in 
the 1990s, Brazil has improved from a country of chaotic, patronage-oriented parties to one with 
institutionalized, disciplined national parties able to control their state-level subsidiaries. As 
parties have become more subject to central control, so too have the institutions of the executive. 
An effective, politically independent Bolsa program is possible only in a context that no longer 
rewards parties for purely clientelistic strategies. With fewer incentives to engage in clientelistic 
behavior, politicians are less likely to pressure the Ministry of Social Development to grant 
special benefits to certain regions.  
Is the Bolsa Família Clientelism? 
Despite the decreasing pressures on Brazilian lawmakers to create clientelistic programs, 
fears persist that the Bolsa is a large-scale clientelistic program. At the center of those fears is the 
fact the program provides individual benefits—a hallmark of clientelism.  
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Zucco (2011) argues that the Bolsa occupies a middle ground between programmatic 
redistribution and clientelism as they are traditionally conceptualized. In the former, benefits are 
given universally according to eligibility criteria, in the latter, benefits are individual in nature 
and given as a reward or incentive for certain political behavior. One of the primary ways of 
distinguishing between the two is to examine whether the good provided was a public good 
(available to all, like a road) or a private good (such as a cash payment). Bolsa Família blurs the 
line by providing private goods according to universal, objective criteria.  
One of the keys to clientelistic exchange is a mechanism for monitoring the behavior of 
the clients. In some regimes, that takes the form of outright interference at the ballot box, or 
through voting targets set for local leaders by officials at higher levels (Remmer 1993; Calvo and 
Murillo 2004). In more democratic regimes, monitoring may occur through politicized friend 
networks (Stokes 2005). Zucco notes that regardless of how monitoring is done, it must take 
place for a relationship to be considered clientelistic. Vote-monitoring, however, is not a fixture 
of Brazilian political life today (though it once was, vide Leal 1948), and there is nothing in the 
Bolsa program’s design that makes it possible for benefits to be removed if beneficiaries are 
suspected of partisan disloyalty. Because the program lacks a mechanism for monitoring partisan 
behavior, and provides benefits according to universal, objective criteria, it should be thought of 
as being intended to provide a programmatic benefit.  
Bolsa Compared and Past Policies 
Hall (2006) places the Bolsa program in comparative context, noting that Mexico 
(Progresa / Oportunidades), Colombia (Familias en Acción), Chile (Subsidio Unitario 
Familiar), Nicaragua (Red de Proteccion Social), Argentina (Jefes de Hogar), and Ecuador 
(Bono de Desarrollo Humano) had all experimented with CCT programs. The goal of these 
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programs was always to fuel national development by expanding human capital. Underpinning 
these programs was a belief that a focus on children’s health and education could break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty. CCTs were a way to deal with the fact that “supply-side” 
spending on social goods—expenditures on schools and hospitals—did not always create public 
goods that the poor could reach. Hall notes that the World Bank sees this “demand-side” 
approach as less clientelistic, and believes that the provision of cash is both simpler and avoids 
creating distortions that sometimes result from provision of specific, illiquid items.  
Brazil has long spent a large share of its government resources on social programs. Hall 
(2006) finds that direct social spending equals about 14 percent of GDP. But 44 percent of all 
Brazilian government social spending goes to pensions, leaving just over half for education, 
healthcare, social security, and welfare programs. In Hall’s reading, Zero Hunger was a way for 
the Lula administration to show that it was more serious about fighting poverty than its 
predecessors: “Fome Zero was underpinned by a clear and vociferous political commitment to 
benefit the very poorest sectors of Brazilian society” (695).  
That political commitment has given many authors pause. Hall (2006) recalls that a 
federal food basket program run from 1993-2000 usually distributed about 15 million packages 
per year, but distributed twice as many during 1998, when President Cardoso was seeking 
reelection. Hall suggests that the Bolsa, and the predecessor food card program, avoided this 
problem by using electronic payment systems to bypass local interests, something that Fenwick 
(2009) applauds. Hall cautions that there still exist opportunities for mayors and other municipal 
authorities to use their role in the registration process to set up patron-client relationships with 
potential beneficiaries. This is why Hall argues that cities in which Bolsa registration passed 
through the mayor’s office (rather than through other municipal departments) were more prone 
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to clientelistic behaviors involving the Bolsa. Then again, Lindert et al. (2007) indicates that 
mayor’s offices only handled Bolsa registration in municipalities where the social services and 
education departments were too understaffed to carry out registration. The “clientelism” Hall 
finds, measured by the presence of ineligible people on the rolls, was just as likely the result of 
understaffing. Catching clientelistic (or at least inappropriate) manipulation of the Bolsa would 
be fairly easy for the MDS, which has access to tax records and the registration forms, but is very 
difficult for outside observers. Outside studies that try to discern self-interested action in cases of 
poor targeting have no way to reliably discern between malicious action and the debilitating 
effects of serious material constraints on municipal capacity.  
Some local officials did attempt to use the Bolsa program for direct electoral gains. The 
Folha de S. Paulo reported that the mayor of Teófilo Otoni, a city of about 125,000 people in 
eastern Minas Gerais, told a meeting of PT party leaders and state governors that she had 
directed city officials to identify beneficiaries of both the Bolsa program and a separate rural 
electricity-provision initiative called “Light For All” (Recondo 2006). The beneficiaries were 
sent a card on municipal letterhead which, according to the paper, stated “that these initiatives 
were the responsibility of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.” The express goal of these notes, 
according to the mayor, was to increase support for the president and his party among the city’s 
poorest voters. Such indirect appeals for voter support may have been successful: Lula received 
53 percent of the votes cast in 2002 in Teófilo Otoni, and 59 percent in 2006. That increase could 
have come from Bolsa beneficiaries or, just as likely, from other voters. These kinds of appeals 
do not appear to have been widespread. This story was the only one of its kind reported by the 
Folha. Importantly, such an appeal is not clientelistic, and, while it may reflect inappropriate use 
of public funds to engage in campaign activities, it is not out of the bounds of normal Brazilian 
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political discourse. Municipal, state, and federal governments all run regular television 
commercials portraying their programs and officials in a positive light. In this case, the attempts 
to attach a personal political identity to the Bolsa program went no further than to assign credit. 
Although the appeal is personalistic in attaching Lula’s identity to the program (on the implicit 
assumption that support for Lula would induce support for the PT), it is also programmatic in 
that it focuses on a policy.  
For some authors, whether the Bolsa program was a specifically targeted electoral tool is 
immaterial, because its effects were identical to the likely effects of a large-scale vote-buying 
effort. The most obvious of these effects would be a shifting of the PT’s electoral base. 
According to Hall, Lula became reliant on Northeastern, poor voters, and depended on the image 
he cultivated of being the “Father of the Poor.” Support for Lula was consistently higher among 
beneficiaries, and three-quarters of beneficiaries live in the Northeast, where one-third of 
households (44 percent of the region’s rural households) receive the benefit. This is why the 
regional divides on the presidential election map were so compelling for pundits: at the state 
level, the dependent Northeast seemed to go all-out for Lula.  
The Bolsa and Incumbency 
Throughout this chapter, the assumption has been that government programs provide 
electoral benefits to the official (and party) who made them happen. That assumption may 
overestimate voters’ ability to connect specific policies to individual legislators. Especially in the 
chaotic Brazilian environment, the electoral benefits of the Bolsa program might not go to PT 
legislators, but to incumbents or other officials who claim responsibility for the program. 
Evidence from comparative studies suggests that CCTs provide a meaningful boost to 
incumbents in other countries. In an early study of a CCT’s political effects, Manacorda, Miguel, 
and Vigorito (2009) find that beneficiaries of the PANES program in Uruguay are 25 to 33 
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percentage points more likely to support the incumbent Frente Amplio government than the 
previous government, which was not in power when PANES began. Because there was a large 
gap in political support between people near the income threshold who received the benefits, and 
those whose incomes were near the threshold but did not receive benefits, it is likely that 
PANES, rather than a more general incumbency effect, accounted for the Frente Amplio’s 
increased support among the poor. Like Bolsa Família, PANES was an attempt to reach most 
poverty-stricken people, rather than a purely political tool. Unlike Bolsa, PANES was a 
temporary measure in place from 2005 to 2007 meant to counteract an economic downturn. 
PANES recipients continued to support the government after the program ended, by about 20 
percentage points more than the national average. Using survey data, Manacorda et al. (2009) 
conclude that those nearest the center of the political spectrum were the most responsive to 
government transfers. Support, they believe, for Dixit and Londregan’s (1996) swing-voter 
model of the consequences of redistributive policies. Such a model would imply that many Bolsa 
beneficiaries who voted for the PT in 2006 had not done so in the past. 
Sewall (2008) notes that Mexico’s CCT program, Oportunidades (formerly Progresa), 
which reaches five million families, seems to have been used quite successfully for political gain. 
Beneficiaries were 11 percent more likely to vote for Felipe Calderon, the chosen successor to 
President Vicente Fox, who had established the program. These poor voters may have been 
decisive in the 2006 national election, which was decided by fewer than 250,000 votes. 
In Hall’s (2006) view, the Bolsa is a dangerous program over the long term because it is 
vulnerable to manipulation for electoral gain and opens the door for clientelistic policy design. 
But he qualifies his concern: “Of course, such dependence on of poorer classes on federal 
transfers has to be seen together with the massive reliance of the middle classes and former 
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public sector employees upon heavily subsidized state pensions, which consumes the lion’s share 
of Brazil’s social budget” (707). Hall’s point here is important—much of the Brazilian 
population derives some share of its income directly from the federal government. Including (as 
Hall fails to) the large elderly pension scheme, that percentage grows even further. Although the 
Bolsa program does extend an important income source to people who had not received federal 
support in the past, this broader context suggests the expansion of federal aid is a move toward 
equality in both absolute income and federal income support.  
At the Ministry of Social Development 
Whether the Bolsa program is corrupt, in terms of being subject to manipulation for 
political purposes, or in terms of having been created primarily for electoral gain, was a question 
I posed in each of my interviews. The most interesting response came from Aline Amaral, an 
official at SENARC, the office that administers Bolsa payments. Amaral is the coordinator for 
the Single Registry, a position that gives her a great deal of power over who enters the registry of 
eligible persons. Before working in the Social Development Ministry, she had worked in a 
Senate office, and her answer reflects experience working with politicians:  
Soderborg: Is there political interference in the Ministry [of Social 
Development]? 
Amaral: This secretariat particularly, which directs the Bolsa Família Single 
Registry really doesn’t have it. For me that was a surprise, because before 
I worked here I worked in the Senate.  
Soderborg: Have you ever been visited by, say, mayors or senators who tried to 
influence you? 
Amaral: I’ve met with some deputies and Senate staffers saying, “My city is 
receiving very little, I’d like an increase [in the number of Bolsa program 
beneficiaries]. Did you know that I support Lula? So we’d like to see an 
increase.” But as there are objective criteria, I don’t think this happens 
anymore. Because they already know that there is an estimate [of the 
correct number], and they know how that selection is made.  
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The exchange reveals several important things. First, those who have worked in politics 
in Brazil tend to expect political interference with bureaucracy, and they expect that interference 
to take the form of legislators pressuring bureaucrats to grant special favors to constituents. 
Amaral’s comment about being surprised by the MDS’s ability to withstand such interference is 
an encouraging sign that this important institution does not aid clientelistic exchange between 
elected officials and constituents. The comment also suggests that she knows firsthand that 
clientelism, and clientelistic pressure, are a common political tool. Critics are right to be worried 
that the MDS could be a tool of clientelistic exchange, because politicians seem to treat every 
government program as a tool for clientelistic exchange. Interestingly, the politicians seem to 
believe that they have a better chance at getting more funds—or believe they deserve them—
because of their relationship with Lula. At all levels, their thinking seems to be about direct 
exchange: an increased share of the Bolsa money is the logical payback for supporting Lula. And 
they seem to think that the people in MDS are susceptible to that appeal.  
Amaral: But here there is nothing of that kind of politics. Here, it’s very 
technical. Most of the team is drawn from career public servants, you 
know, like public policy specialists and public administration. The 
Secretary, which is the top position, he is a [trained] administrator. His 
second-in-command, he’s an administrator, the four directors general, 
they’re administrators. Now, these are all positions filled by appointment.  
Soderborg: How so? 
Amaral: For people who have passed civil service exams. Preferably people who 
have passed civil service exams, but not necessarily. . . . This 
administrative path, all of these are tied to [and placed in other ministries 
by] the planning ministry. Here there are many people from this career 
path.  
Amaral refers here to civil service exams, national competitions for government jobs that 
are used to fill most positions in the bureaucracy. Interestingly, even though the upper-level jobs 
inside SENARC are filled through executive appointments, nearly all of the people in the 
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positions come from areas of the government that are relevant to the work they do. Thus, despite 
being staffed with appointees, MDS is a technocratic place. It appears, however, that there is no 
formal requirement that MDS officials be technocrats, which means that an administration 
interested in using the ministry for pork-barreling or clientelistic exchange might be able to do 
so. Despite this, MDS officials did not seem concerned that the agency might become subject to 
external pressure through, for example, the appointment of a partisan department head interested 
in exploiting the program for patronage.    
One key to preventing abuse lies, according to Amaral’s and others’ analyses, in the 
formal eligibility criteria. These provide an easy way for bureaucrats to respond to the 
lawmakers from whom they experience pressure. Amaral says as much in the next excerpt, and 
also points to a limit on the degree of nakedly clientelistic behavior she has seen.   
Amaral: Now we’ve never had indications; I’ve never gotten “I want this family 
to receive benefits.” That’s never happened.  
Soderborg: Ok.  
Amaral: Now I’ve met with cities wanting increases like this; even today we have 
this, but in a much more formal way, one that’s also legal: “Look, this 
estimate doesn’t reflect reality. I need more openings here . . . I have more 
poor people than the estimate says.” Alright. 
Soderborg: What do you do after this? Do you take the initiative and look over 
the records? 
Amaral: We’ve never looked back over the records. We do the following: we look 
at how up-to-date the records are. If there are lots of registrations that 
haven’t been updated in more than two years, we tell them to update the 
records. We look at the number of revised registrations, do an audit, and 
usually the number is correct.  
Soderborg: You ask the mayor to update the records? 
Amaral: Exactly 
The distribution of responsibility thus protects SENARC and the Bolsa rolls from 
interference. In this exchange, Amaral is explaining that the usual cause of serious under-
enrollment in a city is the result of out-of-date registrations (beneficiaries must receive visits 
45 
 
from the registering body at least once every two years). If the mayor’s complaints are an 
attempt to increase their city’s Bolsa allocation above what it ought to be—rather than an honest 
complaint about eligible people failing to receive benefits—three technical hurdles make it 
difficult to pad the program rolls. First, the tax records of any household a city registers are 
reviewed before they are added to the list of eligible persons. This effectively keeps people with 
formal incomes above the threshold from joining the program. A mayor could encourage the 
workers who carry out registration to systematically understate families’ informal-sector 
incomes. In doing so, he or she might succeed in adding ineligible people to the rolls who would 
pass the tax check. Because municipal Bolsa allocations are actually derived from SENARC’s 
estimates of the level of poverty in the city, a large increase in registerations that brought the 
number of registrants far above the estimate would likely result in a SENARC audit. Finally, the 
actual value of allocations is limited by Congress, and those limits have led SENARC to 
establish municipal caps on Bolsa expenditures. Registrations in excess of this cap would be 
added to the list of eligible households, but would only receive benefits when existing 
beneficiaries exited the program or Congress expanded the program’s budget. The potential 
electoral benefits of systematically subverting the program at the municipal level are thus quite 
small. 
Although a few authors wondered whether mayors would attempt to manipulate 
registration for electoral advantage, this story is an important sign that the separation of 
registration from payment and the auditing process limit the power of local interests to affect the 
program’s deployment. At the same time, the technocrats in the national office are insulated from 
high-level political pressure, and can use the program’s well-known eligibility criteria to deflect 
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pressure from municipal-level officials. It is, after all, the city officials who are responsible for 
registering everyone who is eligible.  
Amaral: I think the success of the Bolsa Família is this: the process is shared. The 
ones who register [eligible families] don’t choose [who receives benefits]. 
The ones who define how many will receive [benefits] also, those are 
several institutions. When I first came here, I thought, “You must be 
joking, this will never work.” But it does. 
The combination of localized processing and national oversight achieves several things that 
make Bolsa Família the envy of other CCT programs (Lindert 2007). Administrative costs are 
low, penetration is high—local officials know where to find eligible families—and no one has 
the ability to add a family to the payment rolls without approval from someone else. In this 
system, there is little possibility for abuse. The technocratic bent of SENARC staffers makes it 
even harder to manipulate the system. Bolsa seems to be a well-functioning, rational 
bureaucracy, which raises the question of why (and how) the government decided to create a 
ministry that did not behave according to the usual patterns of governance in Brazil.   
Why It Works 
The answer lies in the program’s prominence. Because Bolsa Família is such an 
important part of the PT’s platform, any kind of scandal related to the program could do serious 
damage to the party. Political interference of the kind one might expect—manipulating the rolls 
to ensure that certain municipalities and certain individuals receive money—might help local 
officials and federal deputies win reelection. But if reporters managed to discover systematic bias 
in the program’s administration, the resulting costs to the party would likely be greater than the 
benefits a manipulated program would bring. Although this explains the executive’s interest in 
running the Bolsa with probity, Brazil’s history of corrupt institutions and perverse incentives 
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requires a more detailed answer for how this insulated bureaucracy managed to come out of the 
Brazilian Congress.  
In Politician’s Dilemma, Barbara Geddes develops a theory that accounts for the 
occasional existence of insulated bureaucracies in countries whose administrative institutions are 
known to be subject to near-constant political interference (1994). The dilemma of the title refers 
to her hypothesis that parties and candidates face different incentives when they consider using 
patronage. Candidates, Geddes argues, play one-shot games. If they lose an election, they no 
longer compete; if they win, they face different competition the next time around. There is little 
reason to eschew patronage because each election requires building coalitions around patronage 
exchange, but each election coalition will be different, depending on the identity and affiliation 
of each challenger. Parties, on the other hand, face an iterated game if they campaign on their 
own probity. For a party that campaigns on a reform platform, the costs of being involved in 
patronage scandals are great. After a scandal, any opponent, corrupt or not, could attack the 
reform party for failing to live up to its principles, and the reform party would no longer have 
access to the claim that it is uniquely honest. It would lose the thing that made it different. Thus 
reformist parties play an iterated game where they must weigh the benefits of patronage against 
the possibility that they will lose their distinguishing characteristic if their patronage activities 
become public knowledge. Because non-reformist parties do not attempt to convince electors 
that they are especially ethical, their incentives against patronage are weak, and resemble the 
single-game incentives of individual candidates.  
Geddes’s model sheds light on why the PT would choose to create an independent 
bureaucracy to administer the Bolsa program. The PT has a long reputation for honesty and good 
governance, an image that underlies many of their campaign appeals (Casado, Leali Interviews 
48 
 
Aug 2011). That image of administrative probity would make a scandal in government more 
damaging for the PT than it might be for other parties. Together with Bolsa’s place at the center 
of the party’s action plan, the need to protect the PT’s reputation ensures that MDS is 
technocratic and insulated from outside pressures.  
This way of thinking about the Bolsa masks the degree to which PT leaders probably 
believed that the program would redound to their benefit. If a scandal would be costly, but a 
well-run program could produce huge electoral benefits, the incentive to use the program for 
patronage all but disappears, regardless of a party’s reputation for honesty. Those benefits would 
accrue to the party in two ways. First, through individual voters who identify (perhaps after 
viewing campaign ads) the party and its candidates with the Bolsa benefits they receive. Second, 
through being able to claim that a major policy initiative was well-executed and effective, an 
appeal that works regardless of a party’s reputation (Stokes 2007).  
Although it appears the program is free from interference, Amaral’s account makes it 
clear that local politicians believed they could subvert the system to reap additional gains. 
Geddes describes the interplay between local and federal political officials in Brazil in a way that 
explains those municipal officials’ conduct while showing how federal officials expected to 
benefit from the creation of MDS and the Bolsa program: 
Local patronage is much more firmly tied to the center than it is in the United 
States because municipalities have very limited power to tax. Consequently, local 
leaders rely on the central (or state) government for virtually all important 
services. This centralization of decisions and resources means that election 
outcomes at the local level often depend on the success of local candidates in 
obtaining favors through the intervention of national legislators. In return for such 
intervention, local leaders are expected to turn out the vote for the legislator when 
the time comes (101). 
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Federal officials likely believed that local co-partisans would campaign on the Bolsa for them, 
crediting the federal deputies who voted for the program and the PT leaders who crafted the plan. 
Municipal leaders in turn had especially large incentives to increase the impact of the Bolsa 
program in their communities—something that they could take credit for through their role in 
administering the Bolsa at the local level. The resulting partisan gains would help incumbent 
federal officials and win the local politician credit from higher-ups who might in turn reward him 
with additional patronage money. Teófilo Otoni’s mayor was behaving in exactly this way.  
While Geddes focuses on reforms to election policies and corruption laws, her framework 
helps answer another question: why would politicians outside of the PT agree to a law that they 
expected might bring huge gains for that party? Certainly, they might have believed that being 
part of the PT’s ruling coalition ensured that they would be able to claim credit for the program 
just as the PT did. But given the level of volatility in electoral alliances (and the weakness of 
non-PT partisan attachments), the connection in voters’ minds between Bolsa and another party 
might not be strong at all. If Bolsa, even without political interference, might generate 
impressive gains for the PT, why did allied parties support it? Perhaps the policy appealed to 
them, and the technocratic aspects of the plan helped them stomach it—the MDS would not be 
the patronage arm of the PT. There was precedent for such a situation. Geddes (1994) writes that 
in 1992 (the era of President Fernando Collor, who was impeached for corruption), 94 percent of 
the money distributed by the federal government’s Secretariat for Regional Development had 
gone to districts whose representatives supported the president. In the months leading up to 
Collor’s impeachment, the president of the Bank of Brazil (a partially state-owned commercial 
bank whose head is appointed by the president) offered large health infrastructure development 
packages to deputies and senators who agreed to vote against impeachment. A technocratic, 
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independent MDS would ensure that the PT could not use Bolsa money to manipulate congress 
in the same way. 
Perhaps the most important consideration allied parties made in voting for the Bolsa was 
based on their belief that it would bring electoral benefits for everyone involved in its passage. 
As Geddes writes, “Individual benefits are highly visible and concrete, and thus easy for 
beneficiaries to understand and for politicians to take credit for” (1994: 136). Traditional rational 
voter theories (Downs 1957), which have long suffered for producing tiny estimates of the utility 
of voting work well for explaining what hypothetical Bolsa beneficiaries might do—the value of 
Bolsa benefits to the voter is easy to estimate, and (importantly) there is a fine for failing to 
appear at the polls. A rational pocketbook voter who entered the Bolsa rolls in 2004 is not 
necessarily changed by that money into a PT voter; rather, she becomes much more likely to 
support the incumbent official. That hypothesis is supported by the long-established American 
politics literature on the economic determinants of voting. This literature finds that in the United 
States, the incumbent party loses when voters experience declining income personally or 
collectively (Tufte 1975), or perceive the economy to be on the wrong track (Kinder and Kiewiet 
1979; Kramer 1983; Fiorina 1981; Markus 1992). This literature generally concludes that 
electoral benefits from increases in voter wealth benefit incumbents. Though the Brazilian 
context differs in many respects, the rational behavior theory underlying these conclusions is 
considered to be an acceptable model of voter behavior everywhere. In Brazil, the proliferation 
of parties makes it quite difficult for voters to understand which officials were behind which 
policies. Thus Bolsa might not be so much a boon for the PT as for any sitting official. 
Supporting a technocratic MDS ensures that benefits are spread according to objective criteria 
(which may strengthen all incumbents), rather than disproportionately going to PT districts.  
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In a personal email, Barbara Geddes indicated that the PT may have had another reason 
for wanting the Bolsa program to be as immune to interference as possible: “many of the areas of 
greatest poverty were controlled locally by parties other than the president's at the time when the 
program was begun and especially when it was extended to much larger numbers” (2012). 
Centralized control and careful means-testing were a way for the PT to ensure that parties in the 
PT-unfriendly Northern states could not subvert the program to their own ends, except insofar as 
the program benefited all incumbents.  
It was precisely Brazil’s reputation for corruption and the frequency of political 
interference in bureaucratic affairs that forced the PT to predicate their unprecedented social 
welfare expansion on, in effect, fair play. The PT needed to protect its reputation for honesty, 
coalition members wanted safeguards to ensure that MDS did not become a PT patronage 
machine, and incumbents as a group believed that the program would help them win reelection. 
Every stakeholder thus had an interest in creating a Bolsa program that followed objective 
criteria and was insulated from political pressures.  
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National Election Trends and the Bolsa’s Electoral 
Effects 
Introduction 
The economists and public policy experts cited in the previous chapter worried that the 
Bolsa program was intended to create a patron-client relationship between the federal 
government and the poorest Brazilians. The country’s long history of clientelistic political 
relationships—including in programs with national scope—made that possibility a real one. 
Partisan critics insist that the Bolsa program is exactly that. After careful review, policy 
evaluators seem satisfied that the program is a programmatic benefit provided solely according 
to objective criteria.  
As a program with that made a large difference in the quality of life for millions of 
families, the Bolsa Família is likely to loom large in the personal utility calculations Brazilian 
voters make as they go to the polls, following the logic of Downs’s (1957) utility-maximizing 
rational voter model. That logic suggests that voters who received Bolsa benefits prior to the 
2006 elections would vote for Lula in 2006 to maximize their chances of continuing to receive 
benefits (Stokes 2005). Voters with incomes near the then-current eligibility line who believed 
Lula would expand the Bolsa would vote for him to maximize their chance of being included in 
the future.  
This logic implies observable consequences in elections to lower-level offices. These 
consequences differ depending on whether voters reward incumbents after their own material 
conditions have improved, or instead seek out candidates affiliated with the party they believe is 
responsible for the improvement. If voters reward incumbents, we would expect poor voters to 
have overwhelmingly supported incumbents. At the regional level, we would expect incumbent 
candidates to perform best in the North and Northeast, where the Bolsa program reached the 
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largest number of people. If voters use party labels as shortcuts for candidate policy preferences 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Lupia 1994), we would expect Lula and the PT to do better in more 
Bolsa-dependent regions than they had in previous elections. 
A literature on the political effects of the Bolsa program supports the hypothesis that the 
program increased support for Lula among the poorest Brazilians. This same literature also 
suggests that Lula became far less popular among the middle and upper classes over his first 
term in office. These articles rely on a pronounced shift in the geography of the Lula vote 
between 2002 and 2006; they point to a 2005 scandal as the most important reason for his 
declining support among the middle and upper classes. Only a few articles attempt to extend the 
analysis beyond Lula’s performance to examine whether there is empirical support for arguments 
that the incentives responsible for shifting voter support towards Lula also operated on voter 
preferences vis-à-vis the PT. Most use survey data, voting results, and census information to test 
the strength of a hypothesized linear relationship between a measure of the Bolsa’s importance 
and voting patterns at an individual, state, or municipal level. Most cover only the 2006 election; 
nearly all use Lula votes as the dependent variable. None of the studies that attempt to test the 
Bolsa’s electoral impact analyze the program’s impact on congressional races. Finally, none 
attempt a systematic explanation of the impact of the 2005 scandal, which almost certainly 
played a role in the PT’s 2006 performance, and likely had differing impacts on voter support for 
the incumbent and his party. Understanding the theoretical justifications for the scandal having 
different effects in different races requires a discussion of the PT’s special place in Brazilian 
party competition. 
Throughout this literature, poverty and the Bolsa program are assumed to have the same 
effects on voter preference for Lula. That assumption seems valid in light of the tight relationship 
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described in the previous chapter. The key, suggestive finding of the literature that compares the 
2002 and 2006 elections is that the relationship between poverty and preference for the PT is 
changing.  
Political Effects of the Bolsa Program 
National-level Analyses 
The idea the Bolsa Família played a decisive role in president Lula’s 2006 reelection was 
part of the post-election narrative almost as soon as the results were in. Nicolau and Peixoto 
(2007) began the academic debate on the relative importance of the Bolsa program by applying a 
linear regression model to municipal-level voting returns. By their reckoning, the percentage of a 
city’s population receiving Bolsa benefits could explain almost 20 percent of the variation in 
Lula’s vote share. Their finding may have been an overstatement, and the model likely suffered 
from multicollinearity resulting from their inclusion of the Northeastern region as a dummy 
alongside measures of the Bolsa scope. Bolsa beneficiaries are highly concentrated in that region 
because poverty, which the program targets, is concentrated in the Northeast. Despite this flaw, 
their work provides strong evidence that poverty, and the government’s response to it, played an 
important role in the 2006 election. Their paper shows that the higher a city’s score on the UN 
Human Development Index, the worse Lula performed there in 2006. Because poverty (which is 
a major component of that score) is an extremely strong correlate of measures of the Bolsa’s 
scope, that same relationship can be expressed by comparing Lula’s 2006 vote share in each 
Brazilian city to those cities’ per-capita municipal Bolsa budgets in the same year.  
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Figure 3.1 Scatter plot of Lula's 2006 Vote Share and Bolsa program per capita payment 
 
The scatterplot is clear: Lula did better where the Bolsa gave the most money.  
 Following Nicolau and Peixoto, many authors tackled the same question, incorporating 
more precise municipal-level data that supported the Bolsa-centric hypothesis (Marques et al 
2009; Zucco 2008), survey results that discounted the Bolsa’s role (Holzhacker and 
Balbachevsky 2009), and models that found economic conditions to be a more compelling 
explanation for Lula’s performance (Shikida et al. 2009). The most sophisticated analysis yet 
produced combines municipal-level voting returns, survey data, and a matching process to 
calculate individual-level effects and create comparisons between identical municipalities (Zucco 
2011). Most articles agree that the Bolsa played an important role. Those that disagree suffer 
from not accounting for the Bolsa’s economic impacts, which were substantial in Northeastern 
towns where more than forty percent of the population received benefits, and from using surveys 
with limited geographical reach. 
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Hunter and Power (2007) claim that poor voters (by which they mean the poorest voters) 
came out to support Lula in large numbers because of material improvements to their living 
standards that had occurred between Lula’s first victory in 2002 and his reelection bid four years 
later. They report a strong state-level correlation between the decline in extreme poverty after 
2003 and Lula’s 2006 vote share. Although they are not measuring the Bolsa directly, the 
program is, from the very beginning, their explanation for Lula’s improved performance. They 
suggest that many of the Bolsa voters had not voted for Lula in 2002, and imply that Lula would 
not have won reelection had the Bolsa not existed. Most subsequent writers worked from a 
similar premise. 
For Hunter and Power the pattern of “interiorização” or “nordestização”13 that 
characterized Lula’s support base recalled Brazilian politics of the 1960s and earlier, when 
incumbent candidates relied on federal aid-dependent rural municipalities whose leaders ensured 
that local votes went to the national incumbent in return for continued access to federal money. 
In the authors’ understanding, changes in Lula’s support base were a sign that the Bolsa Família 
served an electoral purpose, and reflected a failure to move beyond the country’s clientelistic 
past.
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The most consistent challenge to the claim that the Bolsa played a decisive role in the 
2006 election comes from a series of papers written or co-written by Andre Carraro, who agreed 
with the claim that poor voters supported Lula at much higher rates than they had in the past, but 
did not believe that the Bolsa was responsible for that change (Carraro et al 2007; Shikida et al. 
2009). For him, broader economic factors that increased poor Brazilians’ real incomes could 
                                               
13 “Interiorization” and “Northeastization,” respectively—movement towards Brazil’s rural interior or the Northeast. 
14 Leal (1948) famously called interior cities “grottoes” (grotões), and argued that the relationship between 
municipal and national officials was the latest iteration of coronelismo (literally “colonel-ism”)—a pattern of 
patronage-oriented relationships in place since the Portuguese established hereditary captaincies to rule colonial 
Brazil.  
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explain why poorer voters now supported Lula. In the most sophisticated version of the article, 
the authors first confirm the pattern of high Lula voting in poorer municipalities, then turn to the 
role of an export boom that fueled a rise in real incomes in many of the poorest regions. They are 
quick to point out that indices of food prices rose far less quickly than did prices themselves over 
Lula’s four-year term, and that the relative difference between consumer goods price increases 
and food price increases was highest in Pernambuco, where Lula received 82 percent of the first 
round votes.  
Written with Carraro, Shikida et al.’s (2009) analysis of the municipal voting trends 
makes use of sophisticated spatial analysis techniques that can provide a level of control for 
spurious correlations caused by proximity. That part of the analysis is reliable and fits with the 
majority of the Bolsa political economy literature. The theory behind the economic analysis 
suggests that a valid exploration of the Bolsa’s impact should be able to distinguish between 
Bolsa and non-Bolsa-related changes in real income. The data brought to bear in this article are 
insufficient to support their strong claim that the economy alone explained changes in Lula’s 
vote share. Food prices are measured only in sixteen of 27 state capitals, and the comparison the 
authors draw between food basket prices and price levels relies on the national average price 
level, not the price levels in those state capitals. Most discouragingly, they fail to mention that 
Lula was born in Pernambuco and campaigned there heavily, which is a more compelling 
explanation of his success there than any other. Shikida et al do a service by attempting to test 
the importance of non-Bolsa economic conditions on voting. But they do not marshal enough 
evidence to credibly conclude, as they do, that “it’s the economy, companheiro,” and nothing 
else (1). 
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The Geography of Lula’s Reelection 
Many of the investigations of the Bolsa’s role began with a comparison of the state-level 
electoral maps from 2002 and 2006. The pattern is even more pronounced when comparing maps 
of Lula’s and his opponents’ municipal vote shares in the two election years. 
Figure 3.2 Map of Municipal-level voting returns, 2006 and 2010 
 
It was precisely the visible shift in Lula support from the Southeast to the Northeastern region 
that prompted analysts to focus on the possibility that the Bolsa played a major role. Zucco 
(2008), recalling Leal’s (1948) “grottoes” interpretation of Northeast Brazilian politics, notes 
that the Northeast tends to vote for the incumbent presidential candidate no matter his or her 
party and without regard to the incumbent’s policy positions. As he puts it, incumbents regularly 
do better in less-developed municipalities, “even if this has involved shredding traditional 
constituencies” (45). Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB did far better in the Northeast as 
an incumbent in 1998 than when running for his first term in 1994 and, according to Zucco, the 
entrance of the longtime opposition PMDB into government in the late 1980s was quickly 
followed by an increase in PMDB support from Brazil’s poorest municipalities. In this 
formulation, the PT was following the trail blazed by its predecessors in the presidency. Like the 
Source: Veja Magazine / 
Carol Rozendo 
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PT, these parties had drawn their original support from wealthy urban areas. Zucco’s analysis is 
particularly important because it covers parties in addition to presidential candidates. Although 
he does not dwell on the implications of his hypothesized “pro-government electorate” (44) in 
the Northeast, Zucco’s findings suggest that the PT would have improved its showing in the 
Northeast in 2006, and continued to do well through 2010, regardless of its policy positions. 
Zucco’s analysis suggests that the role of incumbency cannot be discounted in attempting to 
understand the PT’s changing base. 
As a consensus developed that there was a meaningful difference between Lula’s voter 
bases in 2002 and 2006, several authors tried to analyze the characteristics of that difference. 
Soares and Terron (2008) use a spatial analysis technique to study the geographic variation in 
Lula vote share at the municipal level.
15
 They find that in 2002 there were large, concentrated 
bands of Lula support around several large Southeastern cities, as well as a few Northern and 
Northeastern capitals. In 2006, the bands of concentrated, elevated neighboring municipal vote 
shares were physically larger (because they included more dispersed populations), extending 
northward from the arid regions of Minas Gerais state (slightly south of the official Northeastern 
region) and across the northern sections of the Northern states. That year, the concentrated areas 
of low Lula share were in São Paulo state, the South, Brazil’s central states, and in some of the 
same Northern capitals where he and his party had enjoyed concentrated support in the past.  
                                               
15 Their technique uses Moran’s I, a measure of correlation of events in space. The value of the I statistic varies 
between -1 and 1, with 1 being an indication that the event under study always occurs in units of space adjacent to 
each other. The expected value of Moran’s I under the normal hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation (no 
discernible pattern of adjacent occurrences) is 0. Moran’s I is given by:   
 
∑ ∑      
∑ ∑ (    ̅)(    ̅)  
∑ (    ̅) 
   where N is the 
number of spatial units indexed by the vectors i and j (in this case, municipalities), X is the variable of interest,  ̅ is 
the mean of X, and    is an element of a matrix of spatial weights (in this case, a matrix of Lula vote shares in 
Brazilian municipalities, with sufficient rows and columns to describe every adjacency). As can be seen from the 
equation, the procedure is to divide an ordinary least squares regression by a matrix that indicates whether two units 
of analysis are adjacent to one another. (Moran 1950; Peters and Thomas 2009). The statistic gives a global value, 
that is, it provides information about the whole range of values. A high Moran I value would mean that 
municipalities with high Lula vote shares tend to be adjacent to other municipalities with high Lula vote shares.  
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This spatial analysis lends additional weight to the impressions generated by the map of 
voting results: Lula did better in the North and Northeast in 2006, and the spatial blocks of 
support he had enjoyed in the Southeast in 2002 cohered less in the following election. When the 
spatial correlation terms were added to a regression model of Lula vote share, the relative weight 
of those variables declined a great deal, suggesting that linear models without correction 
procedures for the influence of proximity on voting tend to overestimate the effects of other 
factors. This result, though, must be used carefully, because the relatively high value of the 
Moran’s I statistic that indicates the overall concentration of the event being studied (municipal 
level vote share) is high—a sign that the variables being included alongside spatial correlation 
may be correlated with each other, violating the preconditions of ordinary least-squares 
regression and greatly increasing the value of the standard error terms. Despite this caution, 
Soares and Terron’s (2008) spatial analysis provides convincing evidence that there was a 
meaningful shift in the geography of the Lula voting base between 2002 and 2006.  
And the PT? 
In their 2007 article, Hunter and Power tackle the puzzling fact that, while Lula benefited 
from the Bolsa program to receive increased support in 2006, the PT lost seats. To explain this 
unexpected discrepancy, they point to the 2005 Mensalão scandal, in which the top PT 
leadership was implicated in a legislative vote-buying scheme. To explain how Lula managed to 
stay in office when his party faltered, Hunter and Power turn to the idea that poor voters are 
more tolerant of corruption than the rich. They note that newspaper circulation is low outside of 
urban centers, and cite a study that shows less-educated Brazilians are more likely than wealthier 
respondents to say that corrupt behaviors were acceptable. O Globo reporters turned to a similar 
explanation when asked why poor voters chose to vote for the tainted Lula administration 
(Weber and Leali, Interview Aug 2011). The Bolsa’s apparent importance makes one of Hunter 
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and Powers’ (2007) results quite interesting. In 2006, state-level PT vote share was negatively 
correlated with Lula’s share in the same state. While the cause remained unclear, the trend 
seemed to be that areas which supported Lula did not support the PT. A lively debate over this 
unexpected (and unprecedented) relationship centered on the question that opened Hunter and 
Powers’ article: why had “the PT benefited far less than the president himself from government 
investment in social policy?” (1).  
In one of the few papers to extend analysis of Lula’s performance to his party, Terron and 
Soares (2010) argue that the reason for the apparent divide was Lula’s pursuit of a catch-all 
strategy while his party made narrower appeals. The PT has historically focused on middle-class 
Southern and Southeastern voters, and has far less capacity to actuate outside of those regions. 
Once again using spatial analysis, Terron and Soares test whether PT and Lula votes tended to be 
concentrated in the same areas. They find that from 1994 to 2002, the spatial distribution of votes 
for Lula and the PT became less aligned, such that by 2006, it was no longer possible to detect a 
strong spatial relationship between municipalities with many Lula voters and those with many 
petistas. The biggest drop in cohesion occurred between 2002 and 2006, when for the first time, 
Lula performed well in a long, continuous swath of the Northeast, while the PT continued 
previous patterns of strong performance by taking some pockets of the Northeast, dominating the 
state of Mato Grosso do Sul, and maintaining some regions of support in parts of the South. They 
conclude that a process of distancing of the party’s and president’s respective geographic 
electoral bases had culminated in 2006 with a “divorce”—Lula and the PT drew their support 
from separate bases. 
Although the Moran I statistic from which Terron and Soares (2010) draw their 
conclusions is a blunt measure, and the categorization process that produced their measures of 
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cohesion discarded a great deal of information, their papers provide strong evidence that Lula 
had a geographically wider support base in 2006. Such a result would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that Bolsa beneficiaries, who live throughout the country, were more likely to vote for 
Lula in 2006 than people in the same income stratum had been in 2002. The declining correlation 
between PT and Lula regions reflects both the increasing dispersion of Lula votes and the fact 
that in some strong PT areas, Lula performed much worse than he had before. It is also 
consistent with the claim that the Bolsa did not bring great benefits to the PT, all else being 
equal.  
Yet interestingly, Terron and Soares (2010) note that the number of municipalities in 
which the PT polled well (according to the paper’s tripartite classification scheme) increased 
from 387 in 2002 to 489 in 2006. That, coupled with a new areas of PT concentration in the 
Northeast were signs that the PT was beginning to actuate and achieve electoral success outside 
of its traditional homes. 
The Changing Geography of the PT 
For much of its history, the PT drew its support from Brazil’s South and Southeast. As a 
leftist party of intellectuals and industrial workers—sometimes characterized as factory laborers 
and universitários—it did best in the wealthy, urban regions where such people were 
concentrated. For decades, São Paulo was the party’s heart. The party’s first great electoral 
victories came in the 1988 mayoral elections, in which the PT won the city of São Paulo and 
three of its largest neighbors, while also taking Porto Alegre and Vitória, the capitals of wealthy 
Rio Grande do Sul state and the small state of Espírito Santo (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  
In 1994, the former mayor of Vitória won the gubernatorial election in Espírito Santo and 
became the first PT member to win a governorship. That same year, the party increased its share 
of lower house seats to 49. The following election saw the PT win 58 seats in the lower house, as 
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well as the governorships of Mato Grosso do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul (where it had previously 
won the capital), and the tiny Northern state of Acre. Then in 2002, on the strength of anti-
Cardoso sentiment and a brilliant whistle-stop campaign by Lula, the PT took 91 seats and 
became the largest party in congress for the first time in its history (Weber and Leali, Interview 
Aug 2011). In four consecutive elections, the PT had gained seats, increasing the size of its 
bench by a factor of five over 16 years.  
During previous presidential terms, the incumbent party had won big: Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s Social Democratic Party (PSDB) went from 62 seats in 1994 (the year he won the 
presidency) to 99 seats in 1998, when Cardoso was reelected. The symbolic power of the 
presidency had been a huge boon to the president’s party in the past; it is common to see 
television commercials lauding government initiatives, and it is clear to most Brazilians who 
those commercials are referring to, though parties are never referred to by name. In addition, the 
patronage power of the presidency had in the past induced many politicians to switch to the 
leading party (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Samuels 2003). 
But in 2006, the PT lost seats. Its 83-member bloc put it in second place, behind the 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Lula was reelected, though he failed to win a majority of 
votes in the first round. Lula won only a handful of municipalities in São Paulo, and took a few 
cities in the traditional PT stronghold of Paraná. Beyond those, Alckmin dominated Brazil’s 
Southern half. Until 2006, the PT, and Lula, had done best in the South and Southeast.  
In what was otherwise a bad year for the PT, the party made great strides in the 
Northeast. For the first time in its history, the PT took five governorships: those of Sergipe, Pará, 
Bahia, Piauí, and Acre. Every one of its governorships was in the North or the Northeast. At the 
same time, incumbent PT governors, and gubernatorial candidates supported by outgoing PT 
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governors, failed to win in wealthy Rio Grande do Sul and the ranching state of Mato Grosso do 
Sul. For the first time since winning a governorship, the PT held no governorship in either the 
South or Southeastern regions of the country. Acre (which with a population of a little over 
700,000 people can be thought of as Brazil’s Alaska without oil) remained safe territory for the 
PT. The party’s continued success there is to a great extent the result of incumbency advantages. 
The win in Bahia was also not a stretch for the party that had previously held the mayoralty of 
Salvador, Bahia’s capital and largest city. Tocantins reelected a PT incumbent.  
Figure 3.3 Map of PT gubernatorial victories 1998, 2002, 2006 
 
This meant that the great surprises of 2006 were the PT victories in Sergipe and Pará. 
Pará is a large, mostly agrarian state whose capital is at Belém, a bustling shipping hub at the 
mouth of the Amazon. The state had a per capita GDP of a little over $7,000 and an illiteracy 
rate of about 12 percent in 2008. Tiny Sergipe had a per capita GDP of about $7,500. Pará’s 
population density stood at about six per square kilometer that year, while Sergipe’s stood at 
91.3. These were the 22
nd
- and 20
th
-poorest states in Brazil.
16
 The states where the PT had 
traditionally been strongest—Mato Grosso do Sul, Rio Grande do Sul, and São Paulo—were far 
wealthier, with per capita GDPs of $10,600, $18,378, and $24,456, respectively. In races for 
                                               
16 Brazil has 27 states 
65 
 
executive positions in 2006, Northern and Northeastern voters preferred the PT far more than 
they ever had in the past.  
When Hunter and Power (2007) raised the question of how the PT managed to lose seats 
in congress despite the Bolsa having a clear role in Lula’s (and, the maps suggest, PT 
gubernatorial candidates’) reelection, they pointed to a 2005 corruption scandal. While this 
scandal can explain the total loss in seats, their question also suggests another line of inquiry: did 
the geography of PT votes in congressional races change in 2006? 
A pair of maps suggests that the PT’s electoral geography was different in 2002 and 
2006. Here, states are color-coded based on how the PT performed in those states relative to the 
national average. Redder states are those in which the PT won the largest share of the vote 
relative to the national averages of 18.4 percent in 2002 and 15.0 percent in 2006.  
Figure 3.4 Map of Relative Performance of the PT in 2002 and 2006 
 
In 2002, as in the past, the PT performed best in the wealthier southern states that contained the 
bulk of its traditional constituency. The 2005 corruption scandal can explain why the national 
average diminished in 2006, but on its own does not explain why the relative performance of the 
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PT in its traditional bases diminished that year, while Northern states were newly fond of the PT. 
Bolsa, with a geographical distribution that favors the North and Northeast, can explain the PT’s 
growth in those regions.  
These geographical trends, and their relationship to the Bolsa and the Mensalão scandal 
of 2005, are mirrored in the results of several surveys that find the profile of the PT voter has 
changed. 
Samuels (2006) uses pre-2006 survey data to find that the strongest influence on an 
individual’s support for the PT was the score the respondent’s municipality received when 
graded on the UN Human Development Index scale, a measure of the city’s wealth and the ease 
of access to basic services in the city. That variable was strongly and positively correlated with 
voters’ preference for the PT; people from wealthier cities were, in the early 2000s, more likely 
to support the PT. The changing electoral geography of the PT suggests that the relationship 
between wealth and PT support might be changing.   
Following the hunt for connections between the Bolsa and electoral behaviors, 
Holzhacker and Balbachesky (2007) test the hypothesis that the poor were, by 2006, strong Lula 
voters. They assume that, if the poor were strong Lula supporters, social class would be a strong 
predictor of preference for Lula in the first round of the presidential elections. Their findings are 
suggestive, though they fail to achieve statistical significance because they are drawn from a 
small sample. One of their findings is striking: the proportion of lower-class voters who chose 
Lula rose from 52.9 percent in 2002 to 77.0 percent in 2006, while the proportion of upper-class 
respondents who chose Lula fell from 46.9 percent in 2002 to 38.1 percent in 2006. In both 
cases, respondents’ evaluations of the government in power were statistically significant with 
respect to their voting choices. Those who had given Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government 
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high marks in 2002 were likely to choose Cardoso’s chosen successor, José Serra (Lula’s 
opponent in the second round of the presidential election that year), over Lula, while those who 
disapproved of Lula’s government in 2006 were more likely to vote for Geraldo Alckmin (his 
opponent in 2006) than for the incumbent Lula.  
As before, social class was a powerful predictor of preference for Lula. But in 2006, the 
direction of the relationship had changed. Poor voters were now more likely to support him than 
were wealthy voters. Importantly, the choice seemed to be the result of a personal evaluation of 
the government’s performance. Poor voters supported Lula in 2006 because they thought he did 
a good job; wealthier people disagreed with that assessment.  
Kerstenetsky, in her article on “The political economy of the Bolsa Família program” 
(2009) dug deeper into the role of the Bolsa and perceptions of corruption in shaping approval of 
the government. Citing public opinion data, she notes that 79.5 percent of Bolsa beneficiaries 
approved of the government, as did 72.8 percent of respondents who were not beneficiaries but 
knew people who received benefits from the program. The survey, conducted in 2007, about 
eighteen months after the Lula administration corruption scandals, found that only 46.1 percent 
of people who did not know any beneficiaries approved of the government. Thus the Bolsa 
appeared to have a large impact on voters’ evaluations of the government’s performance. Poor 
respondents were far more likely to be or know Bolsa beneficiaries than were wealthy 
respondents. In fact, because of the program’s wide scope, and the interclass relationships 
common in a country where poor women often find employment as domestic workers in middle- 
and upper-class households, it is fair to assume that the group who know no beneficiaries are 
drawn from Brazil’s highest income stratum. That group is known from other data to have been 
especially hostile to the Lula government in 2007 (Datafolha 2007).  
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Zucco (2010; 2011) finds that being a participant in the Bolsa program makes voters 30 
percent more likely to vote for Lula if they are in the lowest income bracket, and 43 percent 
more likely if they are in the next-highest bracket (the group that makes two to five times the 
minimum monthly salary). This is strong support for the importance of class in predicting 
individual political preferences. 
An important note from Zucco’s work: the effect of the Bolsa program on municipal vote 
shares is highest when the program’s scope is near the average, and actually tends to be smaller 
in municipalities where many residents are receiving benefits. This is primarily because other 
explanatory variables included in his regression model—per capita GDP, Human Development 
Index scores, and the share of the population living in poverty—gain explanatory power in the 
poorest municipalities where the share of Bolsa beneficiaries is highest.
17
 At first glance, the 
result seems to suggest that PT vote share actually declined in cities with the highest levels of 
Bolsa beneficiary population share. What Zucco actually describes is diminishing marginal 
electoral returns from increasing Bolsa scope, and associations between other measures of 
poverty and support for Lula. 
Through a weighting of individual-level survey results and municipal-level voting 
returns, Zucco concludes that the Bolsa program “increased the probability that the poorest 
voters would vote for Lula by approximately 0.3,” which, he notes, if those votes are assumed to 
be evenly distributed and the 11 million beneficiary families are assumed to contain 20 million 
voters, suggests that 4.3 million Lula votes could have gone to Lula because of the program. 
                                               
17 Because the number of Bolsa recipients is very close to the number of poor in almost every municipality by 2006, 
it difficult to evaluate differences in behavior between demographically similar municipalities with highly divergent 
Bolsa recipient shares—such places were exceedingly rare by the time the election occurred. Further, the reasons a 
municipality might not have implemented Bolsa by that time are limited to extreme isolation or a mayoral decision 
to minimize participation his city’s participation. Both of these are likely to matter more than Bolsa scope in 
explaining voter behavior.  
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Noting that the Bolsa program had indirect economic effects, Zucco estimates that as many as 
five million votes for Lula could be traced to the program in one way another, accounting for 
approximately 80 percent of Lula’s 6.3 million-vote margin of victory. Unfortunately, this type 
of analysis cannot really say whether the votes in question were decisive, that is, it is impossible 
to tell whether in the absence of the Bolsa Família program those votes would have gone to 
Geraldo Alckmin. 
While these studies do not all touch directly on the PT, they provide further evidence that 
the Bolsa affected peoples’ political judgments—including their perceptions of how the 
government was performing. If this relationship extends to the PT, it provides an individual-level 
way to conceptualize reactions to the 2005 corruption scandal.  
One study does address the profile of PT voters directly. Veiga (2007) finds that in 2002, 
the modal educational outcome of PT supporters was having finished two years of secondary 
school. In 2006, the largest number of self-identified petistas had not finished primary school. It 
should be noted that in 2006, nearly all major parties saw similar declines in their supporters’ 
modal educational achievement level, and received less support overall in the electorate than 
they had in the previous election. Still, Veiga’s finding point to two processes acting to change 
the petista profile: an increase in the number of poor voters stating preference for the PT, along 
with some decline in the number of highly educated people who supported the PT.  
Digging deeper into Veiga’s (2007) article shows that there is more to the change in the 
PT supporter profile than a declining education level. In 2006, the mean household income of PT 
voters fell by almost 400 reais (about $180 in the early 2000s) from R$1,350 per month (the 
second-highest average supporter income of any party, after the PSDB) to R$985 per month, 
lower than all but one of the major parties. Together with information about median incomes, 
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this shift paints a specific, compelling portrait of a changing PT. In 2002, the median PT voter 
made R$800 per month; as with average income, this meant that PT supporters were the second-
wealthiest partisans in Brazil. But in 2006, the median income of PT voters fell even as it rose 
among supporters of every other party. The shift resulted in petistas having the lowest median 
income of all partisan groups—R$747 per month in a year where the reported median monthly 
incomes of other parties exceeded R$900. Given that in 2008, the National Household Study 
found that average income for workers was about R$1,051, and average monthly household 
income was R$1,968, partisans in general seem to be of below-average means. Whether that 
reflects a tendency of poor or lower-middle income workers to affiliate with parties, or a 
tendency among the wealthiest survey respondents not to declare a party loyalty is unclear.  
The reason for the falling income is clear in light of the PT’s geographical shift: average 
worker income in Brazil’s Northeast was far lower than the national average, falling at R$685 
per month in 2008. A shift in PT support to Northeastern voters would dramatically alter the 
wealth profile of PT supporters. If the Bolsa motivated support for the PT, petistas would, on 
average, be far poorer after the program’s creation in 2003 than they had been before. 
One author suggests that such a view lacks nuance. Bohn (2011) argues that poor voters 
themselves vote differently in different regions, and so argues that the Bolsa, which she assumes 
to be a universal program, cannot explain the changes in Lula’s and the PT’s vote share. If the 
Bolsa changed voting behavior, it would have the same effect everywhere. She further argues 
that Bolsa recipients “were already Lula voters in 2002,” a claim that would require the program 
to be evaluated as an attempt to “buy” turnout (Nichter 2007) rather than reach voters with 
inconstant partisan loyalties. 
71 
 
The most important part of Bohn’s analysis is to discuss one of the other major policy 
initiatives of Lula’s first term: a comprehensive “statute of the elderly,” which provided 
additional monetary benefits to the needy and aged (though many of these had long been eligible 
for a social security program),
18
 and strengthened penalties for age discrimination. The statute of 
the elderly required that three percent of low-income housing be reserved for elderly heads of 
low-income households, guaranteed all elderly Brazilians half-price tickets to most sporting and 
cultural events, and changed the Continuing Benefit social security program, which disburses 
thirty percent more money than the Bolsa Família. On every bus and subway in Brazil, there are 
now special seats reserved for the elderly. Bohn argues that this statute, which deals directly with 
indignities suffered by the aged and disabled, had a dramatic effect on older voters’ sentiments 
towards the incumbent Lula. In her telling, it was older voters who switched to the PT; the poor 
were already behind Lula.  
Although Bohn disputes claims that the Bolsa turned voters from tucanos (supporters of 
the PSDB) into petistas, she agrees that the profile of PT supporters changed a great deal by 
2006. From 1994 to 2002, there was a positive relationship between years of education and 
support for Lula. In 2006, the best-educated voters were the least-likely to vote for him. She 
attributes the change to the corruption scandals. In a similar vein, 2006 was the first year in 
which income was negatively correlated with support for Lula. In past runs, Lula had polled 
highest among middle class voters (those making ten to twenty times the minimum monthly 
wage); in 2006 he won seventy percent of those earning two or fewer minimum monthly salaries. 
For the first time in his life, Lula performed better among the poorest voters—and did so to an 
overwhelming degree. The idea that the Bolsa program induced eligible people to prefer Lula 
and the PT is consistent with this result, but not sufficient to prove that the Bolsa was 
                                               
18 The Benefício de Prestação Contínua, or “Continuing Benefit.” 
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responsible. Similarly, a newly negative correlation between income (or education) and 
preference for Lula and the PT could also solely be the result of falling support for the incumbent 
in the upper classes. 
Bohn’s contention that the Bolsa fails as an explanation because the poor in one region is 
not the group most likely to vote for Lula is unfair, because all the Bolsa could really be expected 
to do is increase the number (and percentage) of poor voters who support the incumbent. If in 
some region non-poor voters were much more likely to support Lula in 2002, the Bolsa’s 
importance would not be disproved simply because that wealthier group continued to support 
Lula at a greater rate than did poor voters. Only if Bolsa recipients in 2006 were less likely to 
support Lula than voters in Bolsa-eligible income strata had been in 2002 would we question the 
hypothesis that the Bolsa matters.  
The PT as the Exception 
To understand how the Bolsa might affect voting behavior, it is important to consider 
how Brazilian voters relate to political parties. A large literature on the Brazilian party system 
argues that voters have tenuous relationships with parties. At the same time, the PT, unlike the 
other parties, has deep roots in civil society and relies on a set of hardcore partisans. These 
partisans are deeply invested in the party’s reputation for honesty. They are also concentrated in 
certain regions of the country. The PT’s unusual status as a mass party with deep social roots 
makes it more vulnerable to charges of corruption, and that vulnerability is amplified by its long 
cultivation of a reputation for honesty, efficiency, and commitment to democracy. 
Most authors tell the story of the PT as a story of how gaining power has turned 
ideologues into pragmatists. Samuels (2004) gives a brief history of the PT as a party that has 
moved, over its nearly-30 year history, from the far-left to the moderate left: as he puts it, “from 
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socialism to social democracy.” The party’s stated goal in 1982 had been to create a socialist 
society; in 1993 party leaders said that they hoped to increase strain on the existing order—
presumably to further their goal of creating a socialist society. But in 2002, when the party won 
the presidency and became, for the first time in its history, the largest party in the Chamber of 
Deputies, the platform primarily emphasized “morality in public office.” That same year, it 
formed a strategic alliance with the right-wing Liberal Party (PL), and allowed that party to 
choose Lula’s running mate, an evangelical Christian named José Alencar.  
The PT’s transformation into a strategic party with broad appeal prompted Samuels’ 
article. Mainwaring had said that the PT maintained its ties to elements of civil society—the 
labor unions and socialist Catholic groups from which it sprang—by eschewing a vote-
maximizing strategy (1999: 172). In that work and others, Mainwaring compared the PT to the 
Duvergerian concept of a mass party, noting that no comparable party existed in Brazil at that 
time (1995: 382; Duverger 1954). Katz and Mair (1995) refined this understanding of the mass 
party to include a specifically socialist variety, one with a large membership and clear lines of 
internal communications that uses significant mobilization efforts to campaign and gets its 
resources primarily from member fees. Such a party is also able to discipline members and 
legislators. Mainwaring (1995) repeatedly notes that the PT is unique in its ability to discipline 
legislators. Further, while party-switching is notoriously high in Brazil—Samuels (2006) notes 
that one-third of sitting legislators switch parties during the term—PT legislators are the least 
likely of all legislators to vote against the party line or switch out of the party (Mainwaring 
1995). 
Samuels (2004) believes that it is precisely the mass party characteristics of the PT that 
facilitated its move to the center after the end of the cold war. Through internally democratic 
74 
 
institutions of participation and contestation, moderates from the Lula camp were able to 
influence the national party, and eventually rise into its leadership. The structures to which he 
refers—internal elections and a series of committees able to designate delegates to higher 
decision-making bodies—reflect the party’s unique status as a party formed from the bottom-up 
and closely tied to civil society groups.  
The PT considered itself a socialist party from the beginning. Its name and logo, a red 
star inscribed with the letters “PT,” consciously drew upon Marxist symbolism.  
Figure 3.5 PT Logos and Campaign Images 
 
Until 1998, the word “socialism” appeared in every PT platform. Its disappearance from the 
document in that year was the direct result of the pragmatic Lula camp having gained the upper 
hand in the highest levels of the party’s government. 
Samuels argues that the PT’s shift towards moderate pragmatism, and the concomitant 
rise of the Lula camp, pushed the party towards what Strom (1990) called the “policy-seeking” 
model. In that paper, Strom concludes that “high intraparty democracy” and “impermeable 
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recruitment structures,” characteristics he believes are favored by modest government subsidies19 
to parties and mobilization-intensive campaigns, often move parties towards policy-seeking 
behaviors (1990: 594). The PT meets all of these criteria and operates in a multi-party 
environment, which Strom identifies as the most common breeding ground for policy-seeking 
parties.  
The change from an ideological focus to policy-seeking was necessary because the party 
was winning elections, and the cadre of petistas holding elected office tended to be centrists who 
advanced in the party because of their victories. Radicals who won office often attenuated their 
views while serving. At the same time, the civil society groups to which the PT closely adhered 
were closer to the establishment than they had been in the mid-1980s, when Lula, the PT, and 
labor groups had led the Diretas Já campaign for direct elections.
20
 Over the course of the 1990s, 
banking and industrial unions lost hundreds of thousands of jobs, which pushed them towards 
protecting existing jobs, while public-sector unions grew but also became more open to 
negotiations during the hyperinflation and fiscal reform of the late 1990s.  
A combination of electoral success and new priorities for civil society allies changed who 
won in the PT’s internal competitions, which are “highly institutionalized, and the rules are 
always followed” (Samuels 2004: 1011). As more PT members won office, the relative number 
of party-affiliated officials came to exceed the number of party employees. By 2000, 80 percent 
of PT officeholders and staffers were part of the Lula faction. José Dircéu, a faithful member of 
the Lula camp, held the party presidency from 1995 until his appointment as President Lula’s 
                                               
19 A series of legal reforms has altered how Brazilian parties are funded, but they have consistently drawn their 
funds from a combination of private fundraising, government subsidies in the form of free television and radio 
airtime, and by taking a share of the earnings of government officials elected under their banner. The PT expects its 
members to pay a larger share of their earnings than any other party (Ribeiro 2010).  
20 Diretas Já translates as “Direct [elections] Now!” 
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chief of staff in 2002. In 2005, he would become the center of the corruption scandal detailed in 
the next chapter. 
In 2000, the PT membership approved a number of changes to the internal governance 
structure that centralized party leadership and gave party leaders more autonomy. That change 
cemented the Lula camp’s control over the party, and ensured that moderates would dominate 
the PT for the foreseeable future. Ten years of PT government at the federal level all but ensures 
that the party will be led for a long time to come by politicians whose views have been tempered 
by experience in government. Federal party-law reforms in 2002, which applied to all parties, 
increased the control national party organizations exercised over local affiliates (Ribeiro 2010). 
This greater central control has not come at the expense of local organization; the PT continues 
to be the party most able to turn out volunteers to support its political activities. 
The accepted wisdom that Brazil is “an extraordinary case of party weakness” (Power 
2000, 28) may be responsible for a lack of scholarship into Brazilian parties’ roots and support in 
civil society. Samuels (2006) showed that partisanship within the electorate had increased since 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) singled the country out as a case of low party system 
institutionalization, but that this increase is almost entirely the result of increases in support for 
the PT. He writes, “Only the PT has developed an organized web of connections to local, 
regional, and national political and social organizations, such as church groups, neighborhood 
associations, and unions” (2). Samuels also notes here that the PT has long taken pains to “paint 
itself as ‘different’ from Brazil’s other parties . . . especially in terms of its devotion to the 
principles of ‘clean government’” (3). That commitment to ethical behavior has been at the 
center of the PT’s appeal from the beginning. 
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Francisco Leali of O Globo explained that the PT, “From its creation until it entered the 
government, was always the standard-bearer for ethics and liberty. ‘All the other parties are 
corrupt, but I am not’” (Interview, Aug 2011). Given that so many Brazilians (and political 
scientists) are cynical about the country’s political institutions, it is unclear why this message 
would succeed. What made the PT able to credibly claim a greater commitment to ethics than 
any other party? The answer lay, according to Leali, in the party’s actions during the democratic 
transition of the 1980s. During negotiations that led to the election (by congress rather than the 
electorate) of Tancredo Neves to the presidency in 1985, the PT spoke out against the 
proceedings, arguing that a corrupt bargain was taking place. Following their objections, they 
refused to participate in the vote. The gesture was meant to say: “I am a different party,” and 
proved the party’s commitment to the pro-direct elections campaign that had gained it national 
prominence. Other leaders in that campaign—including Neves himself—accepted the indirect 
election deal brokered with the military government. According to Leali, the PT has always 
“presented itself as the party that doesn’t make bargains with Brazilian elites.”  
Partisan Identity in Brazil 
Partisan identity is weak in Brazil. Between 1989 and 2005, an average about 46 percent 
of Brazilian voters claimed to prefer one party over the others. Supplemental information from 
the cross-national Comparative Studies of Elections Survey suggested that as few as 35 percent 
of Brazilians expressed any partisan preference. But at the height of its popularity in 2004, 24 
percent of the electorate identified with the PT—an extraordinarily large share. In 2002, PT 
identification accounted for an astounding 65.6 percent of total party identification. Its leading 
competitors, the PMDB and PSDB, together accounted for less than 11 percent of party 
identification within the electorate (Samuels 2006).  
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Low partisan identification has been explained as, first, the result of Brazil’s large 
number of parties, itself a result of the large district magnitudes and the open-list proportional 
representation electoral system. A second explanation focuses on the way in which parties tend 
to form: from the top down, generally as the result of splintering among larger parties, as when 
the PSDB began by splitting off from the Democratic Movement Party. Such parties have no 
immediate ties to civil society, and may lack even a clear geographical base. Perhaps even more 
important, from the perspective of understanding voting behavior, is the way the electoral 
system’s incentive structure has long allowed politicians to switch parties almost at will 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995). The combination of low accountability as a result of the electoral 
system, and an ability to trade party labels at the drop of the hat, make party labels a poor 
heuristic for predicting legislator behavior. This in turn likely makes party loyalties volatile, 
especially when 8.5 effective parties are competing for voters’ affections (Laakso and Taagapera 
1979).
 21
 The proliferation of parties is both a symptom and a cause of the country’s chaotic party 
environment. Because party labels, partisan allegiances, and even parties’ names are so fluid, 
voters seem to have trouble linking parties to even their most prominent candidates. Baker et al. 
(2006) found that in 1999, only 36 percent of respondents in one poll could identify then-
President Cardoso’s party affiliation.22 
In all of this, the PT is held out as an exception. Baker et al. state explicitly that, “with the 
exception of the leftist Workers Party, party labels provide limited information about candidate 
ideology or policy stances” (2006: 386). Still, it is not readily apparent that the PT’s high voter 
identification and reliable policy positions mean that those who identify themselves with the 
                                               
21 Laakso and Taagepera compute the effective number of parties with the equation   
 
∑   
  
 
 where n is the number 
of parties with at least one seat and    is a given party’s share of all seats in the legislature.  
22 Fernando Henrique Cardoso was a founding member of the PSDB, which broke off from the PMDB in 1988 
following the adoption of the newest federal constitution (PSDB 2012; Mainwaring and Scully 1995).  
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party actually vote for it. Baker et al.’s survey of voter preferences in neighborhoods during the 
2002 election shows that 32 percent of respondents who had a candidate preference at the 
beginning of the election season (August) and voted (the cities registered 84 percent turnout
23
 in 
the October elections), 32 percent switched candidates. The study notes, however, that switching 
was most frequent among the least-informed. If PT voters are in fact the kinds of educated or 
laborite voters many have claimed them to be, and if this group is highly politically aware and 
very engaged, then PT affiliates should be considered likely PT voters. 
Partisanship literature on the PT often attempts to determine whether Brazilian partisans 
derive their attachments from preferences for individual political leaders (the position of 
Mainwaring (1999) and Ames (2001)), or whether, as has been suggested by the “Michigan 
School,” partisan preferences inform feelings toward political leaders (Beck et al. 2002). Another 
classical understanding of partisan identity, drawing from Lipset and Rokkan (1967), claims that 
partisanship is the result of deep social divisions. In the same line, Campbell et al. (1960) noted 
that more educated citizens are more likely to be informed and develop partisan identities 
(Converse 1969). The question is particularly salient with respect to the PT, because it has a 
strong, famous leader in Lula, deep roots in civil society a wide base of informed partisans, and 
has long couched itself in class-conscious, transformational terms. Thus, all three perspectives on 
partisan attachments can be brought to bear on the party. 
Samuels’ (2006) work has shown that measures of wealth are a powerful predictor of 
support for the PT. So, too, are individuals’ perceptions of Lula. Positive feelings toward the 
then-incumbent were associated with a 37 percent increase in a respondents’ likelihood of 
supporting the PT. Weaker positive associations were found between PT preference and 
                                               
23 Voting is mandatory for Brazilian citizens between the ages of 18 and 65. Failure to appear at the polls can result 
in a fine, and election days are national holidays. Turnout consistently exceeds 80 percent (TSE 2012).  
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respondents’ political knowledge and their expressed preference for effective government. A 
negligible (but significant) negative relationship was found between respondents’ tolerance for 
corruption and support for the PT. Ultimately, Samuels concludes that the PT is less personalistic 
than the other parties, a claim supported by the fact that his simulation model was able to predict 
petistas accurately and with low standard error, but failed to identify supporters of other parties. 
The study provides a summary of the received wisdom on PT supporters: “the average petista 
likes Lula, dislikes Cardoso, participates actively in politics, is highly knowledgeable about 
politics, and believes that his or her vote can make a political difference” (2006: 19). 
In research prior to 2006, the PT had been found to be the party of the educated. 
Carreirão and Kinzo (2004) find that with each one-year increase in years of schooling, 
respondents became more likely to support the PT (and less likely to support the generally more-
popular PMDB). The trend is strong enough that high school graduates and the college-educated 
preferred the PT to the PMDB in every year from 1989 to 2002. Most interesting of all, in a 
comparison of five national public opinion surveys covering the 1989 elections, Carreirão and 
Kinzo find that the correlation between party preference and preference for a first-round 
presidential candidate of the same party increased with education. This relationship is so strong 
that the partisan and presidential preferences of college-educated voters were as high as 0.94 
correlated, while the correlation of partisan and presidential preferences of voters with only 
primary educations ranged between 0.66 and 0.81. Education, it seemed, made voters’ 
preferences more consistent with one another—an interesting finding in light of the known 
relationship between increasing education and support for the PT. 
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Conclusion  
The PT’s uniquely deep relationship with civil society made it possible for a long time to 
speak of the typical petista and, in doing so, describe a group that actually existed. The 
characteristics of this group, and the importance it seems to place on the party’s reputation, make 
the PT uniquely vulnerable to public exposure of corrupt activity. Profiles of PT supporters 
suggest that longtime petistas would likely find out about corruption accusations. If the PT 
changed to accommodate the realities of governance, then lost its credibility as a party of ethics, 
its older supporters would have been less likely to vote PT in 2006.  
A large literature supports the claim that the Bolsa changed the geography of PT support, 
and in doing so, altered the economic and educational profile of the petista. This literature shows 
that the PT found new support in the Northeast, and provides evidence that the Bolsa played a 
crucial role in that transition. The party’s history and the characteristics of the traditional PT 
supporter provide the framework that sets up the other half of the story—the story of the PT’s 
weakening in its southern Brazilian heartland. 
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The PT’s “Big Monthly” 
Introduction 
The apparent success of the Bolsa program in steering voters’ preferences raises a vexing 
question: if the Bolsa program had a large impact on voter behavior, why did the PT lose seats in 
the 2006 general elections? Most authors point to a 2005 corruption scandal to explain this 
otherwise unexpected result. The scandal, however, does not provide a straightforward 
explanation because Lula retained the presidency. If the scandal was responsible, why would it 
affect PT deputies but not Lula? 
Keeping in mind the PT’s strong ties to a group of educated partisans, a close look at the 
scandal explains how public anger could fall most harshly on petistas in congress, and provides 
an answer for how Lula managed to survive even as some of his co-partisans faltered. As in the 
previous section, social class and the Bolsa played a major role, this time in determining 
individuals’ attitudes towards the events of the scandal.    
How to win a postal service contract in Brazil 
In April 2005, two businessmen
24
 paid a visit to Maurício Marinho, head of the Brazilian 
Postal Service’s contracting division, at his office in Brasília. They wanted to know how their 
company could win an information technology contract. Marinho obliged: he and the 
businessmen would have to “come to an agreement.” They talked. The businessmen placed 3,000 
reais on the table—about 1,200 dollars at the time. Marinho put the money into his left jacket 
pocket. They continued talking.  
                                               
24 Veja describes them as businessmen; CPMI v.1 p. 32 (2006) says that Joel dos Santos Filho and João Carlos 
Mancuso Villela posed as representatives of a multinational company to reveal to the postal service director what 
was going on in Marinho's office. 
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One month later, Brazil’s most widely-read periodical, Veja, published the details of the 
story (Junior 2005). The businessmen had secretly filmed the meeting. Over nearly two hours of 
footage, Marinho gave the businessmen “a lesson in corruption.” He described ways money 
could be transferred—through accounts opened by stringers, messengers at hotels, currency 
exchanges—in a way that suggested he knew exactly what he was doing.  
Marinho explained that he had close ties with Roberto Jefferson, a federal deputy and 
head of the ruling coalition-member Brazilian Labour Party (PTB).
25
 Jefferson, Marinho 
explained, “Gives me cover. . . . I don’t do anything without consulting him.” Veja explained that 
Marinho and two other officials in the postal service worked to ensure that high-ranking 
members of the PTB would fill important posts in the postal service, and frequently assigned 
contracts to companies indicated by PTB leaders (Junior 2005). The point of these contracts was 
in part to bring money to the party. Friends rewarded with contracts would make large donations 
to the party, and companies interested in improving their relationship with the PTB were 
sometimes willing to over-invest in their service contracts with the postal service, knowing that 
the difference would go to the PTB.  
Schemes like this are not unusual in Brazil. Between August and November 2011, five 
cabinet ministers lost their jobs for bribe-taking and embezzlement meant to enrich themselves 
and their parties. The causes of these practices are manifold, but the most important are the cost 
of Brazilian elections (which are the second most expensive in the world), the non-ideological 
nature of many parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995), strong incentives to cultivate personal 
votes (Shugart and Carey 1995), and a culture of political impunity. Parliamentary immunity, the 
electoral system, and a sense that Brazilian voters are indifferent to corruption are the roots of 
this impunity. Mainwaring and Scully argued that Brazilian parties are patronage machines 
                                               
25 Partido Trabalhista Brasileira 
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designed to maximize revenues by maximizing the number of affiliates holding public positions. 
They are interested in winning elections, but also interested in occupying public offices that offer 
patronage opportunities. Politicians think of parties as vehicles to attain resources; rampant 
party-switching that characterized the system in the 1990s was a direct result of the incentives 
Brazilian politicians have to maximize revenue. Mainwaring and Scully quote one federal deputy 
who explained that “A political career in Brazil is closely connected to success in bringing home 
material benefits. . . . Especially in the poorest regions, communities judge deputies on what they 
bring home” (390). Such incentives can lead to ideologically inconsistent decisions. In 1985, two 
hundred mayors switched from the ideologically opposite Social Democratic Party (PSD) to the 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) overnight, taking their local party organizations with them 
(378). Scully and Mainwaring label such parties “catchall” parties, but specifically note that the 
PT does not fit into this non-ideological, patronage-oriented category. 
The PTB, however, fits easily into the catchall category. The PTB name originated in 
1945, and the party was a creation of the dictator Getúlio Vargas. At that time, the party had a 
more or less laborite orientation. The current party is another animal entirely. It was a close ally 
of disgraced former president Fernando Collor during his impeachment, and has been a member 
of every governing coalition since 1992. If the party’s goal is to capture government offices, it 
did very well during Lula’s first term. In 2005, PTB affiliates held roughly 2,000 government 
positions—equal to the number held by the vice-president’s evangelical-backed Liberal Party 
(PL) and second only to the PT, which held 16,000 offices (Junior 2005). When the postal 
service tapes surfaced, Veja noted that the tourism minister, head of a billion-real yearly budget, 
was a member of the PTB. One of the magazine’s anonymous sources said that the party 
sometimes set patronage goals for party members who held positions in the federal bureaucracy.  
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When the scandal broke, those involved probably believed that they could escape without 
suffering serious harm. Previous bribery scandals had blown over pretty quickly. With the 
exception of President Fernando Collor’s impeachment in 1992, Brazilian public officials tended 
not to suffer serious consequences from accusations like the ones made against Jefferson and 
Marinho. The postal service scandal was different. Millions of people had seen or read excerpts 
of a recording which seemed to be very good evidence that the head of a major party had 
systematized bribe-taking and embezzlement within the federal government. Congress acted. The 
first story about the scandal appeared in Veja on May 18, 2005. A congressional commission
26
 
began investigating the case on June 9.  
The commission formed quickly because the opposition knew it had a chance to make the 
government look bad, while the government needed to ensure that its response satisfied an 
outraged public. A PT senator chaired the commission, which included several prominent leaders 
from the opposition Liberal Front Party (PFL). The commission’s task was simple: figure out 
who did what in the post office and how it connected to the PTB.  
Roberto Jefferson takes the stage 
Most corruption investigations in the Brazilian congress do not get very far. A number of 
well-substantiated accusations were leveled against former president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso in 1998, alleging that he had paid congressmen to vote for the constitutional amendment 
that allowed his reelection (CPMI 2006). The claims never led to hearings. This time seemed to 
be different. Although Jefferson led a coalition-member party, he was not powerful enough on 
his own to quash an investigation.  
                                               
26 A “parliamentary inquiry commission,” commissão de inquérito parlamentar, with subpoena power.  
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Yet the accusations against Jefferson were tainted. A little digging—in this case, a few 
depositions from the people involved—suggested that the man who ordered the recording be 
made was himself engaging in foul play. Arthur Wascheck Neto, a businessman who had already 
won several government contracts, apparently wanted to have Maurício Marinho removed from 
his position. Both Wascheck and Jefferson would eventually describe their interactions in some 
detail. Although their accounts differed, an unclear but suggestive picture emerged. Wascheck 
had arranged to meet with Jefferson after Marinho had been caught on tape, or, depending on the 
version of the story that was being told, had arranged through an intermediary to have Jefferson 
see the tape. They may have negotiated; they may not have negotiated. The commission’s report 
made it clear that something was wrong: “[Wascheck’s] actions are suspect to the degree that he 
did not plan to formally denounce Mr. Maurício Marinho” (CPMI 2006, 38). Though they do not 
come to any conclusions about Wascheck’s goals, it is likely that he was attempting to blackmail 
Jefferson.  
It might have been possible to use Wascheck’s apparently corrupt intentions to dismiss 
demands that an investigation begin. José Casado, a reporter at O Globo in Rio de Janeiro, said 
that Jefferson tried to call in favors to get the commission muzzled (Interview Aug 2011). He 
was, after all a party leader with more than a few chips to cash in. That strategy failed. Even if 
the recordings had been made for a blackmail scheme, they contained strong evidence of corrupt 
behavior and clear links to Jefferson. The taint on Jefferson was great enough—and word of it 
had spread far enough—that no one wanted to be seen attempting to help him.  
Jefferson must have realized that no one was coming to his rescue. So he began talking. 
He talked about something called the “Mensalão.” Mensalão is a word of Jefferson’s invention. 
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It means “big monthly,” as in “big monthly allowance,” and it describes a patronage machine 
that extended far beyond the postal service and the PTB.  
On June 6, 2005, the Folha de S. Paulo ran a front-page article headlined: “PT gave an 
allowance of 30,000 reais to MPs, says Jefferson.” The story related an interview Jefferson gave 
to the paper in which he described a PT scheme to buy party blocs in the national congress. 
Jefferson presents the damning details in as self-serving a way as possible, but the facts of the 
case are extremely disturbing. In the article, Jefferson gives this account of a conversation he had 
with José Carlos Martínez, the previous head of the PTB: 
“Roberto, Delúbio [Soares, PT treasurer] is making a payment allowance scheme, 
a ‘big monthly,’ for the MPs in the governing coalition. The PP [Popular Party], 
the PL [Liberal Party], and he wants the PTB to also receive it. Thirty thousand 
reais for each deputy. What do you say?” I say: “I’m against this. This is 
something for a fifth-rate city council. It will enslave us and demoralize us.” 
Martinez decided not to accept the payments which, according to him, Dr. 
Delúbio was already passing to the PP and the PL.” (Folha de S. Paulo 6/6/2005) 
On the following pages, Jefferson claims that Delúbio Soares approached another PTB leader 
after Martínez’s death and made the same offer, this time bringing with him deputies from the 
Popular Party and the head of the Liberal Party, São Paulo deputy Valdemar da Costa Neto.  
Neto filed an official complaint against Jefferson that afternoon, alleging to the Chamber 
of Deputies’ Commission on Ethics and Parliamentary Decorum that Jefferson’s remarks were 
libelous violations of congressional rules.  
Two days later, the congressional inquiry commission into the post office scandal took its 
seats. Their work would validate most of Jefferson’s claims. New denunciations took place each 
day, as leaders of various parties, Workers’ Party officials, businessmen, and, eventually, cabinet 
ministers took the stand to deny the accusations, dodge them, or pass the buck. The millions of 
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Brazilians who watch nightly news saw, day after day, senior officials describe a corruption 
machine that seemed to involve the entire government.  
The Valério-Viaduct 
As the scheme unraveled, it became clear that the money to buy votes had not come 
directly from the PT treasury. Instead, a publicist named Marcos Valério provided loans to the 
PT through his public relations companies. The loans were underwritten by two major banks in 
Valério’s home state of Minas Gerais. BMG Bank and Banco Rural signed off on huge loans to 
the PT, or to Delúbio Soares himself, allowing Soares, whose net worth was, according to the 
investigating committee, “163,000 reais and a [Toyota] Corolla” to guarantee a loan of 26 
million reais—an arrangement that suggested the bank was colluding by virtue of its “lack of 
interest” (CPMI 2006, 542) in tracking the loans. Though the money came from loans, Valério 
did not bother collecting interest on the loans until after the parliamentary inquiry commission 
had begun issuing subpoenas.  
Most of the cash involved in the loans did not come from Valério himself. Companies 
could contact Valério to express their interest in giving to the PT, and he would arrange for their 
money to pass through his publicity firms. The money then moved through a series of accounts 
on its way to the coffers of the PT, sometimes as cash carried in suitcases to Brasília by Valério 
and his assistants, at other times going directly to the PT in the form of a loan. The papers began 
calling the scheme “Valérioduto,” a play on Valério’s name and the word for a viaduct. The 
congressional investigation found that at least 55.8 million reais (about 30 million dollars) 
passed through the Valérioduto on their way to the PT.   
The businesses that took part in Valério’s scheme did so because they believed they 
would benefit from a close relationship with the PT. Some were involved because they were 
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themselves under the control of PT officials (Casado, Interview Aug 2011). One of the most 
damaging stories to come out of the Valérioduto testimony concerned the Bank of Brazil, a semi-
private commercial bank whose CEO is appointed by the president of Brazil. Over four years, 
the bank had paid Valério’s DNA Publicity a total of 93 million reais (about 60 million dollars) 
for several publicity campaigns. Much of this money was given as advances, and the 
congressional commission found that over 70 million reais were, for one reason or another, not 
documented properly.  
Digging deeper, the commission discovered that one particularly large payment, a 55 
million-real advance, had gone to Valério’s company without passing through normal channels. 
It had apparently been ordered by Luiz Gushiken, then-minister of communications. This was the 
first time a cabinet minister other than José Dircéu (the former PT president and, at the time, 
chief of staff to Lula) had been named in the investigation.  
Valério claimed that he had acted on orders from Delúbio Soares, the PT’s treasurer. 
Gushiken’s involvement was the first confirmations that high-level members of the executive 
branch had knowledge of and participated in the corruption scheme. Gushiken’s conduct was 
particularly damaging because it came closer to plunder of government institutions than did the 
rest of Valério’s activities, which were in effect illegal campaign donations. Indeed, Valerio’s 
defense was that he was guilty only of cooking his books
 27
 to cover up extra campaign 
donations, something the law and the public consider a lesser offense. 
But the money was used to buy votes, and Valério, in his testimony, indicated that he was 
aware of this. He also claimed to have met with Delúbio Soares two to three times each week. 
These meetings were ostensibly about the PT’s public image. Indeed, they might have been—
                                               
27 Maintaining a “second ledger”—a caixa dois—the standard term for hiding money for the purposes of 
embezzlement.  
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Valério was one of the PT’s primary public relations workers. As the commission notes, 
however, Valério’s visits to Brasília coincided with large cash withdrawals and suspicious bank 
movements. Regardless of whatever else he did in those meetings, he discussed the scheme, and 
sometimes took an active role in disbursing money to the parties involved, as when he helped 
deliver a six-million real payment to Liberal Party president Valdemar da Costa Neto.  
Throughout his testimony, Valério insisted that the scheme was run from PT headquarters 
by Delúbio Soares. Jefferson had said that it was in fact José Dircéu, chief of staff to President 
Lula, who kept the scheme going. Valério eventually admitted that he had, in fact, been to the 
Planalto Palace (the presidential residence) to meet with Dircéu two or three times, and that he 
had been accompanied on one of those visits by the head of Banco Rural and another time by the 
head of BMG Bank. The facts seemed to align with the accusations. Jefferson’s picture of a 
money-laundering and vote-buying scheme run out of the presidential palace seemed, 
unbelievably, true.  
What happened in Congress 
Over the following months, fallout from the scandal worked its way through the 
government. Jefferson had named 40 government officials in his testimony to the investigative 
commission, and soon, federal prosecutors unsealed an indictment containing 40 names, 
beginning with José Dircéu. Nineteen of the accused named in Jefferson’s testimony and in the 
indictment had been elected federal deputies in 2002. (Dircéu, had become chief of staff to 
President Lula in January 2003, but retained his seat in congress and the privileges of a deputy.) 
Among the accused deputies were senior leaders in several ruling coalition parties: Valdemar da 
Costa Neto, president of the PL, João Paulo Cunha, president of the Chamber of Deputies and a 
longtime PT member, José Borba, head of the PMDB delegation in the chamber, Pedro Corrêa, 
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president of the PP, “Professor”28 Luizinho, head of the PT delegation in the Chamber, and of 
course, PTB president Roberto Jefferson.  
 One peculiarity of the Brazilian system, noted in Figueiredo and Limongi (2000), is that 
a group of party leaders known as the “directorial table”29 makes most of the decisions about 
which bills will be assigned to committees and which will be brought to the floor immediately 
under urgency rules. The group also has sole power to approve the legislative calendar. All of the 
party leaders named above were part of this directorial table, meaning that most of the congress’s 
agenda-setters had been accused and were under investigation. The fact that the accusations were 
highly public and generated near-immediate changes in public opinion is the key to 
understanding why these congressional leaders did not use their agenda-setting powers to quash 
the investigation.  
They did, however, use their agenda-setting power in one important way: Roberto 
Jefferson was the first deputy whose case was voted on in the national congress. The vote on 
Dircéu’s expulsion occurred in December. Most of the accused did not appear before the plenary 
until the following March, five months after the scandal broke—a sign that the leaders hoped to 
minimize their own vulnerability by delaying most of the votes until public anger had 
diminished. 
Parliamentary immunity in Brazil ensures that federal deputies are protected from most 
prosecutions. They cannot stand trial for crimes until after an absolute majority of the deputies 
vote to strip them of their political protections. Such a vote can take place only after the 
congressional Commission on Ethics and Decorum has heard the accusations against a deputy 
                                               
28 Candidates may register with the electoral tribunal under just about any name. “Professor” is the name that 
appeared on the ballot for Mr. Luizinho, a former teacher, and “Zé,” the Brazilian equivalent of “Joe” was the name 
under which Dircéu had been elected.  
29 Mesa diretória 
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and issued a recommendation in favor of or against expulsion. Importantly, this commission may 
only open investigations into allegations against sitting federal deputies. The ethics commission 
may not investigate a deputy who resigns his seat the day before an investigation into his action 
was to be announced. Such a deputy would not lose the right to contest future elections, and his 
political rights would not be subject to a parliamentary vote. Deputies whom the chamber expels 
lose the right to contest future elections.  
Several deputies chose to resign their seats prior to the October 17, 2005 opening of the 
ethics commission investigation. One, Paulo Rocha, a popular PT deputy from Pará state, handed 
in his resignation only minutes before the investigation officially opened. Such resignations 
should be seen as rational decisions made with reelection in mind. Resigning in this fashion is 
not as costly as a resignation would likely be under a different electoral system. Although voters 
go to the polls to cast one vote for federal deputy, those votes are pooled following a variation on 
the D’Hondt system. It is possible for a deputy candidate with few personal votes, or one who 
sees his vote share decline significantly relative to a previous election, to nonetheless win a seat 
on the strength of other candidates and his position on the party list. Candidates who resign prior 
to the opening of an ethics investigation believe that the reputational cost of quitting office in the 
face of corruption charges is small enough, in terms of personal and party votes lost, that they are 
likely to win reelection despite having resigned. When compared to the possibility of losing 
one’s right to run for office, the risks associated with resigning may seem smaller than the risks 
associated with staying in the congress during an investigation.  
Four deputies availed themselves of the option to resign. Of these, two ran for seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies again in 2006; both of them were reelected. Valdemar da Costa Neto 
resigned because his prominent role in the scandal made it likely that he would be expelled, 
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while his position as head of the Liberal Party would allow him to maintain a high spot on the 
party list. That position turned out to be sufficient to win him another term. Paulo Rocha likely 
believed that his high personal popularity at home (he won 4.9 percent of the vote in Pará, an 
extraordinarily large share in a Brazilian federal deputy election) would allow him to 
successfully contest his state in the future. He, too, was reelected. Another deputy who resigned, 
a PMDB member from Paraná state, chose not to run in 2006. The fourth, a prominent former 
evangelical bishop from the city of Rio de Janeiro (whose name on the ballot was “Bishop 
Rodrigues”), also chose not to run in 2006, likely because he was being investigated by the 
federal police for his role in an ambulance contract scandal (Coutinho 2006).  
The resignations were one more part of the spectacle that Brazilian voters saw unfolding 
in congress. News coverage made it clear that those who resigned were doing so to escape 
justice, and it is reasonable to assume that the image of loopholes protecting wrongdoers rankled 
in many voters’ minds.  
Public opinion during the scandal 
It may be problematic to assume that the Brazilian public’s opinion of the congress and 
the president track each other in meaningful ways. Datafolha, Brazil’s most important public 
polling firm, keeps much closer tabs on the president’s approval rating than on the public’s 
evaluation of congress. The company asks respondents whether they think the president and 
congress are doing a “good or excellent” job, a “normal” job, or a “bad” job. In general, over 
periods where the share of respondents saying the president is doing a good job is falling, the 
share of respondents who approve of the congress is also falling. A similar relationship exists 
between “bad” responses for the president and congress. The exact degree to which variation in 
one can be explained by the other is small, but the two trend in the same direction. Lula 
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consistently received higher approval ratings and lower disapproval ratings than congress. This 
relationship matters here because Datafolha did not poll voters on what they thought of congress 
between August 12, 2005, and February 7, 2006. It did, however, conduct a presidential approval 
poll in late October 2005—the week following the announcements by the ethics commission and 
the resignations to avoid the ethics commission. In that poll, Lula received the highest 
disapproval rating of his term, 28 percent, and the lowest approval rating of his term, also 28 
percent. 
Figure 4.1 Public Disapproval of President and Congress during the Mensalão Scandal 
 
Over the long term, the relationship between presidential approval and support for the 
congress is unclear. Far less data is available on congressional approval, and the data begin after 
the start of Lula’s term and end once he left office. Further, Lula’s immense personal popularity 
at the end of his second term, itself an exceptional trend, causes his approval rating to become 
independent of the congress’s from October 2006 on. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
P
er
ce
n
t 
W
h
o
 D
is
ap
p
ro
ve
d
 
Congressional
Disapproval
Lula Disapproval
95 
 
Figure 4.2 Lula and Congressional Approval Rating, 2004-2010 
 
Nonetheless, during the Mensalão period, Lula and the congress’s ratings seem to track each 
other. Indeed, the two are highly correlated in the period of intense polling that began with the 
post office scandal in early 2005. 
One of the most interesting things about public opinion during the Mensalão scandal is its 
responsiveness to events in the congress. In January 2004, disapproval of the congress had stood 
at 22 percent. Because Datafolha did not poll voters on what they thought of congress before that 
time, it is not possible to say whether 22 percent was an especially high or low disapproval 
rating. By early June 2005, just days before Jefferson’s accusations landed in the papers, 
Datafolha registered a 38 percent disapproval rating, likely elevated because of the post office 
scandal. The company ran two polls immediately after the Mensalão scandal broke, registering a 
ten-point increase in voter disapproval of congress within about five weeks.  
At the end of the summer, Datafolha found that 48 percent of Brazilian voters believed 
that congress was doing a bad job. Only twelve percent believed things were going alright in 
Brasília.  
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Unfortunately, Datafolha did not conduct another survey about congress until February of 
2006. Voter disapproval had declined since the summer, but quickly rose again, jumping eight 
points in early March and six more in early April. (Datafolha seems to launch opinion studies 
whenever it suspects that public opinion is shifting.) In March, the congressional ethics 
commission had begun issuing its recommendations, and the chamber had begun voting on 
whether to expel members accused of involvement in the Mensalão. Four were exonerated by the 
congress in those weeks, including the head of the PL and the former leader of the PT in the 
chamber. One PT deputy had risen from her seat to celebrate the acquittal of another PT 
colleague; the press quickly labeled her giddy steps a “pizza dance” in honor of the exonerated 
deputy. On television, Congress appeared to be a place where criminals went free. Disapproval 
hit 47 percent in early April.  
Not every deputy who had been involved was acquitted or resigned. But those who were 
expelled lost their seats much earlier in the process than those who were ultimately acquitted: 
Jefferson was kicked out in September 2005, José Dircéu, who was still a deputy while serving 
as a cabinet minister, was expelled in December 2005. Even though one deputy did lose his seat 
in the flood of votes taken in late March, most of the votes that month kept congressmen in their 
places. The apparent glee with which deputies celebrated the exoneration of colleagues whose 
alleged crimes had been detailed in public and barely denied (Recall that Marcos Valério’s 
defense was to claim that he had simply engaged in illicit accounting practices.) would upset any 
voter who disliked corruption. The opinion polling data suggest that voters did react negatively 
to these examples of impunity.  
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Regional differences, the poor, and “Rouba, más faz” 
One of the truisms of Brazilian political reporting is an interesting, condescending 
assertion about the poor. In interviews with reporters, political scientists, and opposition 
sympathizers I would ask why corrupt politicians were often reelected. They would respond by 
explaining that poor Brazilians think of politicians in terms of what they have brought or are 
likely to bring to them personally—a standard assumption in the political science literature since 
Downs (1957). The difference for Brazilian poor is that personal benefit is their sole criterion, 
such that when presented with evidence of misuse of public money, these voters respond “rouba, 
más faz”: “he (or she) steals, but gets things done.” (Weber and Leali, Interview Aug 2011). Poor 
voters, it is assumed, place no value on probity in public administration.  
Such an assumption does not seem outside the bounds of rational voting theory. If voters 
believe that they get more from some policy than they might lose from corruption, it would be 
rational to vote for the corrupt politician whose work benefits them. A Bolsa recipient would 
vote PT if she thought that her vote would keep the money flowing—even if the corruption 
allegations disturbed her. Interestingly, another maxim casts the same kind of attitude in terms 
that might appeal to middle-class merchants: “To govern is to build roads,” a phrase once uttered 
by a São Paulo governor and recently repeated as a reminder to the government in Jornal do 
Comércio, southern Brazil’s equivalent to the Wall Street Journal (5/19/2010). Both maxims 
assume that the frequent reelection of corrupt politicians is a sign that Brazilian voters do not 
care very much about corruption; they locate that indifference in a single-minded search for 
personal benefits. Neither explanation considers how institutional factors may greatly increase 
the likelihood that a deputy would escape punishment.  
The claim that poor Brazilian voters care less about corruption is testable. Datafolha’s 
congressional approval polls break the results down by income.  
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Figure 4.3 Congressional Disapproval During the Mensalão Scandal, by income 
 
Rich voters are indeed more likely to disapprove of the congress at any given time. However, the 
level of disapproval seems to vary at similar rates among both groups. When the rich are 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of congress, the poor are, too. 
Dissatisfaction peaks among the rich in the poll taken in mid-March 2006, just after the 
acquittals, and it peaks among the poor at the same time. Although the set of available 
comparisons is limited, it is clear from the graph that both rich and poor Brazilian voters react to 
news about corruption in congress by becoming increasingly dissatisfied with lawmakers.  
Comparing rich and poor Brazilians thus reveals that both groups react similarly to 
corruption, but their baseline disapproval ratings are different. Cesar Zucco’s (2008; 2010) 
municipal-level results suggest that there may be greater support for the government in poorer 
municipalities because municipalities in poorer regions tend to depend more on federal transfers 
than others. He notes that Lula’s vote share in 2006 (but not 2002) was highest in places where 
local tax revenues were a smaller share of the municipality’s overall revenue—implying a 
relationship between federal transfers and support for the incumbent. This phenomenon could 
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manifest in individual polling data if political leaders in municipalities that were more dependent 
on the federal government expressed regular support for the federal government.  
Another common explanation for the difference in natural disapproval level between rich 
and poor hinges on education. This explanation, mentioned by editors at O Globo in Brasília 
(Weber and Leali, Interview August 2011), holds that while less-educated voters may not 
approve of corruption, they are less likely to know about it and, if they are at the lowest ends of 
the education spectrum, may not understand why the accusations matter. Another reason to 
consider education is that it may affect individual opinions in a way different from wealth. 
Profiles of the PT sometimes describe its base as being composed of two types, one of which is 
the middle-class, highly educated leftist intellectual. If such people are common, they may cause 
the relationship between education and disapproval to differ from the relationship that seems to 
exist between wealth and disapproval. In fact, PT sympathizers tended to disapprove of congress 
less often than average during the Mensalão period.   
Figure 4.4 Congressional Disapproval during the Mensalão Scandal, PT Supporter vs. National Average 
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Although the difference is slight, it is visible and consistent with Holzhacker and Balbachevsky’s 
(2007) finding that evaluations of the government were affected by correlates of PT support. 
Interestingly, the relationship between education and disapproval is almost identical to the 
relationship between income and disapproval. 
Figure 4.5 Congressional Disapproval during the Mensalão Scandal, by education level 
 
The similarity suggests that income and education capture something similar. This is consistent 
with education being a strong predictor of income, and vice versa.   
A final explanation for the divergence between rich and poor notes that Brazil’s poor tend 
to be dispersed in underserved, rural regions. This theory provides a physical explanation for the 
difference: people in rural areas with poor roads have a hard time getting newspapers, and are 
therefore more likely to be uninformed. If the default response of a person who does not know 
much about the congress is to say that it is doing “okay,” then rural people with less access to 
information are less likely to say that the congress is doing a poor job, but those who do have 
access to information are as likely to disapprove as any other person with knowledge of the 
scandal. This version of the “poor voters are different” theory has the advantage of assuming that 
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voters are similarly inclined against corruption, and differ only in terms of their access to 
information.  
Figure 4.6 Congressional Disapproval during the Mensalão Scandal, by population density 
 
Comparing urban and rural respondents produces a small gap, a result that does not 
follow from the hypothesis that living in a rural area has a large impact on voters’ ability to gain 
information about their representatives. Further, people who are so isolated that they are unable 
to get information from newspapers or television are unlikely to be contacted in a national 
opinion poll. If living in a rural area does affect knowledge of current events, the Datafolha 
surveys might not capture it adequately, because the urban-rural distinction as they define it 
labels whole municipalities as either “urban” or “rural,” failing to distinguish between types of 
communities (e.g. between living in the city center and living in a semi-rural section of a greater 
metropolitan area). Such broad definitions of “urban” and “rural” ensure that each varies too 
much in itself to provide accurate information about responses. 
In most of the Datafolha polls conducted during the Mensalão period, “poor” was defined 
as living in a household with a combined monthly income at or below five monthly minimum 
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salaries (R$1,750 in 2006 reais). That standard fails to distinguish between people living near 
poverty and those receiving government assistance—a key demographic for understanding the 
relationship between the Bolsa and public opinion. Two polls conducted in the summer of 2006 
did distinguish between respondents who made between zero and two minimum salaries and 
those who made between two and five. With those demographics included it is possible to see 
that the previous measure of poor peoples’ support for the government likely underestimated the 
gap between the rich and the very poor, who make up a sizable part of the electorate.  
Figure 4.7 Congressional Disapproval During the Mensalão Scandal, by Income Stratum 
 
In May, those who reported incomes of two or less times the minimum salary were 13 percent 
less likely to express dissatisfaction with the congress than were respondents in the next category 
up. They were 30 percent less likely to be dissatisfied than people in the top bracket of ten or 
more minimum monthly salaries. Such people were the closest to the Bolsa program eligibility 
threshold, and thus the most likely to receive program benefits or know someone else who did.  
Overall, public opinion data reveal that the lower and upper classes respond in similar 
ways to accusations of corruption in congress. They also reveal that, at least during Lula’s first 
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term, wealthier respondents were at all times more likely to express dissatisfaction with the 
congress. The common theory that the poor are more tolerant of corruption does not fit the data 
well, given that the change in opinion for each group roughly tracks the other. If poorer voters 
indeed had a greater tolerance for corruption, in the sense that it is often expressed, that should 
manifest itself as a greater tolerance for marginal units of corruption, and would lead to more 
gently sloping increases and decreases in disapproval relative to the changes in the rich’s level of 
disapproval. The difference between rich and poor manifests itself as a difference in the baseline 
level of approval each group gives to the government, from which both groups deviate roughly 
equivalently. Differences in support for government policies like Bolsa Família and Fome Zero, 
and recognition of the role of government social policy improving the poor’s standard of living, 
could help explain why these groups consistently diverge from each other, while also allowing 
the assumption that voters in each group are, on average, equally disgusted with corruption. If 
aggregate opinion can be compared to individual opinion, the data imply two profiles: the 
wealthy Brazilian voter who gains nothing from the PT government’s social programs and is 
upset by corruption, and the poor voter whose anger at corruption is tempered by her desire to 
see the PT government’s social policies continue. These profiles would be consistent with PT 
losses in southern Brazil and somewhat increased support outside of traditional constituencies.  
The 2006 general elections 
After the Mensalão had worked its way through congress and led to the expulsion of the 
president’s chief of staff, it would be logical to assume that the same voters who registered their 
disapproval with the president’s administration and, for the most part, thought that the congress 
was doing a “bad” job, would also hold a lower opinion of the party that led congress and held 
the presidency. If the Datafolha polls say anything about the electorate as a whole, they suggest 
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that by the end of August 2006, anti-incumbent sentiment far outweighed feelings of goodwill to 
the government and current congress. In this final poll before the October general election, 17 
percent of respondents approved of congress, while 37 percent said it was doing a terrible job. It 
should have been a bad year for incumbents.  
In the congress, it was, and the PT took a serious hit. After losing eight seats, the party 
fell to second-largest in the chamber of deputies, losing the right to lead the chamber and head 
the mesa diretória. The worst losses were for the PFL, which had been the second-largest 
overall, but lost 19 seats. This is quite surprising—while one PFL deputy had been named, then 
acquitted of wrongdoing for his involvement in the Mensalão, the PFL was an opposition party. 
If public anger was strongest at the architects of the scheme, then it would follow that the 
opposition would benefit in the next election, as long as turnout increased or remained constant. 
Instead, the leading opposition party fell from second place overall to tie with the other main 
opposition party, the PSDB, which itself lost five seats.  
Table 4.1 Party Performance in 2002 and 2006 
Party 2002 Change 2006 
PT* 91 -8 83 
PFL* 84 -19 65 
PMDB* 75 +14 89 
PSDB 70 -5 65 
PPB (PP)* 49 -7 42 
PL* 26 -3 23 
PTB* 26 -4 22 
PSB 22 +5 27 
PDT 21 +3 24 
PPS 15 +6 21 
PCdoB 6 +7 13 
PRONA 6 -4 2 
PV 5 +8 13 
PSC 1 +8 9 
Other 11 +4 15 
* Indicates that at least one deputy from 
the party was accused in the Mensalão 
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Only one party that had won more than 20 seats in the 2002 elections managed to 
increase its share in 2006. That party was the PMDB, which won 89 seats in 2006, after taking 
75 in 2002.
30
   The PMDB’s gains are hard to explain in the national context. Mainwaring and 
Scully (1995) note that the PMDB is an opportunistic party, one without a strong ideology. The 
party has joined the ruling coalition in every government since the reforms of 1988. Further, it 
was involved in the Mensalão scandal: José Borba, leader of the PMDB in the chamber of 
deputies, resigned to avoid the ethics commission investigation. Its victory in 2006 is a mystery, 
one that can perhaps be explained by its state-level alliances, or by the way it handled the 
departure of Borba, or by its control of five governorships (though a gubernatorial explanation 
would imply that the PSDB, which controlled more governorships than any other party, should 
have performed better than it did).   
With the important, but difficult to explain exception of the PMDB, parties whose 
deputies were accused of involvement in the Mensalão lost on average of 14 percent of their 
seats (the percentage lost falls to eight percent if one includes the PMDB). Every party with 
more than 25 deputies in the chamber (except the PMDB) lost seats. When congress is doing a 
poor job in the minds of the voters, the big players take the losses. This in turn means smaller 
parties grow: six parties with fewer than 25 seats in 2002 managed to improve their seat share in 
2006.  
Seats won in the congress are a poor proxy for actual voting results, though they do give 
a sense of what happened. One of the interesting results of the 2006 elections was that the PT 
remained the most-voted party in Brazil—despite receiving two million fewer votes in 2006 than 
                                               
30 Electoral data come from the website of Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the TSE.  
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it had in 2002. That the PMDB, with 400,000 fewer votes, was able to win six seats more than 
the PT is an important reminder that the seat-allocation process takes place at the state level. 
Table 4.2 Total Votes Received 2002-2006, ranked by nominal performance 
Party 2002 Party 2006 
PT 16,093,987 PT 13,989,859 
PSDB 12,534,774 PMDB 13,580,517 
PFL 11,706,231 PSDB 12,689,073 
PMDB 11,692,011 PFL 10,182,308 
PPB 6,840,041 PP 6,660,951 
PSB 4,616,860 PSB 5,730,612 
PDT 4,482,528 PDT 4,854,017 
PTB 4,052,107 PTB 4,397,743 
PL 3,780,259 PL 4,080,272 
PPS 2,682,339 PPS 3,630,462 
 
For testing the impact of the Mensalão, state-level results are the most helpful. Two 
phenomena should be observed if the Mensalão hurts candidates and their parties. First, the 
nominal votes received by the party will be lower in 2006 in states whose deputies were accused 
of involvement. Second, the candidates themselves will have lower total votes than they did in 
2002. Because party votes received is the sum of votes received by its candidates, nominal votes 
for a party will decline if nominal votes for a candidate decline. An overall decline in votes for a 
party that is greater than the sum of the decrease in the number of votes won by a candidate 
accused of involvement in the scandal suggests that parties themselves suffer when candidates 
have been accused of corruption.  
Table 4.3 Nominal Votes for Accused Candidates 
Candidate State Party 2002 Nominal 2006 Nominal Change 
Valdemar da Costa Neto SP PL 158,479 104,157 -54,322 
Professor Luizinho SP PTB 142,811 59,176 -83,635 
Vadão Gomes SP PP 108,533 78,728 -29,805 
Wanderval Santos SP PL 177,451 NA NA 
Jose Dircéu SP PT 556,563 NA NA 
João Paulo Cunha SP PT 196,143 177,056 -19,087 
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José Mentor SP PT 182,955 104,960 -77,995 
Carlos Rodrigues RJ PL 192,640 NA NA 
Roberto Jefferson RJ PTB 40,685 NA NA 
Roberto Brant MG PFL 96,769 NA NA 
Roméu Queiroz MG PTB 76,867 NA NA 
João Magno MG PT 99,976 31,956 -68,020 
José Borba PR PMDB 105,302 NA NA 
José Janene PR PP 119,501 NA NA 
Paulo Rocha PA PT 130,974 117,275 -13,699 
Josias Gomes BA PT 75,338 42,771 -32,567 
Sandro Mabel GO PMDB 147,387 108,629 -38,758 
Pedro Henry MT PP 120,840 73,312 -47,528 
Pedro Correa PE PP 66,172 NA NA 
 
The table shows that every deputy named in Jefferson’s testimony who ran for reelection 
in 2006 received fewer votes than he had in 2002. Though the differing sizes of state electorates 
make comparison of nominal votes lost a less-informative exercise, the share of the state-level 
vote has meaning across cases. Given that the average share of the state-level vote won by the 
nineteen accused deputies in 2002 was 2.14 percent (it was 2.63 percent for the subset who ran 
again in 2006), the average decline of 1.01 percent represents a very large decrease. Indeed, three 
of the ten who ran were not reelected (two of these were PT deputies; the other was from the 
PTB).   
Yet seven of the ten were reelected, which raises an interesting paradox. The numbers 
show that the accused candidates lost a significant proportion of nominal votes, yet only a few 
failed to secure reelection. It is easy to see that three of the victorious candidates simply began 
with greater support: Paulo Rocha, Sandro Mabel, and Pedro Henry each had enough votes on 
their own in 2002 to win a seat outright. The other victors won because of the proportional 
representation system, which reallocates votes cast in favor of less-successful party candidates to 
a more-successful candidate of the same party until that person’s combined vote total exceeds the 
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number needed to win a seat. We may conclude that the three candidates with relatively small 
personal vote totals in both elections managed to win on both occasions by getting themselves 
high places on the party list, something that would have been relatively easy for an incumbent, 
regardless of his or her reputation.  
The effect on state-level party vote share of having a Mensalão-associated candidate run 
for reelection is unclear. In some states, the decline in nominal votes for a party exceeded the 
decline in support for the candidate. In other states, nominal votes increased in spite of the 
candidate’s losses. The results for the two parties most important to the scandal illustrate that the 
effect of the Mensalão is hard to tease out at the party level. 
In 2006 Roberto Jefferson’s PTB actually received 300,000 more votes than it had won 
2002, despite being at the center of the post office scandal and having been led by the man who 
invented the word Mensalão. Some of that increase PTB came from São Paulo, where overall 
votes for the party increased by 176,971, though the state’s scandal-tainted deputy “Professor” 
Luizinho received 83,000 fewer votes than he had in 2002. A more surprising increase came in 
Rio de Janeiro state, home to Roberto Jefferson, where votes for the PTB nearly doubled, from 
171,000 to over 330,000. Perhaps the party benefited from being able to claim that it was not 
running any of its notorious former deputies. Perhaps anti-PT voters supported the PTB precisely 
because Jefferson had revealed so much about the PT. It is hard to imagine a situation in this 
highly personalistic voting system (Carey and Shugart 1995) where a party could increase its 
vote share by so much after having two of its largest vote-getters (in the first and third-most 
populous states) declared ineligible to run for reelection. Whatever the case may be, the results 
of the 2006 election in Rio suggest that voters do not systematically punish parties for corrupt 
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actions of their deputies when those parties have not run on platforms emphasizing their greater 
probity.  
The PT in 2006 
The PT lost nearly three million votes nationwide, and half of that decline can be 
accounted for by declines in two large states—São Paulo and Minas Gerais—where the party’s 
nominal vote share declined by 1.06 million and 566,000, respectively. A little less than ten 
percent of the decline in São Paulo can be attributed to declines in the number of votes won by 
the two PT candidates in that state who had been named. A much larger portion of the decline 
can be explained by the absence from the race of José Dircéu. Dircéu, the supposed architect of 
the Mensalão, had been expelled from congress and was thus ineligible to run. In 2002, he had 
received more than 550,000 votes in the state, the second-highest number of votes won by any 
paulista candidate for federal deputy that year. Though it is impossible to determine from the 
data what percentage of former Dircéu voters cast their votes for non-PT candidates in 2006, the 
absence of such a strong candidate, and the fact that such a high-profile member of the São Paulo 
PT had been kicked out of congress, must have accounted for a large portion of the PT’s relative 
losses in that state.  
That a very large portion of the PT’s loss came from São Paulo and Minas Gerais is not a 
surprise. The two states account for 23 percent of Brazil’s population, and in 2002, 44 percent of 
PT votes were cast in those two states. If voters were upset at the PT, the largest nominal swings 
would come in places with the largest electorates and, likely, the places with the largest number 
of previous PT votes. Interestingly, the role of paulista and mineiro voters in the overall PT vote 
declined in 2006. That year, 39 percent of PT voters lived in either Minas Gerais or São Paulo. 
The share of paulista and mineiro votes as part of the overall number of PT votes could decline if 
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the percent decline in PT support in those two states was greater than elsewhere, if the PT grew 
stronger in other states between 2002 and 2006, or if both trends were occurring simultaneously. 
The data do not clarify which is the case, but they do reveal a distinct regional trend. 
Figure 4.7 Relative importance of statistical region in PT national votes, 1994-2006 
 
Over the twelve years covered, the importance of the Southeast region, which includes São Paulo 
and Minas Gerais, declined each election. This is partly a reflection of the fact that when the PT 
was a small party (it received 5.96 million votes in 1994), its base was in São Paulo and it 
reached mostly educated and labor union voters, groups concentrated in the Southeast. The data 
may thus reflect only the natural decline in the weight of base regions as the party expands 
beyond those base regions. 
The chart above is limited because it does not weight the states by population. The 
Southeast region contains the three most populous states in Brazil, accounting for 42 percent of 
the country’s population, while the Northeast contains about 28 percent, and the South, 14 
percent, leaving less than ten percent in the smallest regions. Thus, even if the PT became the 
dominant party of one of the other regions, winning, say, 30 percent of the votes in the Center-
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West, the relative weight of those victories would not create a large difference in the un-
weighted table.  
To understand where the PT was doing best at the state level, we look at the change in the 
PT’s vote share. The graph below shows how the share of the state-level vote the PT received 
changed over time. States are pooled into the five statistical regions defined by the Brazilian 
census bureau.  
Figure 4.8 PT Vote Share by region, 1994-2006 
 
The result shows that support for the PT grew fastest in the South and Southeast until 2002. After 
2002, support for the PT declined most in the three regions where support, as measured by vote 
share, had been highest. In the Southeast, the PT’s share of the vote dropped by nearly five 
percent, from 21 percent to 16. In the rural impoverished North, it rose from 11.7 to 13.1 percent, 
and in the similarly rural and impoverished Northeast, the PT vote share stayed at 13.2 percent of 
the total. These results are consistent with the narrative that attributes PT gains in poor places to 
the Bolsa, and locates PT losses in the fallout from the Mensalão scandal. 
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Conclusion 
The results of the polling presented in this chapter suggest that Brazilian voters care 
about corruption. They also suggest that the relationship between class and government approval 
is complicated. Because the movement in government approval was roughly the same across 
voter categories, theories of voter preference that claim poor voters are more tolerant of 
corruption, or that rural voters are unaware of it, have little explanatory. If they were correct, the 
approval would not trend the same way across categories.  
Those differences that do exist are consistent with their being another force with differing 
effects on different groups’ baseline levels of support for Lula and the PT. Bolsa Família is 
exactly the kind of policy that would do this. Poor voters care about corruption in the same way 
wealthier voters do—which is why their support for Lula and the PT trended upwards and 
downwards with support among other groups—but have a compelling reason to evaluate the 
government more favorably overall.  
This in turn raises a new question: how much did Bolsa money matter in the 2006 
election? And how much has it mattered since? The next chapter attempts to quantify the 
relationship between the Bolsa program and support for the PT in the two elections that have 
taken place since the Mensalão scandal and the Bolsa together changed the PT electorate.  
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Modeling the Political Impact of the Bolsa Família 
Program 
The final goal of this paper is to test whether the Bolsa program has generated support for 
the PT among poor voters across Brazil. So far, the paper has covered how the Bolsa program 
works, its possible clientelistic uses, and extant theories on how the program affects voting 
patterns in presidential elections. In the presidential election literature, Lula’s victory coinciding 
with PT losses raised doubts about whether the program played a meaningful role in partisan (as 
opposed to personal) politics. The discussion of the PT’s reputation, alongside a dissection of the 
2005 Mensalão scandal illustrated the primary reason for the PT’s losses in 2006. If the Bolsa 
had political benefits for PT deputy candidates, those benefits did not result in the party winning 
more congressional seats because the scandal unseated more petistas than the Bolsa put into 
office. Soares and Terron’s work (2008; 2010) in particular suggested that a new pro-PT 
electorate formed in the Northeast as a result of Bolsa money, while support in southern Brazil 
either declined or remained constant.  
To see whether the Bolsa has played this role, it is first necessary to determine whether 
there is a substantive relationship between the Bolsa program and PT electoral results. To do 
this, I borrow from the approach pioneered by Nicolau and Peixoto (2007), this time using a 
multivariate linear model to test the influence of the Bolsa program’s scope on PT electoral 
performance at the municipal level.  
The model is premised on the hypothesis that the Bolsa program caused many voters to 
choose the PT in 2006 and 2010. I expect the program’s effects to be greater in 2006, when it 
counteracted the decline in support from wealthy, southern voters, and was primarily supported 
by the PT, and smaller in 2010, when most candidates supported maintaining or expanding the 
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program. The electoral effects of Bolsa money on PT support may be diluted in 2010 by the lack 
of opposition to the program.    
Dependent Variable 
In every model used, the dependent variable is PT Vote Share, the share of votes won by 
PT candidates in each of the 5,280 municipalities that reported voting returns in 2006 and 2010. 
Information on PT Vote Share in 2010
31
 comes from Brazil’s Supreme Electoral Court, the body 
that administers elections and handles allegations of electoral fraud. PT Vote Share numbers for 
2006 come from the Institute for Applied Economic Studies, a government think tank.
32
   
The hypothesis that Bolsa money increases voter support for the PT implies an 
expectation that PT Vote Share increases linearly with measures of the Bolsa program’s scope.  
A look at a histogram of the PT Vote Share variable reveals that it is not normally 
distributed.  
                                               
31 The 2010 vote share value was computed manually from the reported number of “nominal votes”—the number of 
votes received by candidates who exceeded the threshold needed to win a seat outright—plus the number of “party 
votes” (votos legendas)—which are the votes initially cast for particular candidates but redistributed (because they 
are in excess of the winning threshold or fail to sum to that threshold) to others of the same party according to their 
place on the party’s list. This sum divided by the number of party and nominal votes cast in a municipality produces 
the PT’s vote share in the city that year.  
32 IPEA performed the vote share calculation itself; they derived the number from the process described in the 
previous note.  
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Figure 5.1 Histogram of PT's Municipal Vote Share in 2006 
 
This distribution is a first sign that the residuals of the fitted ordinary least-squares model in 
which the variable will be used may not be normally distributed. This would violate the 
assumptions underlying the procedure and weaken the model’s explanatory power.   
Independent Variables 
Measures of the Bolsa’s Scope 
There are several ways that the Bolsa’s reach within a community can be measured. Two 
measures focus solely on the share of the population receives benefits. The first of these is PBF 
Household Share, the percentage of households within a municipality
33
 that receive Bolsa 
benefits. The value of PBF Household Share is the number of households within a municipality 
listed by the Ministry of Social Development as households that receive Bolsa program benefits 
                                               
33 The municipality, “município,” is a unit of government roughly equivalent to a consolidated city-county. 
Municipal boundaries are set by the federal government. Article 23 of the 1988 constitution sets norms of municipal 
administration for all municipalities in Brazil; municipal elections occur simultaneously nationwide two years after 
each presidential election. 
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divided by the census bureau’s count of households within a community. This measure has the 
disadvantage of not comparing the beneficiary population to an accurate count of the population 
as a whole. Also, MDS only reported the number of beneficiary households for about half of 
Brazil’s cities in 2006. While most municipalities did receive some Bolsa money (a fact 
corroborated by the relatively small increase in the number of total beneficiaries between 2006 
and 2011), many of  them did not report current enrollment to MDS in 2006. By 2010, nearly all 
municipalities reported the number of households receiving benefits.  
To account for possible discrepancies, an alternative model could rely on PBF 
Population Share. This variable is the number of households on the Bolsa rolls in a given 
municipality multiplied by the average number of persons per household (in Brazil, 3.9 persons), 
the product of which is divided by the official census calculation of the city’s population. The 
total population living in beneficiary households is not supplied by MDS because the ministry 
keeps benefit records in the name of the head of household. Although the application form 
provides information about dependents, that information is used in the pre-screening process 
when MDS officials decide whether or not a family is eligible and how much they will receive. 
Even though the names of beneficiaries are a matter of public record, the information that goes 
into individual benefit decisions is not readily available. Further, the program only tracks 
children and wage earners within households, and does not account for adult dependents. Thus, 
the number of people living in Bolsa households must be derived from the number of 
households. PBF Population Share may be inaccurate if some cities have average household 
sizes that deviate substantially from the national average. As a derivative of PBF Household 
Share, it may not be substantially different conceptually, and its potential inaccuracies weaken 
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its reliability. Nevertheless, looking at the Bolsa program in terms of its reach within the 
population (rather than among households) may provide a useful lens.  
Measuring the share of the population receiving benefits may fail to capture the 
importance of the program to the local economy, and provides no information about whether the 
beneficiaries are drawing the maximum benefit (which would indicate they are extremely poor) 
or fall only slightly below the eligibility threshold. One way to measure the Bolsa’s overall 
impact is with PBF Payment Per Capita, which is the total value of benefit payments disbursed 
within a municipality divided by that municipality’s population. Where this is high, the Bolsa 
program is reaching many people or paying large benefits. This measure has the disadvantage of 
not providing any indication of how widely program benefits are distributed—a community with 
a moderate number of very poor Bolsa recipients would be indistinguishable from one where the 
Bolsa reaches many people who are less needy.  
A final possible measure of the Bolsa program’s importance looks at its share of 
municipal GDP. In the poorest communities, Bolsa money makes up a substantial portion of 
municipal income. These communities may be more likely to have mayors who talk about the 
Bolsa program and campaign on behalf of PT candidates; the benefits to such communities from 
the program are greater than in any others. Thus, PBF GDP Share, the percentage of municipal 
GDP accounted for by Bolsa funds, may capture the program’s importance at the municipal level 
in ways that the other measures do not. Unfortunately, PBF GDP Share is likely to diminish with 
the size of the municipality—large cities have more sources of income while Bolsa benefits are 
capped—which makes the variable a function of both Bolsa scope and city size.  
Each of the four measures of Bolsa scope track roughly the same thing, and the four are 
highly correlated. Below are scatterplots comparing the relationship between PBF Payment Per 
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Capita with the three other possible measures of the Bolsa program’s scope. The relationship 
between payment per capita and share of the population receiving benefits is more linear than the 
relationship between per capita payment and the percentage of a city’s GDP accounted by 
benefits because the determinants of payment levels and benefit reach are roughly the same, 
while changes in Bolsa GDP share may be the result of changes in either benefit levels or 
economic conditions.  
Figure 5.2 Scatter plots of per capita Bolsa payment and correlated explanatory variables 
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This paper focuses on PBF Payment Per Capita because, more than any other measure of 
Bolsa program scope, it provides information about the breadth and depth of the government’s 
response to municipal-level poverty. Even though the measure cannot distinguish between 
communities with deep poverty and those with broad but less serious poverty, the scatterplots 
above suggest that PBF Payment Per Capita captures most of the information provided by 
measures of the percentage of residents receiving benefits, while accounting to some degree for 
the importance of the program in the economic life of the community. The measure of the Bolsa 
as a share of municipal GDP contains a number of extreme outliers, many of which were 
excluded from the scatterplot above. Those outliers reflect a more serious problem for that 
variable as a candidate for inclusion in a linear regression model—it is not normally distributed. 
Instead, as might be expected of a variable that is the quotient of a usually small, capped value 
(the Bolsa budget) and a value with no upper limit (GDP), it resembles a Poisson or beta 
distribution.    
When comparing the role of PBF Payment Per Capita in the 2006 and 2010 elections, it 
is important to keep in mind that the distribution of the variable changed over time. Because the 
Bolsa program’s budget increased repeatedly after its inception (and continues to increase), the 
average benefit per person has increased. This, along with repeated changes to the eligibility line, 
has greatly increased the amount of money allocated to municipalities over time. In 2006, the 
average value of the per capita Bolsa budget at the municipal level
34
 was R$5.43. By 2010, that 
value had increased to R$9.28—almost double the level in the year of Lula’s reelection.  
Because the PBF Payment Per Capita variable is the principal variable of interest in a 
multivariate regression model, it is important to examine its characteristics. Unfortunately, the 
                                               
34 This value is computed over the whole population of the city, not over the number of Bolsa beneficiaries. In other 
words, it is not the average benefit MDS paid to Bolsa recipients in a given city.  
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variable has a bimodal distribution. Using a variable with a non-normal distribution could violate 
the assumptions underlying linear regression (Hanushek and Jackson 1977), but because the 
most logical alternative—the measures of population or household share receiving benefits—are 
also bimodally distributed, the data leave the choice of either omitting any analysis of Bolsa 
program’s effects, or pushing forward knowing that the data are not ideal for the tests I am able 
to carry out. Performing the D’Agostino-Pearson omnibus test35 for normality on PBF Payment 
Per Capita and PBF Share confirms that neither variable is normally distributed. Although PBF 
Share departs from normality less than does PBF Payment Per Capita, the omnibus test statistic 
is useful only for showing whether or not a tested distribution approximates a normal 
distribution, and should not be used for deciding between two confirmedly non-normal variables.  
Control Variables 
Other possible explanations for the PT’s performance are accounted for in the models. 
Because voters who dislike Lula are less likely to like the PT, and to a lesser extent because 
voters who like Lula are more likely to vote PT, Lula’s vote share at the municipal level might 
explain some of the variation in the PT’s electoral performance. It is included as a control.  
Because established party organizations and incumbency play an important role in party 
performance, previous success in an area will likely have a strong, positive impact on subsequent 
electoral performance. Some versions of the model include the PT’s previous municipal vote 
share with the variable PT Vote Share (Year).  
Previous studies of the Bolsa’s electoral effects and the PT suggest that wealth level 
affects the likelihood that a person will support the PT. These effects are pronounced at the 
individual level but may be diluted when taken in the aggregate. It is nevertheless worthwhile to 
                                               
35 The D’Agostino-Pearson omnibus test measures the degree to which a variable departs from normality. The 
omnibus statistic equals the squared sum of the tested distribution’s skewness and kurtosis. A higher omnibus value 
indicates a greater departure from normality.  
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include a measure of municipal wealth, to test whether municipalities’ voting profiles were 
products of both social policy and overall wealth. All models that include this variable use a 
measure of median per capita income.  
Three more control variables test whether known correlates of poverty have their own 
special consequences for PT vote share. The percentage of the municipal population with houses 
in rural areas, the percentage of people who were illiterate, and the percentage living in 
inadequate housing all increase in areas with high poverty, and thus are highly correlated with 
per capita Bolsa payment. Because Zucco (2008) suggested that rural voters are inherently pro-
government, and because so many authors believed lack of access to information played a role in 
the PT’s improvement among the poorest voters, the models include the share of people living in 
rural areas and the illiteracy rate as proxies for these phenomena. Inadequate housing is included 
as an additional measure of the depth of poverty within a municipality.  
Two final variables test the influence of age and social security on the PT’s electoral 
performance. Bohn (2011) argued that Lula’s Statute of the Elderly and expansions to social 
security turned older voters toward the PT. Percent receiving BPC measures the share of the 
municipal population benefiting from the Continuous Benefit social security program. Because 
most BPC beneficiaries are elderly, and the program provides the principal reason for thinking 
that elderly voters came around to the PT, it is not necessary to include the share of elderly 
persons among the population alongside the share of people receiving the BPC. Because Bohn 
also suggested that the youngest voters preferred the PT, the model includes a measure of the 
share of the population aged 15 – 24, a useful proxy for the youngest group of voters (aged 16 – 
24).   
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A final set of models includes a Mensalão variable, a dichotomous variable that indicates 
whether a given municipality is in a state that had at least one federal deputy involved in the 
2005 scandal. Because the presence of a PT deputy or an allied deputy is more likely in states 
that have large PT support, this measure may be a poor proxy for the influence of the scandal, 
and may have a positive relationship with PT vote share at the municipal level. Ideally, it will 
have a negative impact on PT share; because existing PT support makes the presence of an 
implicated legislator more likely, a positive impact would not provide compelling evidence that 
voters were indifferent towards the scandal.   
Results 
2006 and 2010 Compared on Bolsa payment per capita 
Most of the analysis cited in earlier portions of this paper focused on the 2006 elections. 
Beginning with Hunter and Power (2007) and Nicolau and Peixoto (2007), political scientists 
looked for ways to explain why the incumbent president Lula won reelection after the Mensalão 
scandal. Their explanations were driven by an observation that the geography of Lula support 
had changed over time, and they focused on the Bolsa Família as an explanation for the 
northward drift of Lula support.  
The following table presents a multivariate regression analysis testing whether there 
existed a relationship between measures of the Bolsa program’s reach and the share of the vote 
won by the PT in the 5,146 municipalities that reported their election returns and Bolsa budgets 
in 2006.   
Table 5.1 PT Vote Share 2006 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 11.726 6.119 6.949 4.801 4.646 1.093 -1.256 
 
0.991 1.212 0.778 0.955 1.029 1.796 1.849 
Per capita Bolsa 
payment 
-0.314 -0.553 -0.100 -0.190 -0.160 -0.130 -0.096 
0.079 0.084 0.062 0.066 0.076 0.077 0.077 
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Lula vote share 0.097 
 
0.038 0.039 0.040 0.041 
  
0.012 
 
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
PT vote share 2002 
 
0.698 0.693 0.692 0.691 0.696 
   
0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 
Mensalão 
      
1.205 
       
0.236 
Median per capita 
income 
0.002 0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Percent rural 0.031 0.042 0.022 0.026 0.020 0.032 0.039 
 
0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Percent illiterate 
   
-0.020 -0.022 -0.004 
     
0.025 0.025 0.025 
Percent with inadequate housing 
 
0.017 0.017 0.012 
     
0.010 0.010 0.010 
Percent receiving BPC 
   
0.883 0.758 
      
0.184 0.185 
Percent aged 15-24 
    
0.098 0.127 
      
0.073 0.073 
        
Number of cities 5,146 5,145 5,145 5,137 5,135 5,135 5,134 
  0.014 0.026 0.399 0.402 0.404 0.402 0.406 
Italicized results significant at 5% 
Standard errors appear below estimated coefficients 
 
The results are surprising. In the simplest version of the model, increases in per capita 
Bolsa payments are associated with declining PT vote share. This result is consistent with the 
idea that PT supporters tend to concentrate in wealthier cities. Historic trends in PT support 
suggest that many of its strongest municipal-level results would be in highly urbanized, Southern 
municipalities. If even a handful of those municipalities remained major contributors to the PT’s 
base (and, as the charts on the relative importance of regions indicated, they had), the 
relationship between the PT’s vote share and the per capita Bolsa payment would likely be 
negative. Because PBF Per Capita is partly a measure of poverty, and the PT’s strongest areas 
are non-poor, this model may fail to capture the true relationship between the Bolsa and PT 
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support; only one kind of PT supporter is, under this paper’s working hypothesis, a petista 
because of the Bolsa. That voter is more likely to live in a community without a long tradition of 
PT support and a weak or nonexistent local party organization. The measure of per capita income 
was meant to control for this tendency; its failure to achieve significance (and failure to have 
more than a negligible estimated effect) suggests that median per capita income is a poor way to 
model the class determinants of PT preference.    
By controlling for Lula’s vote share in the election, the second model introduces a 
variable known to be highly positively correlated with PBF Per Capita Benefit. Because 
municipalities with high PT vote share usually had high Lula vote share, but municipalities with 
high Lula vote share only sometimes went strongly for the PT, Lula’s vote share is weakly 
negatively correlated with the PT’s share. Introducing Lula’s vote share strengthens the negative 
predicted impact of PBF Per Capita Benefit. Although it is important to control for Lula’s 
performance, his vote share is not independent of the PT’s. The strong correlation between the 
Bolsa and Lula’s performance means that Lula’s vote share varies with both the dependent 
variable and the explanatory variable of greatest interest. Any electoral gains that went to the PT 
in 2006 because of the Bolsa program likely also went to Lula, and may have been captured by 
the Lula 2006 variable to the detriment of accurate measurement of the Bolsa’s effect on the PT.  
The complicated relationship between Lula’s performance and that of his party means 
that it is worth considering a variation hat excludes Lula while testing for the influence of past 
party performance. PT Share 2002 turns out, unsurprisingly, to be a powerful predictor of PT 
performance in 2006. With this control included, the per capita Bolsa benefit’s predicted impact 
drops precipitously and fails to achieve significance. PT Share 2002 may be the best way to 
control for the class-based patterns historically present in PT voting, and could make it easier to 
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separate new votes related to the Bolsa from longtime PT support. The non-significant impact of 
PBF Per Capita in this model suggests that, once the PT’s history has been accounted for, the 
Bolsa program’s impact is unclear. Although that does not provide clear support for the claim 
that the Bolsa helped create new support for the PT, it also suggests that the initial results, which 
produced a strong negative relationship, did not account for the influence of the PT’s middle-
class base. The R-squared term in the models jumps precipitously once the PT’s previous vote 
share is taken into account, as would be expected of any model that includes an explanatory 
variable highly correlated with the response.  
Subsequent versions of the model attempt to control for different economic conditions 
that might have some bearing on the PT’s performance independent of the Bolsa program. Each 
of these is fairly strongly correlated with the per capita Bolsa payment, and introducing them 
may increase to an unacceptable level predicted coefficients’ sensitivity to small changes in the 
dependent variable. In these models, the Bolsa’s per capita payment is negatively related to the 
PT’s vote share. The fact that the percentage of households receiving payments from the 
Continuous Benefit program is positively and significantly related to PT performance is a sign 
that Bohn (2011) was right to include this variable in her analysis of Lula’s electoral 
performance. The importance of the Continuous Benefit hints at one explanation for the relative 
unimportance of the Bolsa program: the BPC provides a very large benefit (a full minimum 
monthly salary) to a very needy group of people (elderly or disabled people with monthly 
incomes below one-fourth the minimum salary) and has been in place since 1988.
36
 The Bolsa 
program provides less money, reaches many households with only one voter (large numbers of 
children would increase per capita Bolsa payments without producing electoral effects), and has 
                                               
36 Assistance of the kind currently provided by the Benefício de Prestação Continuada is guaranteed by Article 203 
of the 1988federal constitution.  
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been in place for only a short time. Lula’s push for laws against age-discrimination amplified the 
age-group effects measured by the BPC variable, and those beneficiaries seem to have chosen 
the PT. It is important to keep in mind that in 75 percent of municipalities less than three-
quarters of one percent of the population receive BPC benefits. Thus, the BPC’s strong 
relationship with PT vote share does not mean that it had a strong impact on the absolute number 
of votes for the PT. Nonetheless, if the BPC program has a strong positive impact because it 
provides a large benefit and has been around for decades, the Bolsa program might have a 
smaller impact because it provides smaller benefits and is newer. If this is true, when the 
absolute value of Bolsa benefits increases, and the program becomes a more permanent fixture 
on the political scene, its importance in elections will increase. Such a result would be consistent 
with Stokes’ (2005) finding that targeted benefits are more likely to influence voting when 
beneficiaries believe the benefits are permanent.   
Taken together, the results of the linear model suggest three possibilities. First, in 2006, 
the Bolsa may have been causing low PT vote share. This is not consistent with current theories 
of voting behavior, and seems unlikely to be the case. Second, the tendency of wealthier 
municipalities to support the PT might have been stronger than the tendency of poorer ones to do 
the same—despite the scandal. Bolsa is concentrated in the Northeast, and the PT’s support base 
is in the South. If the scandal reduced support in the South and the Bolsa increased support for 
the PT in the North, but the changes did not lead to the North becoming the PT’s most important 
region, one would expect this model would find a negative relationship between PT support and 
the Bolsa program’s scope. This relationship would be weakened, but not necessarily controlled 
for, by inclusion of the PT’s 2002 vote share. A third interpretation would argue that the 
variables are poor proxies for what they are being used to study. The PT’s vote share at the 
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municipal level might not be a good indicator of who is voting for the PT. In addition, the non-
normal distributions of several variables might be weakening the estimates. This interpretation 
would hold that the results are inconclusive because they rely on inaccurate methods.  
2010 Election 
Comparison of a similar model for 2010 suggests that the relationship with per capita 
Bolsa payment in 2010 is positive and stronger than the predicted relationship in 2006. This 
would be consistent with the claim that as benefits grow and the program becomes a fixture of 
national politics, its effect on elections increases.
37
  
Table 5.2 PT Vote Share 2010 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 11.34 9.015 2.889 2.065 3.998 3.19 
 
1.524 1.592 1.221 1.274 1.315 2.189 
Per capita Bolsa payment 0.0301 -0.187 0.0961 0.039 0.191 0.192 
 
0.074 0.080 0.059 0.064 0.073 0.073 
Dilma vote share 
 
0.076 
 
0.028 0.032 0.033 
  
0.015 
 
0.012 0.012 0.012 
PT vote share 2006 
  
0.726 0.723 0.714 0.713 
   
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Median per capita income 0.0054 0.005 0.0036 0.003 -3E-04 3E-04 
 
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Percent rural 0.0602 0.052 0.038 0.035 0.052 0.057 
 
0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 
Percent illiterate 
    
-0.14 -0.13 
     
0.030 0.030 
Percent with inadequate housing 
   
-0.04 -0.04 
     
0.012 0.012 
Percent receiving BPC 
     
0.352 
      
0.224 
Percent aged 15-24 
     
0.011 
      
0.086 
Number of cities 5,149 5,148 5,145 5,144 5,137 5,135 
   0.010 0.015 0.376 0.377 0.381 0.381 
Italicized results significant at 5% 
Standard errors appear below estimated coefficients 
                                               
37 The Mensalão variable is excluded because it is not assumed to have an effect on 2010 vote share.  
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In every model version that controls for previous PT vote share, higher Bolsa payments 
per capita are positively associated with the party’s performance. Interestingly, these positive 
results become much stronger (and achieve significance) only after controlling for the proportion 
of the municipal population that is illiterate. The negative relationship between PT share and the 
proportion of illiterates within the population is most likely an artifact of the PT’s longstanding 
strength in areas with low levels of dire poverty, if it indicates a meaningful relationship.   
  In the fullest versions of the model, the Bolsa measure was the second most important 
predictor of the PT’s performance, after the party’s performance in the previous election. 
Comparing the results of the models suggests that in 2010, the Bolsa program mattered more 
than it had in 2006. More importantly, changes in the Bolsa per capita payment accounted for a 
sizeable proportion of the variance in PT performance. If the test procedures have produced 
reliable estimates, it is safe to assert that the Bolsa program increased support for the PT in the 
2010 congressional elections.    
Discussion 
In 2006, the year in which experts attributed the greatest weight to the Bolsa program as 
an electoral tool, its municipal-level effects were limited to the presidential race. There, as 
previous authors have shown, it played an important role in bringing poorer voters into the Lula 
fold. The story in congressional races appears to be more complicated. From the beginning, the 
tenuous link between support for a presidential candidate and support for his or her party hinted 
that it would be difficult to establish a link between determinants of presidential and party 
performance.  
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Because of the emphasis placed on Bolsa by studies of the 2006 results, I expected it to 
fare well as a predictor of PT behavior, especially after the Mensalão scandal did so much harm 
to the PT’s reputation. It seemed likely that the Bolsa would matter less in the 2010 election 
because, at least at the presidential level, no one seemed to oppose it. PT presidential candidate 
Dilma Roussef’s leading opponent, José Serra, had promised to expand the program. That 
unified opinion in favor of the Bolsa led to the hypothesis that voters would be less likely to 
associate the program with a particular party. The apparent increasing strength of the Bolsa at the 
congressional level suggests that, as Bolsa program benefits increase in value and the program 
eligibility line increases, it is having a larger, partisan effect on voting behavior.  
The larger value of benefits and increasing number of beneficiaries is far and away the 
most important reason for the increasing salience of the Bolsa in elections.  
 
Figure 5.3 Histograms of Bolsa municipal budget per capita, 2006-2010 
 
Comparing histograms of the per capita Bolsa budget at the municipal level shows a dramatic 
expansion in the value of benefits paid and the range of program spending. The change reflects a 
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higher threshold income for Bolsa eligibility, nominal increases in the value of benefits paid, 
and, most importantly, the municipal-level divergences in program budget that result from a 
budgetary expansion along the program’s objective criteria. These criteria mean that as the 
program expands, its budget profile differs more between municipalities; as the possible values 
of payments increases, the possible variance in payments across cities increases. As cities 
diverge from one another, measuring the relationship between the program and electoral returns 
becomes easier.  
It may simply be this fact that accounted for the stronger results in the 2010 models. That 
is, the fact that per capita Bolsa payment varied more could explain why the program mattered 
more in 2010. Because, however, there is a straightforward causal story that explains why 
changes in the program profile affect voting, that story should be given full consideration.  
If the Bolsa is coming to play a larger role in congressional elections, the lesson for 
understanding social policy’s role in elections is that the number of people involved and the size 
of the benefit matter a great deal. Larger programs that provide more money per beneficiary (and 
provide benefits to more people) are more likely to affect voting patterns.     
An Alternative Measure of Bolsa scope 
The models presented so far use the per-capita Bolsa program budget to measure the 
program’s impact on communities. This variable was chosen because it incorporates information 
about the program’s secondary economic impacts. The causal story underlying that choice is that 
Bolsa payments, and the economic growth that resulted from the addition of Bolsa money to 
local economies, both matter a great deal. The results are consistent with this—the Bolsa’s larger 
payments in 2010 would have been more compelling to individual voters and generated larger 
economic growth. It also suggests that the individual vote calculus of Bolsa beneficiaries might 
be the primary driver of Bolsa-related voting.  
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One way to test this is by incorporating the average benefit paid to recipient families. For 
understanding broad impacts of the Bolsa program, this variable is problematic, because unlike 
PBF Per Capita Benefit, it changes only when the per-family benefit is changed, and thus does 
not provide information about changes in the number of beneficiaries. The generality of PBF Per 
Capita Benefit is its most important attribute. Still, the previous results lead to the question of 
whether the program’s changing impact on individual households can account for the between-
year change.  
In 2010, the Bolsa program paid, on average, R$93.62 to each beneficiary family, nearly 
double the R$58.17 per-family average in 2006. The size of this change is a compelling reason to 
attempt to look at the average payment on its own. If average payment is a better measure of the 
individual voter-level effects of the Bolsa program (which it would be if individual effects are 
more important than the combination of individual and secondary effects), we would expect its 
relationship to PT vote share to be stronger than the relationship between PBF Payment Per 
Capita and the PT’s electoral performance. The new causal story suggested by the previous 
result would also suggest that the difference between the Bolsa’s effects in 2010 and 2006 will 
be greater when Bolsa is measured by average payment.
38
  
Figure 4.4 PT Vote Share in 2006, with average benefit 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intercept -10.54 -14.12 4.607 2.689 3.197 -0.956 1.082 -1.774 
 
2.034 2.188 1.598 1.726 1.796 2.369 1.861 2.471 
Average benefit 0.252 0.227 0.016 0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.015 0.003 
 
0.027 0.027 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 
Lula vote share 0.067 
 
0.034 0.045 0.047 0.037 0.047 
  
0.015 
 
0.012 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 
PT vote share 2002 
 
0.693 0.690 0.683 0.682 0.691 0.684 
                                               
38 Recall that in 2006, the MDS only provided numbers of households receiving benefits for about half of Brazilian 
cities. (Those cities were receiving benefits, as the program budget data from 2006 shows, but they were not 
reporting the number of households to which the benefits had been given.) This means that N in the 2006 model is 
about half of the N for 2010.  
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0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 
Mensalão 
      
0.703 0.369 
       
0.306 0.319 
Median income 0.021 0.026 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Percent rural 0.022 0.027 0.014 0.017 0.007 0.019 0.022 0.022 
 
0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.009 
Percent illiterate 
   
0.065 -0.060 
 
-0.053 
     
0.030 0.030 
 
0.031 
Percent with inadequate housing 
 
0.037 0.036 
 
0.033 
     
0.013 0.013 
 
0.014 
Percent receiving BPC 
   
0.805 
 
0.766 
      
0.300 
 
0.302 
Percent aged 15-24 
    
0.164 
 
0.162 
      
0.093 
 
0.093 
Number of cities 2,639 2,638 2,638 2,637 2,631 2,629 2,636 2,628 
   0.053 0.059 0.444 0.445 0.448 0.450 0.446 0.450 
Italicized estimated coefficients significant at 5% 
Standard errors appear below estimated coefficients 
 
In the first models, average benefit has a strong, positive impact on the PT’s electoral 
performance. That relationship weakens with the introduction of controls for the PT’s past 
performance. Although average payment is positively related to PT vote share in all but one of 
the models, it has a trivial effect and fails to achieve significance once past PT performance is 
included. Insofar as the results are consistently non-negative, this model hews more closely than 
previous models to the expected relationship between the Bolsa program and PT voting. The 
small effect (and non-significance) of the average payment variable suggests that the program’s 
impact may be negligible or that average Bolsa benefit at the municipal-level does not 
adequately capture the Bolsa program’s effects.      
Results from 2010 support the new causal story that emphasizes how increasing benefit 
payments have magnified the program’s impact.  
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Figure 4.5 PT Vote Share 2010, with average benefit 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept -2.952 -8.756 2.121 -6.397 1.157 
 
2.336 2.047 1.865 2.445 2.594 
Average Bolsa Benefit 0.123 0.133 0.023 0.142 0.031 
 
0.020 0.017 0.016 0.021 0.017 
Dilma vote share 0.032 
 
 
0.044 
 
 
0.012 
 
 
0.012 
PT vote share 2006 
 
0.723 
 
0.711 
 
  0.013  
0.013 
Mensalao 
  
 
1.632 0.779 
   
 
0.349 0.292 
Median per capita income 0.014 0.019 0.002 0.015 -0.001 
 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Percent rural 0.059 0.023 0.040 0.069 0.062 
 
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 
Percent illiterate 
 
 
 
-0.081 
 
  
 
 
0.027 
Percent with inadequate housing 
 
-0.047 
 
  
 
 
0.012 
Percent receiving BPC 
 
 
0.253 
 
  
 
 
0.226 
Percent aged 15-24 
 
 
 
-0.015 
     
0.089 
Number of cities 5,149 5,148 5,145 5,148 5,134 
 
0.018 0.02 0.376 0.022 0.381 
Italicized estimated coefficients are significant at 5% 
 Standard errors appear below estimates 
   
As in the models that relied on the PBF Per Capita measure, Average Bolsa Benefit is a 
consistently better predictor of the PT’s vote share in 2010 than it had been in 2006. This result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the Bolsa’s electoral effects act primarily on beneficiaries. 
It is also consistent with the hypothesis that larger benefits have a greater impact on voter 
preferences. One important caveat in controlling for PT share in 2006 is the fact that if the Bolsa 
did matter in that year’s elections, including the PT’s vote share in 2006 causes the model to 
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attribute some Bolsa-inspired PT support to the effects of incumbency. If this model has captured 
the impact of the Bolsa well, it suggests that in a municipality with the median average Bolsa 
payment, the Bolsa program was responsible for a three percentage point increase in the PT’s 
vote share. In a year where the party’s median municipal vote share was 11.6 percent, this model 
predicts that the Bolsa accounted for about one-fifth of the PT’s total.     
Within-Region Models 
One of the ideas developed in this paper is that voters in different regions evaluated the 
PT in different ways. Northeastern voters, who tend to be poorer, choose to vote for the PT 
because of the Bolsa program. When they vote for the PT post-Bolsa, they are likely doing so for 
the first time. Whether they do so because of the benefits themselves, or the secondary 
consequences of Bolsa money (these motivations cover both those voters whose utility calculus 
is pocketbook-based or drawn from perceptions of national economic performance), measures of 
the Bolsa’s importance might explain more of the variation in PT vote share in the Northeast 
than elsewhere—assuming that the Bolsa scope variables used accurately measure the program’s 
impact.  
 Because traditional PT voters are concentrated in the South and Southeast (which means 
that most PT deputies come from Southern and Southeastern states), and because they tend to be 
especially concerned with ethics, the Mensalão variable should have a strong, negative 
relationship with PT vote share in the South and Southeast, but will explain less variation in 
other regions. The Mensalão variable is left out of the 2010 model because the variable is highly 
correlated with the PT’s good performance in a district and there is not a compelling reason to 
think that this blunt indicator accurately measures lasting impacts from the scandal. Where the 
variable has a positive relationship with PT performance, it is likely the result of having captured 
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the effects of the long-term PT support within a municipality that would make the presence of an 
implicated legislator more likely.   
The model below presents the results of the Average Bolsa Benefit model with controls 
applied separately to the three regions of greatest interest. To give a sense of whether the 
increased average Bolsa benefit continued to account for the program’s increased importance 
within regions, the 2006 and 2010 estimates appear side-by-side.  
Figure 4.6 PT Vote Share in 2006 and 2010, by region 
 Northeast Southeast South 
 
2006 2010 2006 2010 2006 2010 
Intercept -2.435 32.236 -7.017 4.630 -5.686 18.520 
 
10.963 9.502 4.563 3.736 3.894 4.995 
Average Bolsa Benefit 0.119 -0.138 -0.018 -0.062 0.002 0.026 
 
0.106 0.076 0.034 0.024 0.033 0.027 
Lula or Dilma vote share -0.040 -0.008 0.123 0.117 0.148 0.114 
 
0.029 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.029 0.028 
PT vote share previous election 0.589 0.685 0.570 0.609 0.683 0.829 
 
0.055 0.029 0.029 0.022 0.025 0.027 
Mensalão 4.606  3.684  -0.354  
 0.913  1.748  0.656  
Median per capita income -0.015 0.004 -0.0002 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 
0.014 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Percent rural -0.015 0.087 0.021 0.060 0.032 -0.048 
 
0.025 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.0128 0.015 
Percent illiterate -0.007 -0.157 0.207 -0.269 -0.043 0.028 
 
0.068 0.057 0.085 0.065 0.094 0.095 
Percent with inadequate housing 0.033 -0.038 -0.062 -0.018 -0.007 0.021 
 
0.027 0.023 0.037 0.028 0.022 0.025 
Percent receiving BPC -1.770 0.871 0.749 0.705 1.470 -0.529 
 
0.884 0.374 0.545 0.455 0.612 0.721 
Percent aged 15-24 0.227 -0.512 0.068 0.126 0.090 -1.084 
 0.303 0.251 0.157 0.146 0.152 0.171 
Number of cities 565 1,650 878 1,530 802 1,077 
   0.282 0.302 0.391 0.362 0.645 0.545 
Italicized estimated coefficients are significant at 5% 
Standard errors appear below estimates 
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Consistent with the finding that the Bolsa mattered more in 2010 because it was larger, each 
Average Bolsa Benefit predicted coefficient was of greater magnitude that year. Interestingly, in 
the Northeast, larger payments in 2010 were associated with lower PT performance. This 
unexpected result might be a sign that voters in the poorest communities (since high average 
benefits are a sign of very high poverty, and Northeastern communities tend to be the poorest in 
the country) did not believe the PT was doing enough to end poverty. It might also be consistent 
with the PT not being the only party connected in voters’ minds to poverty eradication. Bolsa 
beneficiaries may have voted for other parties that claimed credit for the program, voted for 
incumbents generally (who tend not to be affiliated with the PT), or (less plausibly) not 
considered their Bolsa program status when voting.  
The Mensalão variable had a strong positive relationship with PT share in the Northeast; 
this is not a sign that poor voters approve of corruption. Instead, it is one more artifact of the fact 
that the presence of a Mensalão deputy can indicate past PT success in the state. Because there 
are so few PT deputies in the Northeast, it is not surprising that, in states that have them, the fact 
of there being a PT party structure overwhelms the negative consequences of the deputy’s 
conduct. Where Mensalão should matter is the party’s heart, the South and Southeast. While the 
variable there fails to achieve significance, the estimated value is negative and quite large, a sign 
that the scandal did dissuade some from supporting the PT. The large standard error is a 
consequence of noise—the variable is a state-level measure and does not control for the things 
that increase the likelihood of there being both a Mensalão deputy and large support for the PT. 
The Southern model’s high R-squared term is probably the result of past PT performance being a 
consistently stronger predictor of future performance in that region.  
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Change in PT vote share 
The previous models studied the PT’s share of the municipal vote in a given year. Part of 
the reason they produced results contrary to expectations was that they did not isolate the change 
in PT vote share, on the assumption that the Bolsa program’s effects were so large that they 
would be visible in the PT’s share across regions. Because the party’s performance has been 
consistently lower in some areas, one way to control for the PT’s history is to study the change in 
PT vote share between elections. The following table presents the full models for 2006 and 2010 
applied to the change in PT vote share from 2002 – 2006 and 2006 – 2010.  
Figure 4.7 Change in PT vote share relative to previous election 
 
2006 2010 
Intercept -1.256 3.190 
 
1.849 2.189 
Per Capita Bolsa budget -0.096 0.192 
 
0.077 0.073 
Dilma or Lula vote share 0.041 0.033 
 
0.010 0.012 
PT vote share previous election -0.304 -0.287 
 
0.012 0.013 
Mensalão 1.205 
 
 
0.236 
 
Median per capita income -0.006 0.000 
 
0.002 0.002 
Percent rural 0.039 0.057 
 
0.007 0.009 
Percent illiterate -0.004 -0.134 
 
0.025 0.030 
Percent with inadequate housing 0.012 -0.039 
 
0.010 0.012 
Percent receiving BPC 0.758 0.352 
 
0.185 0.224 
Percent aged 15-24 0.127 0.011 
 
0.073 0.086 
Number of cities 5,134 5,135 
   0.091 0.217 
Italicized estimated coefficients are significant at 5% 
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Standard errors appear below estimates 
 
As in the first models that studied the electoral effect of the per capita Bolsa budget, the program 
appears to have had a strong, positive impact on PT performance in 2010. Once again, the results 
for 2006 are inconclusive. This result is an encouraging sign that the revised hypothesis (which 
put the increasing value of Bolsa benefits at the center of the program’s political consequences) 
is at least partially correct. There is, however, one important problem with this model. In 2006, 
the median municipal change in PT vote share relative to the previous election was -0.55; in 
2010, the median municipal change was 1.60. Like previous models, this model only explains a 
small portion of the variance in PT Change. Given that the overall movement of this variable 
was in the direction of the predicted relationship between the Bolsa program and vote share, it is 
not possible to say definitively that the program was responsible for the changes measured.    
A region-by-region analysis of the PT Change variable using the average Bolsa benefit 
produces results almost identical to those found when average Bolsa benefit is included as an 
explanation of the PT’s vote share (see Table 4.6, p. 135). For that reason, the chart is not 
reproduced here.  
Alternatives and Further Research   
Most of the models presented here have only limited explanatory power. Low    values 
and the non-normality of many tested variables suggest that OLS regression may not be the best 
approach to the data. In addition, the causal story tested is about individual behavior; municipal-
level voting returns and city social security budgets may not be reliable ways of studying 
individual voting decisions. Especially because there are two different social class effects at 
work on PT support—voters’ Bolsa status and their attachment to organized labor or the 
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intelligentsia—municipal measures are a poor way of getting at how each of these has affected 
support for the PT over time.  
This paper does not test the effects of the Bolsa program on incumbent legislators. There 
are strong reasons to believe that incumbency played an important role in both elections, and 
incumbents, rather than PT legislators, may have benefited most from the Bolsa program. A 
model that tracked legislators’ likelihood of winning reelection would be one way to test this 
possibility.  
Given that the PT’s vote share tends to be a small percentage of the total, it would be 
especially interesting to study which parties did well pre- and post-Bolsa. The finding that the 
Bolsa helps the PT more as it gives more money, but may not help the party in the Northeast, 
raises a new set of questions. Might Bolsa beneficiaries prefer other left-wing parties? Do they 
vote for governing coalition parties that participated in the Bolsa expansion? Do they vote for 
incumbents? Or do they vote for some other group? None of the analyses here study the vote 
share of parties other than the PT. Understanding the relationships between the program and 
other parties (and the reasons for those relationships) could give an indication of how voters 
assign partisan responsibility for social policy in fragmented party systems.     
Conclusion 
The statistical models presented in this chapter give unexpected results. The most 
important of these is the finding that as the Bolsa increases its benefit payment and expands the 
beneficiary pool it has a greater positive impact on PT support. Also important is the finding that 
the Bolsa may have different impacts in different regions. A reading of this regional divide that 
focuses on the strongly negative relationship between the average Bolsa’s benefit and PT support 
in the Northeast in 2010 might say that the theory underlying this paper is wrong. Such a result 
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is, after all, inconsistent with the idea that the Bolsa induced people to vote for the PT. Given 
what we know about the PT, the tenuous relationship between voters and other parties, the 
regional differences in political behavior and party strength, the changing impact of the Bolsa 
program, and the strong empirical support elsewhere for money as a factor that influences voting 
behavior, the hypothesis that the Bolsa matters in Brazilian congressional elections should not be 
discarded simply because the municipal-level results fail to support it in one case. Instead, the 
hypothesis should be adjusted. The Bolsa matters in congressional elections, and usually, but not 
always, leads voters to choose the PT. The program’s effects will be greater as benefits increase.  
The next step will be to understand the situations in which large Bolsa benefits lead to 
support for parties other than the PT. Models that explore other parties’ performance and account 
for incumbency will help solve the question of which parties Bolsa beneficiaries choose if they 
do not choose the PT. Such a model will account for the fact that the contours of party 
competition are very different in different regions. Testing incumbency more generally will help 
to show how much the Bolsa has helped (or hindered) PT candidates attempting to win seats in 
states traditionally less friendly towards the PT. Understanding how the program affects parties 
in different regions requires understanding how voters translate knowledge about social spending 
into partisan preferences. Such a project is not possible with municipal-level inquiry. Ultimately, 
survey data will be most able to show whether receiving a Bolsa benefit alters individual voting 
behavior in meaningful, specific ways.  
Overall, the models presented in this chapter show that larger Bolsa benefits are 
associated with better PT performance in congressional races, a result consistent with the 
hypothesis that the Bolsa has a measureable, positive impact on beneficiaries’ desire to vote for 
the PT.   
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Conclusion 
The Brazilian Experience 
The Bolsa program has shown that good policy can also be good politics. As conditional 
cash-transfer programs spread around the world, encouraged by the World Bank and other 
careful students of development, versions of the Bolsa are being tried across Latin America, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, and in New York City (Alatas et al 2010).   
Many of the countries interested in implementing CCT programs are young democracies. 
In such countries, it is easier for political parties to exploit the resources of the state to build 
patronage networks and dominate the political scene (Sartori 1976; Templeman 2010). An 
unscrupulous party might try to build a national political machine around a large CCT program. 
One of the most important lessons of the Bolsa is that a well-run CCT program adhering 
to objective targeting principles and acting independently of political interference can generate 
large electoral gains while significantly reducing poverty. When good policy brings electoral 
rewards, there are fewer incentives for politicians to pursue clientelistic strategies. For political 
actors who attach some value to institution-building and adherence to legal norms, the rational 
CCT is a way to solve pressing social problems and win reelection.   
The New Brazilian Politics 
Bolsa’s impact on Brazilian political discourse has been dramatic, and seems likely to last 
a long time. In February 2010, José Serra of the PSDB, and the leading opposition party 
candidate for the presidency, told an interviewer that as president, he would “maintain or 
expand” the Bolsa Família program. With this gesture, he effectively ended partisan debate over 
whether the Bolsa program as administered under Lula was the right response to poverty in 
Brazil. Although the PSDB had been responsible for the federalization of the earliest Brazilian 
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CCTs, it had long criticized the Lula administration’s willingness to conceptualize Bolsa benefits 
as a right, rather than as a privilege for good behavior. As the 2010 race drew to a close, the 
major political parties seemed to agree that Bolsa Família was a program to be proud of.  
The idea that Bolsa program benefits are a right appears in a 2010 public service 
announcement. In the commercial, a young rapper of African descent with a strong Rio de 
Janeiro accent
39
 talks about how the Bolsa program improves lives and provides dignity.  
Bill: Those of you who are mothers, fighters, you know how the Bolsa Família has 
improved the lives of many people. Kids in school, health in your day, and 
income, this is your right and [the right] of every family. Pay attention to 
avoid losing the benefit, and look on your [benefit] receipt to see if you 
need to update your registration. If it’s time, find out who’s responsible in 
your city. 
Bill and Chorus (rapping): It’s equality, and respect. Inclusion of your family is 
your right. That’s the Bolsa Família. That’s the Bolsa Família, yes it is.  
Announcer: The federal government. 
(The words “Ministry for Social Development and the Fight Against Hunger” 
appear onscreen next to the then-current logo of the federal government, 
which reads, “Brazil: One Country For All.”) 
The non-partisan (but incumbent-positive) message is typical of a new wave of political speech 
that appeals to the poorest voters in overtly class-conscious ways. Although in this ad, the 
message is functional and not obviously partisan, its effect is to remind voters that the federal 
government has helped put “kids in school.”  
With most of Bolsa’s critics defanged by 2010, parties that had long avoided appeals to 
the poor began reaching out to marginalized groups. The DEM party,
40
 long of the center-right, 
has followed a series of leadership shake-ups with an audacious attempt at renewal through 
appeals to poor voters (though the appeals are also directed towards somewhat wealthier 
conservatives who sympathize with the poor). In a series of ads, DEM party leaders attest to their 
                                               
39 An accent referred to as carioca 
40 Democratas, “Democrats,” formerly the PFL 
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commitment to a “more just, less unequal Brazil.” One of the ads features a young black man 
named Bruno Alves, who explains why he votes for the Democrats as he walks through a slum in 
the city of Salvador.  
Bruno: Just because I’m young and live in the periphery,41 some politicians think 
that I have to be of the Left. But the Left doesn’t own the youth, nor is it 
the owner of those who live in the periphery. I’m free to think differently. 
I’m in favor of quotas for the poor, independent of race. I’m in favor of the 
Bolsa Família, but people can’t depend on it forever. I want more 
opportunities, security, and peace. 
(These last three words appear over an image of Bruno playing guitar) 
Bruno: My party? Democrats: the party of free society and Brazilian democracy.  
The advertisement acknowledges that the Bolsa works even as it critiques the program with the 
frequently deployed charge that it promotes idleness. That the largest right-wing party in Brazil 
would produce such an ad testifies to the degree with which the program has installed itself in 
national politics and in the national consciousness. As has happened with large social programs 
in many countries, the Bolsa seems well on its way to becoming an untouchable entitlement. In a 
country where just over 20 percent of people live in poverty, the kind of benefit Bolsa provides 
makes a dramatic difference in the quality of life for millions of people. It is not an expensive 
program when compared to what Brazil spends on other kinds of social security, and may be one 
of the most carefully administered sections of the country’s bureaucracy. The Right’s apparent 
cession of the issue may increase the program’s bureaucratic independence even more, 
something that should lessen fears that the program will be co-opted in the future.   
President Dilma Rousseff, elected by a wide margin on the strength of Lula’s 
endorsement, is pursuing policies that will keep poverty near the top of the national agenda. Her 
“Brazil Without Misery” initiative intends to expand the Bolsa program, housing aid, and other 
                                               
41 Periferia, “periphery,” refers to any neighborhood that is poor or not centrally located. “Center,” when used in 
this context, refers to posh districts; wealthy Brazilians live downtown.  
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food programs in order to end extreme poverty in Brazil. These initiatives are meant to reach 
people whom the Bolsa (as it currently functions) fails to reach. The 2010 census indicated that 
even in that year, 16.2 million people, or 8.7 percent of the population, lived below the extreme 
poverty line of R$70 per month (BBC 2011). This effort reflects her desire to bring Brazil into 
modernity—by getting rid of the poverty that keeps it from being considered a developed 
country. The federal government’s newest official logo, which appears on websites, television, 
and on public documents, reflects the national aspirations tied to the goal of eradicating poverty.  
Figure 6.1 Dilma-era logo of the Brazilian federal government 
 
The slogan at bottom translates as “A rich country is a country without poverty.” 
When Lula took office in 2002, he promised to make social policy a priority. When the 
Mensalão threatened to destroy his career, he reached out to the regions that had benefited most 
from the Bolsa program (Weber and Leali, Interview Aug 2011). In an interview with Jornal da 
Record, Brazil’s second most-watched nightly news program, he tearfully described his greatest 
moment in office being when a group of homeless people told him, “We don’t want to demand 
anything. We just want to say this: our greatest accomplishment is the fact that we are in the 
Palácio [the presidential palace].”  
Bolsa Família and the aspirations it represents were the center of Lula’s vision for Brazil 
Over the years of his leadership in the PT, that became the party’s vision. Now, poor voters are 
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rewarding the PT for reaching them. If any party in Brazil can call itself the party of the poor 
today, it is the PT. That is something new for the Workers’ Party, a product of Lula’s sincere 
striving as well as the tempering effects of governance. No longer a party of revolution, the PT 
has become a party of incremental solutions. 
Just as the PT took existing social policy and expanded it until it was something else, the 
Bolsa has shaped the PT, moving it into municipal peripheries, bringing it northward, and 
reinforcing its commitment to fighting poverty. Large-scale policy decisions, well-executed, can 
have a lasting, positive effect on a party’s electoral fortunes. They can also transform parties. 
The story of the next decade of Brazilian party politics will be that of how the PT’s rivals learned 
to compete in the issue landscape it created with Bolsa Família. Excepting the scandal, political 
entrepreneurs in other developing countries would do well to follow the Bolsa model to the 
letter.  
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